Category Archives: 2014

History of the CPC and its leaders — and President Xi’s ambitious new long march for China

Ahead of the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party on July 1, 1921, a look at the extraordinary journey of China’s ‘Red Dynasty’ and its new ‘Yellow Emperors’ from Mao to Xi

Updated: June 30, 2021 9:54:37 am in Indian Express

A screen shows Chinese President Xi Jinping during a show commemorating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China at the National Stadium in Beijing, China June 28, 2021. (Reuters)

As per traditional Chinese belief, it is the ‘mandate of heaven’ (tianming) that gives an individual the right to rule. While a capable ruler would be allowed to govern with a renewed mandate, it could be revoked in the case of a despot. Interestingly, a dynastic bloodline was never the criterion to determine the line of succession.

Since the time the seeds of Chinese civilisation sprouted on the flood plains of the Yellow River (Huang He) almost five millenniums ago, hundreds of rulers have taken the legendary title of the ‘Yellow Emperor’ (Huang Di). The first ruler to claim the ‘mandate of heaven’ was King Wen of Zhou State (1050 BCE), and it was Shi Huangdi of the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BCE) who unified China for the first time.

The new ‘Yellow Emperors’ of China

In the history of contemporary China, few have wielded more power than Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping; the modern ‘Yellow Emperors’ of the ‘Red Dynasty’, the Communist Party of China (CPC). Of the 13 dynasties that ruled China, only eight lasted in power for longer than 100 years. The CPC is, therefore, justified in celebrating its centenary with a grand ceremony.

The CPC was founded on July 1, 1921 in Shanghai by the intellectuals, Chen Duxiu, who was popularly referred to as “China’s Lenin”, and Li Dachao. The Party traces its origins to the May Fourth Movement; an anti-feudal political movement that grew out of student protests.

The Red Army came into being on August 1, 1927, in the wake of the Nanchang Autumn Harvest Uprising, when workers and peasants led by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai revolted against the nationalist forces (Kuomintang- KMT). Mao was appointed commander-in-chief of the Red Army.

In December 1929, during the Ninth Meeting of the 4th Red Army at Gutian, Mao clarified that the role of the military was “to chiefly serve the political ends”. Thus, absolute control of the Party over the Army became entrenched.

Mao became Chairman of the CPC in 1945. After defeating the KMT in the Civil War (1945-49), he proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Mao emerged as China’s paramount leader, and his ideology, ‘Mao Zedong Thought’, was encapsulated in the famous Red Book and enshrined in the Party’s constitution. Mao believed in class struggle, and was convinced that China had to be transformed by mobilising the masses.

Mao collectivised agricultural production by creating communes. The ideological assumption that China could emerge as an industrial nation based on the sheer grit of its people made him undertake the Great Leap Forward (1958-61), which had a disastrous outcome, with over 30 million people perishing in a horrific famine.

In 1962, Mao launched the Social Education Movement to infuse a new revolutionary spirit into the Party and government machinery. The Cultural Revolution followed in 1966 to stamp out corruption, elitism, and bureaucratisation. It was marked by extensive repression and intense violence, and the ‘revolution’ ended with Mao’s death on September 9, 1976.

Mao was the most influential and controversial figure who left behind a mixed legacy. Lauded for restoring national sovereignty after the successful Communist Revolution, he initiated major industrial reforms, and improved the status of women. Yet, Mao’s era was characterised by staunch ideological dogma that brought intense misery to the Chinese people.

Post Mao’s death, Deng assumed the reins as the ‘Second Generation’ leader in 1978 after a brief power struggle. He initiated the process of “reforms and opening up” (gaige gaifang), a clear departure from Mao’s ideology. The crux of Deng’s reforms was the ‘Four Modernizations’ programme, encompassing agriculture, industry, science and technology and defence. Deng adopted an ‘open door policy’ coupled with capitalist reforms, which attracted huge foreign investments in the manufacturing sector, transforming China into the factory of the world, and leading to years of very high rates of economic growth.

While Deng emerged as the architect of modern China, he came under intense criticism for the military crackdown on the Tiananmen protests in 1989. He played a key role in the return of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese control. The ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’ of “socialist market economy” was enshrined in the CPC’s constitution. Deng fixed the tenure of the Presidency to two terms to ensure a smooth transition from one generation to the other. He died on February 19, 1997, marking the end of the ‘Second Generation’ leadership.

After Deng’s demise, Jiang Zemin assumed the mantle of ‘Third Generation’ leadership, continuing largely with the policies enunciated by Deng. He adopted a “collective leadership” approach and was the architect of the ‘three represent’ (san ge daibiao) thought. It defined the role of CPC: to represent China’s advanced productive forces, orientation of the nation’s culture, and the fundamental interest of the majority of Chinese people. These were incorporated in the Chinese constitution in 2002.

During Jiang’s period, China experienced significant economic growth due to the continuation of economic reforms. Jiang passed the baton to Hu Jintao in 2002. At the age of 94, Jiang Zemin is the oldest living Paramount Communist leader.

Hu, who represented the ‘Fourth Generation’ of the CPC leadership, continued to follow the policies of his predecessor. He professed two main ideological concepts: “Scientific Outlook on Development and Harmonious Social Society”.

On completion of two terms, Hu Jintao handed over the reins to his successor Xi Jinping in 2012. Xi, a dark horse, was the consensus candidate over Li Keqiang, the incumbent Premier, to take on the mantle of the ‘Fifth Generation’ leadership.

Xi bears the tags of ‘Princeling’ and ‘Second Generation Red’, being the son of Xi Zhongxun, a revolutionary. Having joined the Communist Party in 1974 at the age of 21, he progressively moved up the Party hierarchy and burst on the political scene as the graft-fighting Governor of Fujian in 1999.

Given his mild demeanour, it was assumed that Xi would abide by the constitutional rule. However, he played his hand differently, emerging as the most powerful leader after Mao.

Xi set about systematically consolidating his position by strengthening his hold over the twin levers, CPC and PLA. Alongside, he launched an unbridled campaign to clean up the system, resulting in the punishment of more than a million office bearers, including ministers, senior government officials, and military personnel. The anti-corruption drive also proved handy to purge Xi’s political rivals like Bo Xilai.

Since 2013, Xi has initiated pathbreaking military reforms to make the PLA a modern fighting force at par with the Western militaries in the next two decades. The rationale behind the deep-rooted reforms was two-fold: prepare the military for China’s expanding global role, and establish the Party’s firm control over the military in consonance with Mao’s dictum, “Party controls the Gun”.

By reorganizing the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi appointed himself Commander-in-Chief. At the 19th Party Congress held in 2017, he further strengthened his iron grip over the Party, and a year later went on to discard the two-term Presidency limit, to be life-long incumbent.

“Xi Jinping Thoughts for New Era Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” were enshrined in Communist Party constitution. Xi firmly believes that a return to original Maoism is the only way to save China’s future.

Also in Explained |Explained: Are Chinese Covid-19 shots effective against the Delta variant?

Xi’s new long march into power and prosperity

Xi has unveiled his ‘China Dream’ (Zhong Meng), which envisions a “powerful and prosperous” China that is a “great modern socialist country” by the middle of this century. He has referred to China entering a “New Era”, in which Beijing plays a greater role in world affairs, abandoning Deng’s policy of “hide and bide”.

To realise the China Dream, Xi has chosen the geo-economic route. His Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) envisages an investment of $1 trillion, and seeks to enlarge China’s influence across the globe through mega projects, employing chequebook diplomacy. Xi’s model is characterized by an “authoritarian political structure” and “state driven capitalism”.

While the world was fighting the coronavirus pandemic which ironically originated from Wuhan, China, Xi, by employing the strategy of Wei Ji (Crisis and Opportunity), managed to control the spread of the virus and claim victory. In line with his strongman image, Xi has made quick territorial gains in disputed areas including in the South and East China Seas, and the Eastern Ladakh region of India. Internally, Xi has tightened the noose around Hong Kong and Xinjiang, where the Uyghurs are facing intense repression.

During the ‘Two Sessions’ (Lianghui) held in March this year, the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC) approved the 14th Five Year Plan (2021-25), and laid out Xi’s Vision 2035. The major themes include prioritizing the quality of growth, achieving “common prosperity”, elevating China’s leadership role in global governance, and managing the great power rivalry with the United States.

A major overhaul is envisaged in the Chinese economy as it adopts the “dual circulation” system of boosting domestic consumption and creating new demand, and reduces the dependence on shrinking export markets.

Today, China is the world’s second largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion, has the largest foreign exchange reserves, is the largest trading nation in terms of goods, and has the second largest military — all remarkable achievements for the CPC. Never in its history has China witnessed such prosperity. Even in the wake of the Covid pandemic, the Chinese economy has registered a growth of 18.3 per cent in the first quarter of 2021.

Xi Jinping’s scorecard over the last nine years makes a strong case for seeking a renewed mandate — a ‘Third Term’ — at the 20th Party Congress next year. However, Xi rides the dragon that is externally formidable but internally fragile. He is aware that in case his policies go awry, it could mean an existential crisis both for himself and the CPC.

Xi has gambled on the risky venture of elevating himself to the league of Mao and Deng, although as Princeling he does not belong to the tribe. If he does succeed in leading China into the ‘New Era’, then as per the Chinese 11th century classic ‘The General Mirror for Aid of Government’ (Cu Chi Tang Qian), Xi would qualify to be called an ‘Emperor’.

Expert Explained MAJOR-GENERAL (RETD) G G DWIVEDI

Explained: Why Kailash Range Matters

The Kailash Range was the theatre of conflict during the 1962 Chinese offensive, with key battles at Rezang La and Gurung Hill. In 2020, Indian troops secured Kailash Ridge in an operation that took the Chinese by surprise. A look at the strategic importance of the mountain range, and the lessons learnt.

It was in early October 1962 that Chairman Mao Zedong decided to launch a large-scale invasion to severely punish India. While the main offensive was to be in the Eastern Sector, coordinated operations in the Western Sector were to be undertaken to capture areas up to the 1960 Claim Line in eastern Ladakh, which entailed elimination of

43 Indian posts. Gaining control over entire Aksai Chin was essential to guarantee security of the Western

Highway, linking Kashgarh in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) offensive began on October 20, 1962, simultaneously in the Eastern and

Western Sectors. The operations in Aksai Chin were executed in two phases. During Phase One (October 20-28,

1962) PLA went on to clear Indian posts at Daulat Beg Oldie, Galwan, astride both banks of Pangong Tso and Dungti-Demchok areas. Phase Two was launched after a tactical pause of three weeks on November 18, 1962 to capture the strategically important Kailash Range.

Reorganising India’s defences

The Karakoram Range ends on the northern side of the Pangong Tso. The Kailash Range originates from the southern bank and runs northwest to southeast for over 60 km. The Kailash Ridge is characterised by rugged, broken terrain with heights varying between 4,000-5,500m, and its key features include Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Spanggur Gap, Muggar Hill, Mukhpari, Rezang La and Rechin La. The Ridge dominates Chushul Bowl; an important communications centre.

The lull following Phase One was utilised by the Indian Army to reorganise its defences. The 3 Infantry Division was raised at Leh on October 26, 1962 under Major General Budh Singh. The HQ of 114 Infantry Brigade was moved to Chushul, the 70 Infantry Brigade took over the responsibility of Indus Valley Sub Sector, and the I63

Infantry Brigade was inducted for the Defence of Leh.

Deployment at Chushul

The 114 Infantry Brigade responsible for Chushul area was holding a frontage of around 40 km, and was deployed as under:-

 1/8 Gorkha Rifles covered the northern side of Spanggur Gap. Its two companies were deployed on the Gurung

Hill, another company was deployed to the North, and a fourth company was in the Spanggur Gap itself with

Battalion HQ along with an ad-hoc company at the Chushul airfield.

 13 Kumaon was on the southern side of the Spanggur Gap with two companies on the Muggar Hill, one company at Rezang La, and a fourth company along with Battalion HQ south of it.

 Brigade HQ along with 1 JAT and two troops AMX 13 tanks of 20 Lancers were located at Chushul. 13 Field

Regiment less a battery, equipped with 25 Pounder guns, was in support.

Chinese plan of attack

The plan duly approved by the Central Military Commission (CMC) envisaged capturing both Rezang La and Gurung Hill simultaneously. Troops comprising three battalions of the PLA’s 4 Infantry Division along with supporting units were concentrated in Retuzong area, about 40 km from the border. All these units had been in action during Phase One as well. As per instructions from the CMC, operations were to be confined to the positions on the ridge line only.

Battle of Rezang La

The C Company of 13 Kumaon, responsible for the defence of Rezang La, was deployed two platoons up (Strong Points 7&9 ) with a third platoon and Company HQ on Point 5150 (Strong Point 8) in the centre. Besides, there were supporting detachments of 3-inch mortars, heavy machine guns and rocket launchers.

The Chinese, having carried out detailed reconnaissance of Rezang La, planned to outflank the position at night and attack simultaneously from the northern and southern directions at first light. Accordingly, the attacking troops were divided into two task forces. One task force, composed of 3rd Battalion less company of 11th Regiment, was to attack Strong Point 9 from the south. The second task force, composed of two companies (one each from the 3rd Battalions of 10th & 11th Regiments), was to attack Strong Point 8 from the North. The 3rd Battalion less company ex-10th Regiment, and 3rd Cavalry less two companies, were to act as reserves.

The two task forces started from Retuzong at 8 pm November 17 and were in their respective firm bases by 6 am on November 18. Following brief artillery bombardment, the attack commenced from both directions at 9:15 am. A fierce battle ensued, with the defender beating back successive Chinese attacks. With communication snapped and the position encircled, leaving no possibility of the C Company being reinforced, it was “do and die” situation. Major Shaitan Singh, the Company Commander, even launched a local counterattack. Finally, by employing reserves, the Chinese did manage to break through and Rezang La fell by 10 pm November 18.

It was an epic battle, literally fought to the “last man, last round”. Of the total 141 personnel at Rezang La, 135 fought to the finish and 5 were taken prisoners, with one lone survivor. Major Shaitan Singh was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra. The Chinese suffered 21 killed and 98 wounded.

Battle for Gurung Hill

Gurung Hill was held by two companies of 1/8 GR (Strong Points 16, 5 & 6) located northeast at Spanggur Gap. Strong Point 16, the most dominating feature, was at a height of 5,100 m. It was held by a company minus a platoon. The defences were well coordinated and covered by a protective minefield. The position was supported by a troop of AMX 13 light tanks.

The task to capture Gurung Hill was assigned to Ali Detachment, the holding formation. A force of eight sections was mustered and duly reinforced by a platoon each of engineers and flame throwers, one heavy machine gun, one

57 mm recoilless gun and twelve 82mm mortars for fire support. One company of 3rd Cavalry was to act as reserve. The operation to capture Gurung Hill began at 9:22 am November 18, coordinated with the attack on Rezang La. It was preceded by brief artillery bombardment. In the face of stiff resistance from Gorkhas with tanks in a direct shooting role, the Chinese suffered heavy casualties and the attack was stalled. On regrouping and reinforcements joining in, the PLA resumed the offensive at 11 am. After repulsing repeated attacks with no reinforcements coming by, the position was captured by PLA towards last light on November 18. The intensity of fighting can be gauged from the casualties — 1/8 GR suffered 50 killed and several wounded while the Chinese sustained over 80 (killed and wounded). The PLA could not capture the remaining part of Gurung Hill i.e. Strong Points 5 & 6.

While only Rezang La and part of Gurung Hill had been captured, a decision was taken at the highest level to pull back from the Kailash Ridge and redeploy West of Chushul on the night of December 19. The Chinese did not follow the withdrawing troops or go for Chushul airfield. The PLA had only division-plus at their disposal for the

operations in Aksai Chin, and hence were severely constrained to undertake any further operations. On the other

hand, India’s 3 Infantry Division had the capability to launch a limited counteroffensive. After declaring ceasefire

on November 21, Chinese troops fell back to depth positions due to logistics constraints.

Explained |What is the new disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh?

August 2020: the present

The course of history was set to reverse 58 years later when. on August 30, 2020, the Special Frontier Force (SFF) troops secured Kailash Ridge as a pre-emptive operation, taking the PLA by surprise. This action proved a game- changer, neutralising gains made by the Chinese along the northern bank of Pangong Tso and rendering PLA positions east of Spanggur Gap-Maldo Garrison totally vulnerable. Why the PLA did not go for Kailash Ridge initially as part of its aggression in May 2020 could be because of two plausible reasons: first, paucity of infantry as 4 Infantry Division, now motorised, not suited to hold ground, and second, a presumption that Indian Army will not venture to undertake proactive counteractions.

In 1962, it was on the Kailash Ridge that Indian soldiers proved their mettle and made the PLA pay a heavy price, despite being poorly equipped and ill-prepared. Today, given a rich experience in high altitude-cum- glacial warfare, coupled with vastly improved equipment and infrastructure, the Indian Army is well positioned to hold the Kailash Range for good. The Chinese, on the other hand, are beginning to realise the harsh realities of winters at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Aware of the inability to regain Kailash Ridge with the current force level, and with the window for launching major operations already foreclosed due to the onset of winter the Chinese may use all ploys to negotiate the Indian Army’s pull-back from south of Pangong Tso. India should be wary of past mistakes and avoid falling into the Chinese trap. The PLA’s current aggression, wherein it flouted a series of agreements signed between the countries over last three decades to unilaterally alter the status quo along the LAC, is a case in point. The Kailash Ridge marks a tryst with history, a turning point, as it is the first piece of territory that has been recovered from Chinese illegal occupation, but definitely not the last one as India’s claim line is the Johnson Line of 1865. External Affairs S Jaishankar recently said that India was being tested in the seven-month-long standoff with China in eastern Ladakh. Therefore, it is time to convey a stern message to the Chinese leadership that India will not compromise on its sovereignty.

Analyzing The Pandemic of The Century

Nicholas Taleb described „Black Swan‟ as an improbable event and random occurrence with extreme impact. „Grey Rhino‟, on the other hand, as per Michele Wucker, is a highly probable event that may occur after a series of warnings and visible pieces of evidence with enormous impact. Originating from Wuhan, China, towards the end of

2019, coronavirus appeared as a „Black Swan‟ creating havoc across the globe. In India it mutated into „Grey Rhino‟, causing mayhem in the form of extreme disruption and destruction.

It was during March last year that Covid-19 virus cases began to surface in India. Initially, the daily infection rate was barely in hundreds in comparison to Western nations where the count was in five figures, despite the advanced health care system. Given modest medical infrastructure and India is being predicted to be a potential hot spot, the Central Government declared nationwide lockdown towards late March 2020

to obviate a catastrophe. PM Modi addressed the nation frequently to sensitise the citizens about the consequences of the deadly virus.

Starting with insufficient PPE kits, N-95 masks and testing facilities, the Indian medical fraternity led the charge against coronavirus, duly complemented by „Non-Profit Organisations‟ corporates and the public at large. Despite severe hardships, migrants‟ untold suffering and millions losing their livelihood, the nation reposed implicit faith in the PM-led campaign against the pandemic. By mid-February 2021, daily infections had dropped to around ten thousand after hitting the peak of nearly a lac. Corona appeared to be on the wane, given the assurances by the top leadership including the PM and Health Minister. The economy was showing signs of recovery and the business environment looked favourable, marked by a sense of optimism. Going by the indicators, apparently, the „Black Swan‟ phase of the pandemic had been well handled.

BLACK SWAN TO GREY RHINO: SLEEP WALK TO THE EDGE

Now there was a window of opportunity for the Central and State administrations to get the house in order and prepare earnestly for the pandemic‟s second surge, evident from the experience of US and Western nations. Even the forum of scientific experts had warned the officials against a more contagious variant of the Covid-19 virus taking hold of the country. Hence, making up shortages of critical medical equipment and ramping up supply chains ought to have been taken upon the highest priority. As mass immunisation offered the best option to defeat the second wave, India was in a far better position than even the advanced nations due to its vast potential to produce vaccine doses. However, due to the Government‟s reluctance to fund the capacity building of vaccine manufacturing firms, the advantage could not be leveraged.

Ironically, complacency got better of prudence, faith trumped science and fixation with the election calendar threw all the Corona protocols to the wind. Assumptions like our young demographics and BCG vaccination provided us with special immunity against virus proved to be wishful speculations. Delusion of triumph against pandemic obfuscated all signs of impending disaster. The Covid-19 second wave did not turn into Tsunami overnight. The crisis had begun to loom large on the horizon towards the end of March. It appears India almost sleepwalked into the „Grey Rhino‟ trap.

It was only around 10 April when the daily cases crossed 150,000 that the panic button was pressed. By the end of April, daily Corona infections had breached the four lac mark. The health infrastructure in many states has been overwhelmed. The role of government machinery leaves much to be desired. With the situation having spun out of control, the nation today finds itself on the edge, many left to their own fate. It›s mid- May, the total infection stands at twenty-five million with over a quarter-million deaths. The daily cases continue to hover around 3.5 lakh, with approximately 4,000 deaths.

INDIA FIGHTS BACK

While intense fire fighting actions are on, adhocism and past assumptions are inadequate to solve the existing cataclysm. The need of the hour is adaptive leadership

and strategic clarity. The toughest challenge facing the authorities is to reconcile to the fact that grievous lapses led to the current dire straits. Persistent efforts of the administration to play down the crisis and cacophony of blame game are most disheartening. Instead, what is needed is the correct diagnostic of the problems areas and formulation of actionable strategies by the experts to mitigate the crisis situations. To this end, the constitution of 12 members National Task Force (NTF) by the Supreme Court marks a step in the right direction. For effective results, the NTF should be empowered to take decisions and government officials must ensure a speedy implementation mechanism.

Currently, the most critical issues are the availability of oxygen, ICU beds and life- saving medical equipment. As for oxygen, the cruciality is not its shortage per se but the logistics constraints of the supply chains. Although the situation is now being addressed on a war footing by employing strategic air and naval assets and augmenting internal capacities, it‟s going to take some time before the situation eases out. Therefore, judicious utilisation and prioritising the distribution of resources can considerably alleviate the criticality. Installing in situ oxygen plants in major hospitals must be done on the highest priority. Setting up field hospitals facilities utilising the resources of the armed forces, central agencies like DRDO, ISRO, PSUs and industry has come as a great relief at a very crucial juncture.

During the calamities, the tendency of over-centralisation just cannot work, case in point initial blunder of virus testing restricted only to government labs. Delegation, deregulation and distribution of responsibility are the key essentials to handle unforeseen contingencies. In fact, the NGOs, local bodies, „resident welfare associations‟ (RWAs) are already making yeoman contribution by setting up Covid beds and supplying life-saving equipment. I can personally vouch for it being part of some of these initiatives. Incidentally, in China, the „Residential Committees‟ (Juzhu Weiyuan Hui) played a pivotal role in controlling the coronavirus. One of the serious shortcomings still is the lack of real-time information regarding the availability of beds and critical medicines. Here, well organised „Covid Care Centre‟ in each major city/town can prove to be of immense value and bolster much needed public confidence.

It is most unfortunate that bureaucratic procedural norms continue to hamper the import of critical medical equipment and speedy distribution of foreign assistance material to the states. „Crisis Management Teams‟ composed of logistics experts must be deployed at key nodal centres to handle this issue, as each minute the lives are being lost. During such abnormal times, the leaders in public life should be visible on the ground. Ironically, most appear to be missing in action. The political parties have substantial resources at their disposal. Instead of indulging in petty squabbles, it is a great opportunity for these organisations to contribute in the hour of crisis by throwing open their facilities for the good of the fellow countrymen.

There is a need for a clear overall strategy. The topmost priority ought to be in saving precious lives and bringing down the infections rate. Besides lockdowns, strict adherence to regulations pertaining to public behaviour, prioritising allocations of resources and capacity building merit immediate attention. The medical supply chains

need to be reconfigured and the expertise of multinationals like Amazon and Flipkart could be ideally exploited. Measures must be put in place in anticipation of the third wave in view of the new variant of virus and vulnerability of the under18 population. A long term strategy is needed to fix the public health system which is currently in shambles.

The vaccination programme has to move in tandem as it is the best defence against future waves. The strength of pharmaceutical companies should be leveraged to boost the production of vaccines, alongside seeking immediate IPR waiver. The current pace of daily vaccination which is barely 2 million needs to be accelerated significantly. Pricing must be standardised and Central Government should compensate the Pharma companies for subsidising the vaccines. For those „below the poverty line‟ vaccination must be free.

As a nation, we have tremendous resilience to bounce back during adverse situations but have a poor record in anticipating these. We tend to believe in fait accompli, ignoring the science, besides avoiding introspection of lapses, thus missing out on valuable lessons. Even our strategic community is more at ease with hindsight wisdom than prognostics. History tells us, „If you don‟t learn from history, you are bound to suffer it.‟

India will win the fight against the pandemic, primarily due fortitude and forbearance of ordinary citizens- the real Victors. Nonetheless, the leadership of the day owes to the countrymen a solemn commitment; “never again will India fall victim to „Black Swan‟ or

„Grey Rhino‟ phenomenon”.

The author is a war Veteran, former Assistant Chief Strategic; Currently Professor Geo Strategy

& Management Studies, Distinguished Fellow at United Institution of India.

Aksai Chin 2.0: Xi’s bid to replicate Mao merits review to obviate past miscalculations

Communist leaders are known to have a deep understanding of their nation’s history and tend to make comparisons between present and the past, driven by conviction: “further you look back, farther you look ahead”.

Published in Indian Express on Nov. 24, 2020

Major General Dr GG Dwivedi (Retd).

Chinese thinking since ancient times advocated the need of a conducive periphery, that is a ‘subdued neighbourhood’, to be an essential prerequisite for its prosperity. Communist leaders are known to have a deep understanding of their nation’s history and tend to make comparisons between present and the past, driven by conviction: “further you look back, farther you look ahead”. Therefore,
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s bid to replicate (Chairman) Mao Zedong’s Aksai Chin play book some six decades later merits a review to obviate past miscalculations in defeating Dragon’s misadventure.

Aksai Chin 1962-Mao’s Game Plan

Henry Kissinger’s book ‘On China’ begins with Mao briefing his top commanders on the eve of the 1962 war wherein he recalled that China and India had fought “one and half” wars earlier. The first one in 649 AD, when Sino-Tibetan combined force rallied against rebellious successor following King Harshavardhana’s death. This followed centuries of religious and economic exchanges till Timurlane ransacked Delhi in 1398, what Mao referred to as “Half War”. Lesson Mao sought to drive home was: “Two neighbours could enjoy long period of peace, but to do so China had to use force to knock India to the negotiating table”.

By the summer of 1961, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had advanced almost 112 km south-west of positions it held in 1958. In the end of 1961, the Chinese leadership realised that its policy to prevent India from establishing forward posts without bloodshed was not delivering. Consequently, on October 6, 1962, Mao decided on a large-scale invasion to severely punish India. A directive from Mao as the chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC) to General Lou Ruiquing, Chief of Staff PLA laid out broad strategy for the projected offensive. While the main assault was to be in the Eastern Sector to cause maximum destruction of Indian forces, coordinated operations were to be undertaken in the Western Sector to capture areas up to 1960 claim line which included complete Aksai Chin, to ensure security of the Western Highway, linking Kashgarh in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet.

General Zhang Guo Hua, a Korean War Veteran was made the overall operational commander. The timing of offensive was selected with due deliberation. At the 10th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of Communist Party of China (CPC) held in September 1962, Mao faced severe criticism due to the disastrous outcome of ‘great leap forward’. World attention at the time was focussed on ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’.
PLA offensive commenced on October 20, 1962, simultaneously on the Eastern and Western Fronts, taking the Indian leadership by complete surprise. The operations in Aksai Chin were executed in two phases. During phase one (October 20-28, 1962) PLA went on to clear Indian posts in DBO, Galwan, astride both banks of Pangong Tso and Dungti-Demchok areas. Phase two was launched after a tactical pause of three weeks on November 18, 1962, to secure Kailash Range including Gurung Hill and Razangla. PLA faced stiff resistance here and suffered over 200 casualties. Having secured areas up to the claim line, China declared ceasefire on November 21. PLA employed 4 Division and few local units for the operations under Xinjiang Military Region.

The Chinese victory helped Mao restore his position and dent India’s image in the global polity. He had expected the effect of India’s debacle to last for a decade; apparently it sustained far longer. Over the years, India’s approach to buy peace by adhering to ‘One China Policy’, high-level exchanges and signing series of agreements obviously did not work. On the other hand, Beijing was able to legitimise its claim over 38,000 km our territory illegally occupied and consolidate its position along the LAC by pursuing “nibble and negotiate” (Canshi he Tanpan) tactics, part of ‘bulletless war’ strategy. While border issue remained on the backburner, economic ties emerged as the key component of bilateral relations, tilted heavily in favour of People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Xi’s Grand Design 2020-India’s Response

Soon after assuming power in 2012, Xi initiated the process of path-breaking military reforms in consonance with China’s expanding role. This entailed a major shift in the military strategy incorporating combined “offshore waters defence with open sea protection” and “inter-theatre operations”. Post Doklam, China apparently reviewed its strategic objectives, evident from the massive upgrade of infrastructure in Tibet, with number of airbases, air defence positions and heliports near the LAC almost doubling over last three years.

As a sequel to reorganisation of military regions in to theatre commands, the ‘Western Theatre Command’ was assigned the operation responsibility of entire border against India. Its order of battle included the key Tibet and Xinjiang Military Regions, (both corps size formations), besides 76&76 Corps, six air divisions and missile base at Qinghai. Even Theatre Commander Gen Zhao Zongqi and Political Commissar Gen Wu were handpicked, former being Vietnam War Veteran and latter a rising star.

Given the timing, locations and force level of over three divisions, including 4 motorised and 6 mechanised divisions of South Xinjiang Military Region (SXMR), it is obvious that operation was planned at the CMC; President Xi being its chairman and commander-in-chief of PLA. The political intent was punitive to convey a strong message to Delhi to kowtow Beijing’s interests and desist from undertaking development of infrastructure in Ladakh, apprehending change in status quo. The military aim was to make swift territorial gains by occupying unheld contested areas astride the LAC and secure the 1960 Claim Line-de facto border for the final settlement. The status of new LAC was to be legitimised through prolonged negotiations, from position of strength. Coincidentally, DBO, Galwan and Pangong Tso are the same areas which the PLA had addressed during 1962 war.

The operations launched towards the beginning May 2020 went as planned, with PLA gaining ‘first mover’ advantage. Indian Army’s robust mirror deployment and Galwan incidence on 15 June 2020 which led to abrupt escalation had not been anticipated by the PLA. With Indian Army’s pre-emptive action on the 29-30 August 2020 of occupying strategically important Kailash Range took the Chinese leadership by complete surprise. With this move, Indian Army gained tremendous tactical advantage in the Pangong Tso sector. However, PLA had managed to gain a definite edge in DBO, Galwan and Hot Spring areas.

Obviate Past Miscalculations to Defeat Dragon’s Misadventure

Of the major reasons for India’s defeat in 1962 were twin presumptions; China’s inability to undertake offensive and Communist leadership commitment to honour the agreement. This misjudgement proved disastrous. After declaring unilaterally ceasefire, PLA pulled back to positions which could be administratively sustained. However, Chinese continued building military infrastructure to enable forward deployment of forces at a short notice.

Ironically, even six decades on, realistic assessment of rapid accretion in Chinese war waging potential and holistic strategy to meet the challenge still remains a work in progress. Even reactions to PLA’s periodic transgressions across the LAC since 2013 have been more by way of crisis management rather than calibrated responses. ‘Strategic Guidance’ format evolved mutually by PM Modi and President Xi, was taken as an ‘iron clad guarantee’ that Chinese military will cooperate in maintaining peace and tranquility on the LAC. Ironically, we misread China’s intent and capability yet again.

PRC’s assertive behaviour has a definite correlation with the internal situation as was in case of Mao in 1962. PLA’s current incursions coincided with Xi facing criticism for mishandling the Corona virus, besides slowing down of economy and world attention on battling COVID 19 pandemic. Two forth coming events; Communist Party’s Centenary in 2021 and 20th Party Congress in 2022 are decisive for Xi’s future. Hence, it is imperative to keep a close watch on China’s internal power dynamics scene.

Chinese are known to be hard-nosed negotiators, proved once again from the manner de-escalation talks remain deadlocked over last five months. It is primarily due to PLA’s rigid stance on Indian Army to disengage first, while denying its role as an aggressor. Post eighth rounds talks between the two Corps Cdrs on November 6, 2020, there are unconfirmed reports of phased disengagement in the offing. PLA has been pressing hard for Indian Army to pull back from Kailash Range and as a trade-off willing to fall back from Finger 8 from Finger 4.

Chinese are well aware of the criticality of the situation as India’s current deployment on the South Bank makes PLA positions at Maldo and beyond virtually untenable. Hence, vacating Kailash Range will be a strategic blunder, more so when the Chinese are silent about their ingress especially DBO-Depsang sector.

It is evident that Xi’s misadventure has failed to achieve political aim and military objective. In fact, over rated PLA is finding it hard to sustain through harsh winters. Its effort is to stage a selective pull back to get through the winters. India ought to be wary of Chinese ploys and avoid falling into PLA’s trap of sector wise disengagement. Our bottom line should be restoration of April 2020 status quo and disengagement process based on ‘confirm and verify’ principle. Any move to sign yet another agreement (with five already in place and sixth just signed last month) should be vehemently thwarted as Chinese are known to violate agreements at will.

Even if the current standoff crisis is resolved, the sanctity of LAC in future can only be ensured if it is well defended and not merely patrolled, which implies robust border management mechanism. The current system of multi-organisational complex set up needs to be replaced by single nodal agency with a unified command structure, wherein all elements are brought under operational control of the Army. Border militias based on ‘home and hearth’ concept can be a major asset. Besides, current efforts for massive upgrade of our infrastructure must be given further impetus to ensure calibrated timely responses.

Chinese traditionally respect strength (li), ranking nations as per their ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP) and exploiting asymmetry to coerce the weak. India’s approach of exercising restraint in the wake of Chinese assertiveness has been perceived by Communist leadership as weakness. Hence, there is no option but to narrow down the prevailing power differential to deal with China on level footing. India needs to formulate long term pragmatic China policy based on hard ground realities and not on wishful assumptions. Institutionalising of strategic partnerships like ‘Quad’ and initiatives such as ‘Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor’ ought to be accorded highest priority.
Given the conflicting national interests coupled with unresolved border issue, India-China relations will continue to be marked by complexities and contradictions, defined more by “Competition-Confrontation” rather than “Competition-Cooperative”. It is only the audacity of our leadership to take bold decisions and courage to stand ground to safeguard strategic interests that will obviate disputes turning into conflict. After all, Chinese traditionally believe in sitting across the table only with the equals.

Aksai Chin 2.0: Xi’s bid to replicate Mao merits review to obviate past miscalculations

Communist leaders are known to have a deep understanding of their nation’s history and tend to make comparisons between present and the past, driven by conviction: “further you look back, farther you look ahead”.

November 24, 2020 in Indian Express

Aksai Chin 1962-Mao’s Game Plan

Xi’s Grand Design 2020-India’s Response

Obviate Past Miscalculations to Defeat Dragon’s Misadventure

An Expert Explains: The PLA and its relationship with China’s Communist Party

To comprehend the aggressive behaviour of the Communist leadership, it is important to understand the symbiotic relationship between these two entities, and the nature of the generational transformation in the Chinese military.

Written by Maj Gen (retd) Prof G G Dwivedi | Updated: August 23, 2020 10:17:48 am

Members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) march during a flag raising ceremony at an open day at the Ngong Shuen Chau Barracks in Hong Kong, China, on Sunday, June 30, 2019. (Bloomberg Photo: Eduardo Leal)

It is customary for a nation to have an army but extremely rare for a political party to have one. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is an exception, as it owes allegiance to the Communist Party of China (CPC).

This exclusive arrangement was formalised in December 1929 during the Ninth Meeting of the CPC at Gutian in Fujian province where Mao Zedong, while addressing the men of the Fourth Army, clarified the role of the military: it was “to chiefly serve the political ends”, Mao said.

Here on, absolute control of the Communist Party over the army became entrenched. Interestingly, 85 years later, on December 30, 2014. President Xi Jinping during his address to ‘Military Political Work Conference’ at Gutian, reiterated that the “PLA remains the Party’s army, and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters”.

The two most powerful organs in the Chinese system, crucial for the survival of the authoritarian regime, are the CPC and the PLA. To comprehend the aggressive behaviour of the Communist leadership, it is important to understand the symbiotic relationship between these two entities, and the nature of the generational transformation in the Chinese military.

The PLA: Birth, structure, evolution, and its symbiotic relationship with the Communist Party

The PLA traces its roots to the ‘Nanchang Uprising’ of August 1, 1927, the day the Communists led by stalwarts like Mao, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De rose against the nationalist forces. It played a key role in the successful culmination of the Communist revolution in 1949, and of the CPC coming to power. The PLA’s iconic commanders, Mao and Deng Xiaoping, led the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for almost a half century as its first and second generation leaders.

Given its symbiotic relationship with the CPC, the PLA is well represented in the two apex governing bodies – in the Politburo, the PLA has 2 members out of 25, and in the Central Committee, the PLA accounts for 18-20 per cent of the 205 permanent and 171 alternate members.

The Central Committee elects the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the highest political body that is currently composed of seven members. Until 1997, the PLA had representation in the PSC as well; General Liu Huaqing was the last general to hold that position.

Members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) march with a Chinese flag during a flag raising ceremony at an open day at the Ngong Shuen Chau Barracks in Hong Kong, China, on Sunday, June 30, 2019. (Bloomberg Photo: Eduardo Leal)

The Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body, is composed of the PLA top brass, appointed by the PSC. The chairman of the CMC is the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the PLA, usually the Secretary General of the CPC, and presently President Xi.

Senior PLA officers are invariably members of the CPC. While commanders handle operational and training aspects, Political Commissars are responsible for personal matters, propaganda and indoctrination to establish the Party’s authority over the PLA.

Barely a year after its creation, China jumped into the Korean War in 1950 to take on the United States. Fighting the adversary to a stalemate, the PLA suffered over half a million casualties, including Mao’s son Capt Anying.

In 1962, it defeated the Indian Army in a limited conflict. However, the PLA performed poorly against the Vietnamese Army in 1979. As a sequel to introspection, it went through a sustained restructuring and modernisation process.

In 1993, President Jiang Zemin, upon observing US military power on display in the 1991 Gulf War, directed the PLA to prepare for “local wars under modern conditions”. This paved the way for the initiation of major doctrinal reforms in the Chinese military. In 2004, President Hu Jintao laid down the revised mandate for the PLA: “To win local wars under informationised conditions”.

The PLA’s march towards modernisation: plan, timelines, goals and strategy

On assuming power as China’s ‘Fifth Generation’ leader in 2012, President Xi laid down his China Dream (Chong Meng): a “powerful and prosperous” PRC that would acquire “great power status by 2049”. In Xi’s vision, military reforms were critical to realise the ‘China Dream’, besides achieving key national objectives, namely: stability – unchallenged authority of the CPC; modernity – sustained economic progress; and sovereignty – integration of claimed territories with the motherland.

The strategic directions for military modernisation have been spelt out in the ‘White Papers on National Defence’. The 2015 White Paper focussed on the strategy of ‘Active Defence’, and that of 2019 delved on ‘Defence in the New Era’.

The timelines laid down to achieve the stated goals are: mechanisation by 2020, basic modernisation including informationisation by 2035, and transformation into a world class military force by the middle of the century.

The main thrust of military reforms has been on revamping systems and structures across the board. At the macro level, the focus was on civil-military integration, jointness, and optimisation.

The CMC is now responsible for policy formulation, controlling all the military assets and higher direction of war through 15 offices and departments. Three additional Headquarters, namely the Ground Forces, Rocket Force, and Strategic Force, were created to ensure centralised control of these assets at the highest level.

The national flag of China. The ongoing reforms in the PLA are aligned with Xi’s grand projects. (Bloomberg Photo)

In the new command structure, the President as the C-in-C exercises direct operational control over the PLA.

The modernisation process of the PLA is doctrine driven: “Winning Local Wars under Informationised Conditions”. While ‘Local Wars’ envision short, swift engagements in pursuit of larger political aims, ‘Informationised Conditions’ refer to the predominance of technology in fighting the war.

The salient facets of China’s ways of war fighting are:

* Adopt a holistic approach to balance ‘war preparation’ and ‘war prevention’.

* Respond to multi-dimensional security threats by concentrating superior forces, ensuring self-dependence.

* Employ integrated combat forces to prevail in system-vs-system operations, featuring information dominance, precision strikes and joint operations.

* Reorientate from ‘theatre’ to ‘trans-theatre operations’, move to ‘off shore waters defence with open sea protection’, transit from territorial air defence to building air space capabilities including outer space, and strengthen strategic deterrence.

* Pursue ‘Grey Zone Conflict’ strategy alongside ‘nibble and negotiate’ tactics.

* Expand military cooperation to establish a regional security network.

At the operational level, the erstwhile 17-odd Army, Air Force, and Naval commands have been organised into five ‘Theatre Commands’ (TCs) – Eastern, Western, Central, Northern, and Southern. While the Eastern TC is responsible for the Taiwan Strait, the Western TC looks after the entire Indian border. Putting all the war fighting resources in each TC under one commander ensures seamless synergy and optimisation.

In addition, 84 corps size formations have been created, which include 13 operational corps and airborne corps, besides dedicated training facilities and logistics installations in each theatre.

While the PLA is reasonably well equipped, it lacks combat experience. To overcome this handicap, it trains under realistic conditions in well-organized combined training facilities. To support capacity building, adequate budgetary support has been provided. The official defence budget for the year 2020 was $179 billion (actual figures being much higher). However, its revenue expenditure is gradually rising due to the huge maintenance cost and provisioning for over 50 million veterans.

After claiming victory over the novel coronavirus in April this year, Xi has gone on the overdrive to consolidate his position at home and to project a strongman image abroad, through aggressive posturing by the PLA around the disputed territories in the South China Sea, and against India in Ladakh. It is part of Xi’s campaign to set the stage for the 20th Party Congress due in 2022, during which there will be a reshuffle in the leadership.

PLA’s Western Theatre Command, which has been engaging with the Indian Army

PLA’s aggression in Eastern Ladakh during May this year was well planned. Beijing’s strategic aim apparently was to convey a strong message to New Delhi to kowtow to China’s interests, and to desist from building border infrastructure so as to maintain the status quo.

In tactical terms, its twin objectives were to make territorial gains in the contested areas, and to seek to shift the Line of Actual Control (LAC) westward.

These operations have been undertaken by the PLA’s Western Theatre Command (WTC), the most expansive of the five TCs, which has responsibility for Tibet and the restive Xinjiang region. Gen Zhao Zongqi, Commander, and Gen Wu She Zhou, Political Commissar of the WTC, are handpicked for the job.

Both the Commander and the Political Commissar are members of the Central Committee of the CPC. While Zhao is a 1979 Vietnam War veteran who has commanded brigade and corps in this area, Wu is a rising star.

The major formations under the WTC are the South Xinjiang Military Region (SXMR) and the Tibet Military Region (TMR), both of corps size, 76 & 77 Corps; six air force divisions; the rocket force base in Qinghai; and the ‘joint logistics support centre’ at Xining. Its “combined arms tactical training base” (CATTB) is at Xichang-Qingtongxia.

SXMR under Maj Gen Liu Lin, who has considerable experience in the area, undertook the incursions with clear objectives:

* Pangong Tso area: to dominate the Chushul Bowl,

* Galwan Valley: to dominate the Durbuk-DBO road,

* Depsang Plateau: posture to pose a threat to Siachen and enhance security of the Western Highway.

Although the PLA gained an initial advantage, it did not expect the stiff resistance from the Indian Army. Given the PLA’s intent to hold on to the gains, coupled with the current levels of build-up by both sides, and with the military level talks yielding little results, the de-escalation process is in for a long haul.

On the eve of the PLA’s 93rd anniversary on August 1, 2020, Xi, while presiding over the ‘group study session’ of the CPC Central Committee, said: “To develop ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and achieve national rejuvenation, efforts to make the country prosperous and making the military strong go hand in hand. Military capabilities must fit the national needs.”

Calling for leapfrogging developments, Xi underscored the implementation of strategic guidelines in the “new era”, including the drawing of a scientific roadmap and cultivating high-calibre military talent.

The ongoing reforms in the PLA are aligned with Xi’s grand projects like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Maritime Silk Route to enlarge China’s global footprint. The impact of the rapid accretion in the war-waging potential of the PLA is already being felt, given its growing aggressive behaviour.

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China has ensured that the border issue with India remains unresolved in order to retain the ability to mount tensions on the LAC at will. The current aggression by the PLA in Aksai Chin is part of a grand design with multiple strategic and tactical objectives. The WTC is China’s strategic theatre from the point of internal security, and of working with Pakistan against India.

To effectively cope with the PRC’s repeated misadventures, India needs to reset its China policy to one that is centred on its core interests.

There is need for a realistic articulation of threat assessment, and formulation of long-term strategy to effectively safeguard national sovereignty and integrity. This demands transformational initiatives to restructure apex organisational frameworks to successfully prosecute calibrated responses in the realm of a limited war scenario, through synergised application of war-waging potential.

Explained: Understanding India-China 5 point action plan to reduce LAC tension

The Indian Express speaks to Maj Gen Prof G G Dwivedi (retd), who has commanded troops in this sector and served as Defence Attaché in China, to put the India-China talks in perspective.

Manraj Grewal Sharma

The Foreign Ministers of India and China, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Wang Yi, arrived at a ‘Five Points’ agreement to reduce the prevailing tension on the Ladakh border during their talks in Moscow on the sidelines of the SCO Summit on September 10. The Indian Express speaks to Maj Gen Prof G G Dwivedi (retd), who has commanded troops in this sector and served as Defence Attaché in China, to put these talks in perspective.

How significant were the India-China talks?

The process of dialogue between the nations is vital especially when the two are neighbours with strained relations. This meeting between the two foreign ministers was an attempt to break the state of impasse as series of talks have taken place at multiple levels without yielding any results. It was also good optics especially for China as the Communist leadership was keen to showcase its sincerity to resolve the issues through dialogue.

It is in keeping with the Chinese policy of ‘talking and fighting simultaneously’ (yi bian dan-yi bian da). Besides, it also lent credence to the role of Moscow in setting up the stage for the talks. Some experts have termed these talks as stepping back from the brink of war which it is not. The current situation is well below the threshold of conflict if we talk of the escalatory ladder.

Can you briefly explain the escalation and de-escalation matrix?

The genesis of the current stand-off was the aggression undertaken by the PLA in the form of incursions by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Given the scale, extent and timing, the operation was well planned at the highest level i.e. Central Military Commission (CMC) headed by President Xi Jinping as its Chairman.

While the political intent was to give a strong message to Delhi to kowtow Beijing’s interest, the military aim was to make quick territorial gains in the Depsang, Galwan and Pangong Tso area. This marked the first step in the escalatory ladder, which almost went as planned for China. Indian Army’s swift mirror deployment took escalation to the next level.

A bloody skirmish at Galwan on June 15 and rapid build-up on both sides led to steep escalation in which 40,000 PLA soldiers stand deployed with almost an equal number on the Indian side. However, the situation remained regulated by talks at the military-diplomatic and political levels. India’s counteraction at Chushul by way of the occupation of Kailash Range on August 29-30 took the escalation to a higher level, but well below the threshold of conflict.

Technically, the conflict situation consists of actions such as building fortifications, clashes between patrolling parties, laying of mines, air intrusions alongside certain provocative political actions.

The de-escalation process starts with gradual disengagement of troops alongside the dismantling of war-waging infrastructure, pulling back, and finally withdrawal to the designated locations.

What is the significance of the India-China five-point Action Plan?

It reiterates the process of dialogue, disengagement, and easing of the situation. All this was comprehensively dealt with in the previous five agreements given below:

• The 1993 ‘Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Agreement’ forms the basis of all followup agreements.

• 1996 ‘Confidence Building Measures’ denounced the use of force

• 2005 ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ and patrolling modalities.

• 2012 ‘Process of Consultation and Cooperation’

• 2013 ‘Border Cooperation Agreement’, signed as a sequel to Depsang intrusion by PLA

There is no requirement of additional agreements. The moot point is their implementation as these have been violated by the PLA in pursuit of its “Nibble and Negotiate” strategy. In fact, all these agreements have only helped China to consolidate its claims over a period of time by waging a ‘bullet-less’ war.

The mechanism of strategic guidance evolved at Wuhan and later reconfirmed at Mamallapuram between PM Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping has not delivered despite the fact that Xi is the commander-in-chief of PLA.

What should be India’s future strategy?

China has not been able to achieve its aims either politically or militarily due to India’s firm and resolute response. This will definitely reflect upon Xi Jinping’s iron man image. It is worth noting that Xi would like to add to his achievements that can be flaunted during the centenary celebrations of the Communist Party of China (COC) in 2021, and the 20th party congress, a crucial five-yearly Communist party event due in 2022.

The force level deployed by China in Aksai Chin with two strike divisions (4 Motorised Division in the Chushul sector and 6 Mechanized Division in Depsang) and 150 frontline fighter aircraft positioned on the forward bases belies Chinese intent to de-escalate. Therefore, India must continue its proactive posture not only in Ladakh but across the complete length of LAC. After all, it’s the position on the ground which will decide the trajectory of talks on the negotiations table. Above all, we must insist on April 2020 status quo and make it clear to the Chinese that the border issue cannot be delinked from bilateral relations.

China uses border issue as tool to build pressure on India

As India and China are engaged in a stand-off in the Galwan Valley,
Maj Gen GG Dwivedi (retd) shares his insight into the current situation. He has commanded 16 JAT in Siachen (Durbuk Pangong Tso area), a brigade in the Kashmir Valley and Mountain Division in the North East and also served as India’s defence attaché in China and North Korea from 1997 to 99. He is currently a professor of strategic and global affairs.

China considers it opportune to push its agenda regarding disputed areas as the world is battling the Covid-19 pandemic. Further, President Xi Jinping is under pressure due to slowing down of the Chinese economy. Also, China does not want India to develop infrastructure in Ladakh. —Maj Gen GG Dwivedi (retd)

Can you explain the difference between the LoC and the LAC?

A: There is a tendency to compare the Line of Control (LoC) and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) but these are two distinct terms. We have International Border and LOC with Pakistan and LAC with China in Jammu and Kashmir. LoC is like a de facto border and manned by troops deployed on the either side. In contrast, LAC is neither delineated nor demarcated. It is based roughly on the positions held by both sides towards the end of 1962 war. As a result, both sides have their own interpretation. In the Ladakh region, it generally corresponds with the Chinese claim line as China captured most of the Aksai Chin area in the 1962 war. However, there are a number of contested points where the two sides have a varying perception. In the middle sector and eastern sector (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh), the LAC is by and large aligned with the McMahon Line.

Can you give a brief overview of the border issue between India and China?

Though no official boundary has been negotiated between India and China, the Indian Government considers a line similar to the Johnson Line of 1865 as the boundary, according to which Aksai Chin is a part of India. The Chinese Government, however, considers a line similar to the McCartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 as the boundary which is well to the west of Johnson Line. The 1913-14 Shimla Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet defined the boundary between Tibet and British India, which later came to be known as McMahon Line. But China declined to sign it. After China annexed Tibet in 1951, the two countries started sharing boundary. China initially did not raise the border issue as surreptitiously it was constructing a highway from Kashgarh in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet in the 1950s which passed through Aksai Chin. When India learnt of this in 1959, it raised the matter with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This is how the border problem started, ultimately leading to the 1962 Indo-China war. Incidentally, the opening shots of the war were fired from the Galwan Valley.

Why do you think that the LAC has not been defined as yet?

Chinese has kept dragging their feet on the issue as it is not in their interest to resolve the boundary imbroglio. The PRC has often used the border issue as a tool to build pressure on India.

Why has China created the trouble amid the pandemic?

China is known for creating problems when it is confronted with internal and external issues. At present, China considers it opportune to push its agenda regarding disputed areas with Taiwan, South China Sea and the LAC, as the world is battling the Covid-19 pandemic. Further, President Xi Jinping is under pressure due to slowing down of the Chinese economy and a global outcry holding China responsible for the pandemic. Also, China does not want India to develop infrastructure in Ladakh as presently they have a definite edge over us. The Galwan Valley is important because from there, China can dominate Durbuk- Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) road that India constructed recently. China also has high stakes in the Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (POK), too, as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor traverses through the region. It has also invested in various projects in the POK, including the proposed $9 billion Daimer-Bhasha Dam.

What are the options before India in present situation?

Our aim is to restore the status quo ante that existed in April which implies that the PLA has to pull back. To ensure this, adequate pressure has to be built on China through various means, including military, political, diplomatic and economic

Why has not the Chinese media reported on casualties suffered by their troops?

China has an authoritarian rule and a state-controlled media. The communist leadership employs media as an instrument to spread its propaganda and fight an information war.

An Expert Explains: Deciphering the dynamics of de-escalation in eastern Ladakh

Written by Maj Gen (retd) Prof G G Dwivedi , Edited by Explained Desk

The process of de-escalation has been underway for several days in eastern Ladakh, where Chinese forces made large scale incursions in the areas of Pangong Tso, Galwan and Depsang in May. Prompt counter-deployment by the Indian Army to check the Chinese intrusions resulted in a serious standoff, marked by violent clashes on June 15.

There is lack of clarity in the environment about de-escalation per se; as terms like disengagement, pulling back, and withdrawal are being used concurrently, in the same breath.

De-escalation is a complex and time consuming exercise, as it entails navigating an uncharted course in a graduated manner. To decipher the dynamics of the ongoing de-escalation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it is essential to comprehend the genesis of the Sino-Indian border dispute, and the typical ‘conflict cycle’.

While the main reason for the Sino-Indian conflict is apparently the unsettled border issue, there are other factors too – including divergent geopolitical interests and ideological dimensions.

In Ladakh, India considered the border to be along the Johnson Line of 1865, which included Aksai Chin. The Chinese on the other hand, initially agreed to the Macartney-MacDonald (M-M) line of 1899, which was west of the Johnson Line.

Towards 1959, the Chinese began to establish a series of posts west of the M-M Line, usurping large parts of Aksai Chin, as they had constructed the Western Highway from Kashgar to Lhasa through it, and wanted to consolidate the hold on Tibet. In response, India adopted a forward policy by setting up posts opposite the Chinese to check the latter’s expansion.

In 1960, the Chinese came out with a map laying claim to almost the whole of Aksai Chin. The main reason why Mao went for war in 1962 was to capture the claimed territories in eastern Ladakh, as also to teach India a lesson.

During the 1962 war too, DBO, Galwan, and the Pangong Tso-Chushul areas were scenes of major action. By the time the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire, the PLA had almost secured the areas up to the 1960 claim line. At the end of the war, the two sides as per mutual understanding withdrew 20 km from the positions last held by the opposing forces.

Subsequently, the Line of Actual Control came to denote the line up to which the troops on the two sides actually exercised control. However, the LAC was neither delineated on the map nor demarcated on the ground. Hence, both India and China have different perceptions on the alignment of LAC.

However, over a period of time, Patrolling Points (PPs) were identified on the ground, setting the limits up to which the two sides could patrol. These PPs became reference points, although these are not bang on the LAC but at some distance on the home side. Hence, it is through patrolling boundaries that the Indian and Chinese troops assert their territorial claims. There were 23 areas which were contested by both sides.

Also read | Ladakh through a bifocal lens: a short zoom-in, zoom-out history

Given the potential for clashes, five major agreements were signed between India and China to ensure peace on the border.

* The first one on ‘Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC’ was signed in 1993, which formed the basis for the subsequent agreements.

* In 1996, a follow-up agreement on ‘Confidence Building Measures’ along the LAC was inked, denouncing use of force or engaging in hostile activities.

* In the 2005 Agreement, ‘standard operating procedures’ were laid down to obviate patrol clashes.

* The Agreement of 2012 set out a process for consultation and cooperation.

* The ‘Border Defence Cooperation Agreement’ was signed in 2013 as a sequel to the Depsang intrusion by the PLA. Its emphasis was on enhancing border cooperation and exercising maximum restraint in case of ‘face-to-face’ situations. Wherever there was a difference of perceptions in disputed areas termed as ‘grey zones’, both sides could patrol up to the perceived line, but were not to undertake any build-up.

The dynamics of de-escalation

In the Chinese strategic culture, the use of force is considered perfectly legitimate. Since 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly resorted to force against neighbouring countries in the pursuit of its expansionist design.

It was in Chinese interest to not define the LAC or resolve the border dispute, so as to use it as leverage against India. The Chinese policy was to keep consolidating its position by building infrastructure, alongside the pursuit of the policy of ‘nibbling and negotiating’ to make tactical gains, employing unconventional means such as using graziers and border militias.

Given the scope and scale, the PLA aggression was well planned, and definitely cleared by the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest defence body in the Chinese system. In the process, the Chinese violated all of the above agreements, and once again betrayed India’s trust.

Beijing’s strategic aim apparently was to convey a strong message to New Delhi to kowtow to its interests, and to desist from building border infrastructure so as to maintain status quo, which is at present in China’s favour.

In tactical terms, it was to make limited gains through large scale intrusions, undertake a build-up in the grey zones, and seek to shift the alignment of the LAC further westward.

The PLA’s probable objectives in the Pangong Tso area was to dominate the Chushul Bowl; in Galwan to dominate the Durbuk-DBO road; and in DBO, to posture towards the Depsang plateau to pose a threat to Siachen from the east and ensure the security of the Western Highway.

Given India’s strong resolve both at the political and military levels alongside favourable world opinion, the Chinese decided to de-escalate, having achieved their initial aim and to obviate further upsurge.

Decoding LAC Conflict

The process of de-escalation

Every conflict has a cycle – it begins with escalation, and is followed by contact, stalemate, de-escalation, resolution, peace-building and reconciliation.

The de-escalation process entails talks at multiple levels, and ground action in various stages. As in this case, there have been three rounds of talks at the Corps Commander level, simultaneous talks between Joint Secretaries, and at the level of Special Representatives.

On the ground, the first step in the de-escalation process is of disengagement – i.e., to break the ‘eyeball-to-eyeball’ contact between the opposing troops on the forward line by pulling back to create a buffer zone. This is currently in progress – the forward troops on both sides are reported to have pulled back by about 1.5 km in the area of PP 14 in Galwan, PP 15 southeast of Galwan Valley, and PP 17A in the Gogra-Hot Spring areas. Similar action will be required to be taken in the Pangong Tso fingers area, where the PLA has reportedly intruded up to Finger 4, as also in the PP 10-11 areas in Depsang-DBO.

The next step is the pulling back of the troops in the immediate depth, followed by reserve formations in the rear.

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In the present case, the PLA created a number of intermediate positions, besides staging forward 4 Motorised and 6 Mechanized Divisions. Even fighter aircraft have been positioned at the forward air bases like Ngari and Hotan. India too, has undertaken the requisite build-up. Withdrawal of all these elements will require many more rounds of talks at various levels.

Given the serious trust deficit — as the PLA is known to backtrack — each move will need to be confirmed and verified on the ground, and complemented by other surveillance means. Even the distance of pulling back cannot be sacrosanct, as the PLA is in a better position to build up, given the terrain advantage and better infrastructure.

India’s bottom line at the negotiation table is to restore the April 20 status quo ante. The Chinese are masters at engaging in marathon talks. Maj Gen Liu Lin, commander of the South Xinjiang Military Region (SXMR), who is currently representing the PLA in the Corps Commander-level talks, has been in the area as Division Commander and Deputy of SXMR. He took over the SXMR last year, and will be around for a couple of years, given the PLA’s long command tenures.

Soldiers keep guard as an Indian Army convoy moves on the Srinagar-Ladakh highway at Gagangeer, north-east of Srinagar. (AP Photo)

Well aware of the ground situation, Liu can be expected to indulge in hard bargaining. Therefore, the de-escalation process is set to be in for a long haul, marked by the ‘going back and forth’ phenomenon. India must have its options in place, should the process of de-escalation get stalled.

Maj Gen (Dr) G G Dwivedi: ‘Right now, Chinese have an edge, we must neutralise it’

Maj Gen (Dr) G G Dwivedi, who commanded a Jat battalion in this sector in 1992, and was subsequently the defence attaché to China in 1997, told The Indian Express over the phone that he is not surprised by the recent Chinese belligerence.

The peaks around the Galwan valley last saw bloodshed in 1962, when Chinese soldiers opened fire on a company of 5 Jat on October 22, killing 36 soldiers and capturing company commander Major S S Hasabnis. It marked the start of the 1962 war.

“It is part of China’s ‘nibble and negotiate policy’. Their grand aim is to ensure that India does not build infrastructure along the LAC, change the status of Ladakh, cosy up to the US and join the anti-China chorus caused by Covid-19. It is their way of attaining a political goal with military might, while gaining more territory in the process.’’

Dwivedi recounted the time he commanded 16 Jat in Pangong Tso and Hot Springs area in 1992. There was no tension between the two countries at that point. “We used to patrol up till Hot Springs and so did they. The Ladakh Scouts controlled the Galwan valley and did not encounter any problems either. We would learn of Chinese patrols from the red Hong Mei cigarette packets they left behind and graffiti on the rocks that read ‘Chung ko (This is China)’.” Dwivedi said the Indian troops would retaliate by scribbling ‘This is India’ on the rocks.

Things have changed, and Beijing is worried about India’s recent actions of reorganising Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and improving infrastructure in the region, Dwivedi said. “It has high stakes in PoK as the $60-billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) traverses through it, and it is also the site of the proposed $9 billion Diamer Bhasha Dam, a joint project of China and Pakistan.’’

He said that China’s current aggressive behaviour also coincides with pressure on President Xi Jinping, who is the chairperson of the Central Military Commission, due to opposition around the globe due to Covid-19 and the economic slowdown at home.

The PLA’s aim, said Dwivedi, is to dominate Durbuk-DBO road, strengthen its position in the Fingers area, halt the construction of link roads in Galwan-Pangong Tso and negotiate de-escalation on its terms.

“They have quietly and steadily built a lot of infrastructure along the LAC, and now they want to dominate the hilltops. Any military man will tell you that this matters because if you don’t occupy the hilltops, you are like a sitting partridge.’’

Decoding LAC Conflict

On the way forward, Dwivedi said India must be firm on restoration of status quo as on April 30. “We must be firm on that, they should go back. We started to disengage but the Chinese did not, they want to consolidate their gains and make us accept the new LAC alignment.”

Negotiations depend on how strong you are on the ground. “Right now, the Chinese have an edge, we must neutralise it. We must either push them back or occupy some other place that affects them.”

Military action, said Dwivedi, should be accompanied by political, diplomatic and economic action. “We must isolate China in the geo-political arena and ensure a consensus in our favour. Last but not the least, let us present a united front as a nation and win the propaganda war as well.”

Tudo Passa

Blog By MAJOR GENERAL (Retd) PROF G.G. DWIVEDI, official website : https://soulssynergyexcellors.com/

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