Maj Gen GG Dwivedi (retd)

Former Defence Attaché in China

China is rapidly building a robust and lethal force with capabilities spanning the ground, air, maritime, space and information domains, designed to enable Beijing to impose its will on the region and beyond. India finds itself in a catch-22 situation. While not in a position to effectively counter China’s expansionist design, it is constrained to join regional grouping ‘Quad’ with US, Japan and Australia.

Arecent Pentagon report has raised the alarm on China’s relentless drive for global expansion, both by military and non-military means. As per Dan Taylor, a senior US defence intelligence analyst, People’s Republic of China is rapidly building a robust and lethal force with capabilities spanning the ground, air, maritime, space and information domains, designed to enable Beijing to impose its will on the region and beyond. By undertaking counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden over the past decade and expanding its military presence in the East and South China Seas, as per Taylor, China has demonstrated its willingness to employ the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as an instrument of national power in the execution of a ‘historic mission in the new century’. The Chinese leadership considers a well-conceived military modernisation programme essential for the country to achieve the status of a ‘great power’ .

The thought process of the communist leadership continues to be influenced by China’s ancient wisdom. Chinese strategists firmly believe that their country was secure and prosperous when internally strong with a subdued neighbourhood, ensuring a peaceful periphery. Traditional Chinese thinking professed that the best way to respond to a threat was to eliminate it. This is vindicated by the fact that China used force eight times during the first three decades following the 1949 Revolution. The Chinese attribute the loss of their prime position to the weakness of the Qing Dynasty (1636-1912) and a continental mindset. ‘Shi’ (strategic configuration by gaining position of advantage) is an essential facet of strategic thinking.

Given the authoritarian character of the Chinese system, generational leadership change significantly impacted the nation’s policies, particularly during the times of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. President Xi Jinping, on assuming power, moved fast. He went on to initiate transformational reforms aimed to change the traditional strategic framework, advocating a greater Chinese role in world affairs.

Xi took on the mantle of the Fifth Generation leadership in 2012. He was expected to abide by the constitutional rules adhered to by his immediate predecessors. However, he chose to play differently. While commencing his first term as the President in 2013, Xi had stated, “To forge iron, you ought to be strong.” Accordingly, he set about systematically to strengthen his hold on the twin levers of power — the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the PLA. Xi unleashed an unbridled anti-corruption campaign which proved handy to purge political rivals. Concurrently, radical military reforms were initiated with a dual aim: to prepare the defence forces for the enlarged role and reinforce the party’s hold over the PLA. To the three most important titles — General Secretary of the CPC, Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the President — that Xi was already holding, he added half a dozen over a short period. In a lighter vein, Xi began to be referred to as the CEO (Chairman of Everything).

During the 19th Party Congress held in 2017, Xi unveiled his concept of ‘China Dream’ (Zhong Guo Meng). It envisaged China’s road to rejuvenation — entering the ‘new era’, emerging as a ‘prosperous and powerful’ nation and the restoration of its legacy. He outlined twin centenary objectives: China to emerge as a fully modern socialist economy by 2035 and to acquire the status of a ‘great modern socialist country’ by 2049. Xi’s ‘Thought for New Era Socialism with Special Chinese Characteristics’ stand enshrined in the party constitution. With the abolishment of the limit set on the presidential term through a constitutional amendment, the path was cleared for Xi to continue in power for life.

Xi propounded the policy of ‘striving for achievement’ (fanfa youwei) during the 2017 party congress, advocating a greater Chinese role to shape the new international order. This marked the abandonment of the three-decade-old strategy enunciated by Deng — to “conceal one’s strength, never take a leadership role, and bide one’s time” till China completed its peaceful rise.

In keeping with the changed foreign policy, Xi has initiated major strategic initiatives since 2014. There was an overdrive to expand China’s military position in South China Sea with a rapid programme of island reclamation to ensure diminution of US influence in the region. As part of its global outreach, China is in the process of acquiring a string of naval bases in Myanmar (Kyaukpyu), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Pakistan (Gwadar) and Djibouti to emerge as a major player in the Indo-Pacific, besides the westward expansion into Eurasia region.

The path-breaking military reforms that are underway aim to transform the PLA into a modern fighting force on a par with the Western armies by the next two decades. The focus is on building a strong national defence and powerful armed forces as a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development.

Xi has combined geo-political and geo-strategic dimensions to launch ‘Belt-Road’ and ‘Maritime Silk Route’ initiatives across Eurasia, Africa and beyond, engaging more than 70 countries and entailing multi-trillion-dollar investment. Playing a lead role in regional groupings like the Shanghai Cooporation Organisation and BRICS, and establishing financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are consistent actions to further China’s policy of resisting the West-driven international order.

Xi’s foreign policy is unapologetically nationalist, in pursuit of its core interests — sovereignty, stability, security and economic development. His new ideology seeks to promote an alternative model characterised by ‘authoritarian capitalism’. Today, the US is conflicted about its global role with Trump in relentless pursuit of the ‘America First’ policy. Russia under Putin continues to be under the delusion of the ‘Cold War’ symmetry. Xi has scripted a clearer strategic road map for China. He is expected to pursue aggressive diplomacy to restructure the international order, whose underlying rules will be increasingly framed by Beijing.

Given India’s complex relations with China, the emerging scenario has far-reaching implications. While not in a position to effectively counter China’s expansionist design and at the same time seriously constrained to join the regional grouping such as ‘Quad’ with US, Japan and Australia, India finds itself in a catch-22 situation. Ironically, Delhi has no option but to revamp its capability to engage Beijing on equal terms. It is time India formulates a long-term policy to emerge as an important stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific.

China’s strategic shift is in sync with Xi’s grand design — China acquiring superpower status by the middle of this century. Given the opaque system, past legacy and growing assertiveness, the communist leadership’s claim about their nation’s rise to be peaceful has inherent contradictions. It is vital for the global polity to effectively engage with the communist leadership to avoid what US political scientist Graham Allison called the ‘Thucydides trap’.

Abstract

Two most powerful organs which are critical for the very survival of current Chinese authoritarian regime are the Communist Party and the Army. The latter historically has been controlled by the Party.The underlying rationale behind the critical reforms were twofold; firstly, prepare the military for China’s expanding global role and secondly, establish Party’s firm control over the PLA through revamped CMC.China has therefore, formulated a long-drawn strategy, with well-defined national objectives. These are stability, sovereignty and modernity i.e. sustained economic development.In this milieu, ‘Stability’ implies unchallenged authority of the CPC and its continuation in power.

Background

Two most powerful organs which are critical for the very survival of current Chinese authoritarian regime are the Communist Party and the Army. While the Communist Party of China (CPC), was founded on 01 July 1921 at Shanghai, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) traces its roots to the ‘Nanchang Uprising’ of 01 August 1927, when stalwarts like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai revolted against the Nationalist Forces . Both share a unique symbiotic relationship. This historic bonding was formalised in December 1929, at the Ninth Meeting of the CPC convened at Gutian, a town in Fujian Province. During the conference, Mao addressed the men of Fourth Army and clarified the role of military; “to chiefly serve the political ends” .

Thus, absolute control of the CPC over the Red Army became entrenched. Since then, People’s Liberation Army (PLA)has remained the Army of Communist Party and not of the nation. Incidentally, President Xi Jinping visited Gutian on 30 October 2014 to address ‘Military Political Work Conference’. In his speech, he reiterated what Mao had asserted eight and half decades earlier i.e.; “PLA still remains Party’s Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to the political masters” . Traditionally, PLA has been well represented in the apex political policy making bodies. China’s highest defence body, Central Military Commission (CMC) is exclusively composed of senior most military commanders, headed by the President.

PLA played a pivotal role during the Communist Revolution as an armed wing of the Party. Its top commanders namely Mao and Deng emerged as the icons of First and Second Generational leadership. Barely a year after its establishment in 1949, People’s Republic of China (PRC) entered the ‘Korean War 1950-53′ to lock horns with the US-led UN Forces. Suffering over half million casualties, Chinese Forces succeeded in pushing the adversary back to the 38th Parallel, thus restoring ‘status quo ante’. In 1962, PLA convincingly defeated the Indian Army in a limited conflict. However, it performed poorly against the Vietnamese Army in 1979. Here on began the process of restructuring and modernization the PLA.

Defence was one of the ‘Four Modernizations’ enunciated by Deng, to transform China. However, there was lack of strategic direction. In 1993, President Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to prepare for ‘local wars under modern conditions’ on observing the power of Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) displayed by the US military in the 1992 Gulf War . This paved the way for the initiation of major doctrinal reforms in the Chinese defence forces towards late 1990s. The twin transformations (lianggezhuanbian) were aimed to prepare the PLA to ‘win local wars under high tech conditions’ and facilitate transition from ‘quantity to quality’ based military. In 2004, President Hu Jintao laid down revised mandate for the military; ‘to win local wars under informationised conditions’ .
China has formulated a long-drawn strategy, with well-defined national objectives. These are stability, sovereignty and modernity i.e. sustained economic development. ‘Stability’ implies unchallenged authority of the CPC and its continuation in power.

However, the Process of radical reforms commenced only on president Xi Jinping assuming power as the ‘Fifth Generation’ leader in 2012-13. The sense of urgency could be attributed to the geopolitical considerations; US strategy of rebalancing from West to East, being a major factor. The underlying rationale behind the critical reforms were twofold; firstly, prepare the military for China’s expanding global role and secondly, establish Party’s firm control over the PLA through revamped CMC. The path breaking reform process kick started during the Third Plenum of 18th Central Committee of the CPC held in 2013, with the establishment of National Security Commission (NSC), headed by the President as Chairman. The on-going reform process is deep rooted and goes well beyond the structural changes. Its impact is expected to be wide and varied, having both regional and global implications. The paper undertakes a holistic overview of China’s current military reforms phenomenon, with focus on salient imperatives, doctrinal dimensions, organizational restructuring and strategic ramifications.

Salient Imperatives

The on-going military reforms process is driven by multiple factors. Obama Doctrine of ‘Pivot to Asia’ enunciated in 2011 sought to deploy 60 per cent of US military assets in the Asia-Pacific region by the end of decade lent impetus to China’s military reforms and modernization . Even the Trump Administration has taken a tough stance against the Chinese growing assertiveness in South China Sea. Defence policy makers in Beijing are well aware of the prevailing wide gap in the military capabilities between the US and Chinese armed forces.

Chinese Communist leadership has laid down 2049 as the timeline for the nation to achieve status of ‘developed socialist state’. During the 19th Party Congress held at Beijing in October 2017, President Xi Jinping unfolded his grand design, referring to China entering ‘new era’, advocating greater role in the world affairs . To realise its global ambition, China has formulated a long-drawn strategy, with well-defined national objectives. These are stability, sovereignty and modernity i.e. sustained economic development.

‘Stability’ implies unchallenged authority of the CPC and its continuation in power. Absolute systematic control of the Communist Party over the military remains sine qua non. During the inaugural ceremony of newly constituted ‘Theatre Commands’ on 01 February 2016, President Xi had stated; “Centralisation of military was vital. All the theatre commands and PLA should unswervingly follow absolute leadership of the Communist Party and CMC to the letter” . ‘Sovereignty’ besides external non-interference entails protecting core national interests which encompasses unification of Taiwan with the motherland and exercising control over South China Sea; perceived by Beijing, as its backyard. Lately, Arunachal Pradesh which China claims as South Tibet has also been included in the list of core interests. Diminution of US influence in Asia-Pacific and containing Japan are extended agendas of sovereignty. Nationalists Government gaining power in Taiwan also contributed towards accelerating the military reforms. For the Communist Party to remain in power, ‘economic development’ is the key. Hence, sustaining rapid pace of growth is not an option but imperative for the Chinese leadership. Strong central authority and peaceful periphery are considered essential prerequisites for prosperity and progress.
‘Stability’ implies unchallenged authority of the CPC and its continuation in power. Absolute systematic control of the Communist Party over the military remains sine qua non. During the inaugural ceremony of newly constituted ‘Theatre Commands’ on 01 February 2016, President Xi had stated; “Centralisation of military was vital. All the theatre commands and PLA should unswervingly follow absolute leadership of the Communist Party and CMC to the letter.
Doctrinal Dimensions

Concept of ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP) which includes both hard and soft power is central to Chinese thinking. Acquisition of hard power is seen as a key component towards enhancing nation’s CNP. As per President Xi Jinping, military reforms are the key to realisation of ‘China Dream’ . This is also vital for the implementation of ‘Belt-Road Initiative’ and ‘Maritime Silk Route’ projects. In fact, Chinese military strategic culture lays great emphasis on exploiting propensity of things i.e. ‘strategic configuration of power’-Shi to achieve one’s objectives .The core of strategy is not to fight the adversary, but to create disposition of forces so favourable that fighting is unnecessary, in consonance with Sun Zu’s dictum, “to subdue enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” The on-going military reforms are oriented towards capacity building and force projection.

Concept of ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP) which includes both hard and soft power is central to Chinese thinking. Acquisition of hard power is seen as a key component towards enhancing nation’s CNP. As per President Xi, military reforms are the key to realisation of ‘China Dream’.

The general trend of the Chinese strategic thinking is defined in the White Papers on National Defence issued periodically since 1998. The theme of ‘Ninth White Paper’ published in May 2015 titled ‘China’s Military Strategy’, was ‘active defence’, with stress on winning ‘local wars in conditions of modern technology .The thrust was on expounding maritime interests, priority being accorded to navy and air force vis-à-vis the ground forces.

Chinese military doctrine of ‘Local Wars under Informationised Conditions’ has two components. ‘Local Wars’ envision short swift engagements with limited military objectives in pursuit of larger political aim. ‘Informationised Conditions’ refers to the penetration of technology into all walks of modern life, but specific to war fighting which includes IT, digital and artificial intelligence applications. It implies network centric environment and waging information operations to ensure battlefield domination. In essence, aim is to achieve complete security of PLA networks while totally paralyzing that of adversary’s. This encompasses electronic warfare including computer networks, psychological warfare and deception to attack enemy’s C4ISR systems, employing both hard and soft kills . Joint operations and integrated logistics are inherent components of the doctrine.

Thrust Areas

The main thrust of the on-going military reforms is on revamping the systems and structures across the board, at all levels i.e. political, strategic and operational. At the macro level, major changes that have been instituted are about deepening national defence through military reforms with Chinese Character, in keeping with the guidelines issued by the CMC. The focus is on civil-military integration to achieve unity of command, joint operations and optimization. The composition of the CMC itself has been balanced out to eliminate erstwhile ground forces bias. With the redefined role, CMC will now be responsible for formulating policies, controlling all the military assets and higher direction of war. As a sequel to the military reforms, PLA, People Armed Police Force (PAPF) and Theatre Commanders directly report to the CMC.

The erstwhile PLA Headquarters had four key Departments-General Staff, Political, Logistics and Armament. These have been reorganized and integrated into the restructured CMC, ensuring centralised control at the highest level. In the new set up, there are fifteen bodies. These include five departments and three commissions besides seven offices .(diagram below refers). With the integrated Joint General Staff under the CMC, the decision-making process at the apex level has been streamlined. In the restructured CMC, President as the Commander in Chief now exercises direct operational control over the military through the ‘Joint Operational Center’.

Besides the existing PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAFF) Headquarters, three new Service Headquarters have been created. These are ‘Ground Forces Command’ making it a service, Rocket Force-an upgrade of Second Artillery which operates both strategic as well as conventional missiles and ‘Strategic Support Force’ to control as also secure cyber and space assets. These structural additions will greatly facilitate prosecution of ‘Informationised Local Wars’.

At the operational level, erstwhile 17 odd army, air force and naval commands have been reorganized into five ‘theatre commands'; Eastern, Western, Central, Northern and Southern. With all the war fighting resources in each battle zone placed under one commander will ensure seamless synergy in deploying land, air, naval and strategic assets in a given theatre. In addition, 84 corps level organizations have been created including 13 operational corps, as well as training and logistics installations. To make the armed forces nimbler, a reduction of 300,000 rank and file, mostly from non-combatant positions has been ordered which will downsize the PLA to around to 1.8 million.
Theatre Commands (TCs) – Deployment of Corps

• Eastern TC– Nanjing (Taiwan, East China Sea)- 71,72&73 Corps
• Southern TC-Guangzhou (Vietnam and South China Sea)- 74 &75 Corps
• Western TC-Chengdu  (India &Internal Security)-76 &77 Corps  
• Northern TC– Shenyang (Korean Peninsula & Russia)- 78,79&80 Corps
• Central TC– Beijing (Internal Security& Reserves)- 81,82&83 Corps

Capacity Building

Salient advances in the armaments are designed to achieve domination in the field of information warfare, anti-radiation missiles, electronic attack drones, direct energy weapons, airborne early warning control system, anti-satellite weapons and cyber army under the Strategic Support Force[i]. Even the focus of the Chinese military publications dealing with new modes of war fighting is on jointness and space based operations.  Information based operations are an on-going process, conducted even during the peace time, which could prove a valuable asset during the times of conflict.

In consonance with the strategic direction, KRAs for the services have been clearly defined. PLA Army (PLAA) is required to reorient from ‘theatre defence’ and adapt to precise ‘trans-theatre mobility’ missions. This entails elevating capability through restructuring in undertaking multi-dimensional, joint offensive and defensive operations. PLA Navy (PLAN) while gradually shifting its focus from ‘off shore waters defence’ to a combined strategy of ‘offshore waters defence with open sea protection’ is required to build a combined, multi-functional and efficient maritime force structures. It has been tasked to enhance capabilities for strategic deterrence, counter attack, joint operations at sea and provide comprehensive support. PLA Air Force (PLAFF) in line with the strategic requirements to execute informationised operations is to build requisite structures by shifting focus from erstwhile territorial air defence to building air-space capabilities. It is also in the process of boosting strategic capabilities for early warning, air strike, information counter measures and force projection[ii].

[i]Zi Yang (24 January 2018), Ideology behind China’s Fast-Changing Military, The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-ideologu-behind-china’s-fast-changing-military

[ii]Note 11, op cit.

President Xi is the lead architect of the current phase of the path breaking reforms. His ideology which has been enshrined into the Party constitution during the 19^th Party Congress also encompasses army rebuilding. It expects PLA to “Obey the Party, be able to win wars and maintain good conduct”. The supreme Commander has also pronounced three tenets for a strong military i.e. confidence, competence and commitment

The Rocket Force to be lean and effective will be adopting transformational measures through reliance on technology upgrades, enhance safety and reliability of missile systems-both nuclear and conventional, thus strengthening strategic deterrence. Strategic Support Force will deal with challenges in the outer space and secure the national space assets. Besides, it will also expedite the development of “Cyber Force” by enhancing situational awareness, cyber defence and security of national information networks. People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) is to undertake multiple and diversified tasks including contingency tasks under informationised conditions.

President Xi is the lead architect of the current phase of the path breaking reforms. His ideology which has been enshrined into the Party constitution during the 19^th Party Congress also encompasses army rebuilding. It expects PLA to “Obey the Party, be able to win wars and maintain good conduct”[i].The Supreme Commander has also pronounced three tenets for a strong military i.e. confidence, competence and commitment. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Xi has maintained close relations with the armed forces, obvious from his frequent appearances at PLA events and visits to remote military bases in various parts of the country. The process is being supported by requisite budgetary allocations; evident from the fact that 2017 defence budget of $151 bn (actual spending estimated to be far higher) marks an increase of over 7 per cent[ii].

 Strategic Implications

 The on-going China’s military reforms as a phenomenon are possibly one of the biggest generational shake of its kind. Steered by President Xi as the Chairman of the CMC, these radical reforms are in line with the PRC’s envisioned future role as a global player. Although the framework of reforms does not follow traditional Western model or template, yet these are in sync with the key trends in modern warfare.  While the primary aim is to scale up national defence capability with Chinese characteristics, the process is geared to serve multiple objectives, with far reaching ramifications.

Domestically, predominance of the Party over PLA stands revalidated with centralization of power structure under the reorganized CMC. By ensuring implicit obedience and absolute loyalty of the armed forces through rejigged structures and reshuffles in the PLA hierarchy, President Xi has reinforced unity of command; most critical for any professional war fighting organization. Total control over the military has ensured that reformed PLA is resistant to the external influences. Xi’s emergence as an unquestionable leader with titles such as the ‘paramount leader’ and Zhu Xi (Chairman) puts him in the league of Mao and Deng. As per the Chinese public opinion, Mao made China great, Deng made it rich and Xi is striving to make it strong.  Described as a person with ‘an iron soul’ by former statesman late Lee Kuan Yew, Xi is expected to pursue his stated vision relentlessly.

From the external perspective, exponential accretion in China’s military capability is a cause of concern, particularly in PRC’s neighbourhood. Beijing is already seen to be more assertive towards realising its national objectives. It will be rather naïve to believe that the ‘Belt- Road’ and ‘Maritime Silk Route’ projects are only driven by economic considerations. In fact, these are path breaking initiatives to facilitate China to enlarge its strategic footprint, an essential pre-requisite for the global superpower in making.  Communist leadership’s repeated claims that China’s rise will be peaceful,bely its actions on the ground. After all, ‘a dragon remains a dragon’. As per Trump Administration Security Strategy, China and Russia are its main rivals. As Washington is expected to play a greater role in protecting its interests besides assuaging the concerns of its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific, the region is set to be the scene of intense inter- power rivalry.

Being India’s biggest neighbour with disputed border, clashing geostrategic interests and complex relations, China’s critical military reforms and rapid build-up of its military potential are stark realities which cannot be wished away. It is a matter of serious security concern. From the strategic perspective, India’s current higher defence organizational structure is service specific, lacking integration and jointness. We are yet to formulate comprehensive National ‘Limited War Doctrine’. Due to bureaucratic gridlocks, the procurement procedures of armament and equipment are rather tenuous, proving to be major impediment in modernization process. Current piecemeal and knee jerk approach to augment the defence capability needs to be replaced by long term national defence policy. Restructuring of the higher defence organization to meet the emerging security challenges is no more an option but an imperative.

[i]Note 14 op cit.

[ii]Michael Martina, Ben Blanchard (05 March 2017) Economic News

Being India’s biggest neighbour with disputed border, clashing geostrategic interests and complex relations, China’s critical military reforms and rapid build-up of its military potential are stark realities which cannot be wished away. It is a matter of serious security concern.

In operational terms, before the current reforms, it was PLA’s Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions which were responsible for operations against India’s Eastern and Northern borders. Post reorganization, it is now the Western Theatre with integrated Army, Air Force and Rocket Force assets, under a single commander that faces own four army commands (Northern, Western, Central and Eastern) and three air force commands (Western, Central and Eastern). This configuration will pose enormous coordination challenge in the event of a major conflict. Even during the 1962 War, China had constituted single Headquarters for controlling operations in Ladakh and Arunachal (then NEFA) while we fought isolated battles even within the theatre. Ironically, five and half decades on, we remain oblivious to this glaring short coming.

China has avoided major military confrontation since 1979. However, it has cleverly pursued the strategy of ‘nibbling and negotiating’ (yibiandanyibian da-talking and fighting concurrently). Doklam type stand-offs or confrontations in South Sea are part of this strategy and ought to be accepted as the new normal in dealing with PRC. Frequent incursions by the Chinese and hardening claims to Arunachal which it claims as South Tibet need to be seen in the light of the above realities. To realise Xi’s ‘China Dream’, Beijing does not enjoy the luxury of indulging in a major conflict. Therefore, while probability of a major confrontation between the two giants remains low, local skirmishes cannot be ruled out, especially in the contentious locations. As limited engagements demand speedy deployment and a flatter logistics chain, inadequate infrastructure in the border areas stands out as a major constraint for India while the adversary has a distinct edge. This shortcoming needs to be addressed on the highest priority.

China’s critical military reforms and rapid build-up of its military potential are stark realities which cannot be wished away. It is a matter of serious security concern. From the strategic perspective, India’s current higher defence organizational structure is service specific, lacking integration and jointness.

The revolutionary military reforms initiated under the current Chinese Communist leadership are indeed of monumental nature. With President Xi all set to be at the helm well beyond his stipulated two terms i.e. 2023, the military reforms process will continue till 2035, the timeline laid by him for PLA to ‘emerge as a modern fighting force capable of winning wars’. Incidentally, today China faces no external threat and its main security concerns are internal. Continued maintenance of CPC’s unchallenged hold over the system being prime concern of the Communist Leadership, PLA’s identity as the ‘military of the Party’ remains sacrosanct. To further its aspiration as emerging superpower, China’s Military reforms aim to enhance nation’s war waging capacity and power projection capabilities.

The PLA transformation process, its magnitude notwithstanding, is on the fast track. It will take a few decades before the Chinese Armed Forces as a modern military can stake claims to be at par with the Western Armies. PLA undoubtedly is poised for a ‘Great Leap’; in the process set to seriously disrupt the existing ‘balance of power’ dynamics. In the Chinese strategic lexicon, military strength is an important component of the CNP. The global strategic community will constantly struggle to decode the intent of Chinese Leadership; as to how it will deploy exponential accretion in country’s military potential.

Endnotes

[1]Edgar O’Ballance, (1962), The Red Army of China, Faber and Faber, London, p38

[1]David Shambaugh (1996), Soldier and State in China in Brain Hook, The Individual and State, Oxford, New York, p108.

[1]China Military Online, (3 November 2014), Party Controls Gun.

[1]Andrew Scobell, (2004), Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin, University Press of Pacific, p11.

[1]Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Travis Tanner, Assessing the People Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, Strategic Studies Institute-US War College Press, p10.

[1]President Obama address to Australian Parliament (17 November 2012), Parliament House Canberra, Australia http://www.white house.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian parliament. Accessed 24 January 2018, 4pm.

[1]Mark Moore,(24 October 2017), New York Post, New York.http://mypost.com, accessed 20 January 2018, 10am

[1]The Hindu, (03 February), China Revamps Military Command Structure

[1] Ibid

[1]Thomas G Mahnken, (2011), Secrecy and Stratagem: Understanding Chinese Strategic Culture, Lowy Institute of international Policy, Australia, p18.

[1]White Paper on China’s Military Strategy (May 2015), The State Council Information Office, People Republic of China, Beijing.

[1]Zi Yang (24 January 2018), Ideology behind China’s Fast Changing Military, The Diplomat.http://thediplomat.com. Accessed 28 January 2018

[1]Business Insider, (14 January 2016), China’s Latest Military Reform Reveals its Rising Ambitions.

[1]Zi Yang (24 January 2018), Ideology behind China’s Fast-Changing Military, The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-ideologu-behind-china’s-fast-changing-military

[1]Note 11, op cit.

[1]Note 14 op cit.

[1]Michael Martina, Ben Blanchard (05 March 2017) Economic News

Published in Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLVIII, No. 612, April-June 2018.

Mr Henry Kissinger’s seminal book “On China” begins with Chairman Mao Zedong briefing his top military commanders in October 1962, in the wake of Sino-Indian border standoff.1 Deep diving into history, he recalled that China and India had fought ‘one and half’ wars and there were valuable lessons to be drawn from each. The “first war” occurred during Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD) when China dispatched troops to support Indian Kingdom against an aggressive rival. After China’s intervention, the two countries enjoyed centuries of religious and economic exchanges. The lesson as Mao put it; “China and India were not doomed to perpetual enmity. They could enjoy long period of peace again, but to do so, China had to use force to ‘knock’ India back to negotiating table.” The “half war” Mao referred to was, when Mongol Timurlane sacked Delhi, almost seven hundred years later in 1398, killing over 100,000 prisoners. (Mao reckoned China and Mongolia then were part of same political entity).  When ordering offensive against India, Mao instructed his forces to be ‘restrained and principled’.  Accordingly, after inflicting crushing defeat on Indian forces, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) retreated to the original line of control, returning even the captured heavy equipment.2

The singular uniqueness of Chinese leaders lies in invoking strategic principles from millennium old events. No other country can claim to link its ancient classic dictums of strategy to its present statesmanship. This is why; the world often gets China wrong while decoding the mind of its leaders. Even in the recent past, series of incidences that occurred on India’s border with China invariably synchronised with important visits. Depsang in April 2013 preceded Chinese Prime Minister (PM) Li Keqiang visit to India, Demchok-Chumar happened in September 2014 when President Xi was in India and Doklam in June-August coincided with PM Modi’s visit to the USA.

President Xi Jinping is known to have deep understanding of Chinese history and seems to follow Mao. As per Mr Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, Xi is a man of extraordinary intellect with well-defined world view.3 Late Mr Lee Kuan Yew had compared Xi with the likes of Nelson Mandela. Therefore, informal summit (Fei Zhengshi Huitian) at Wuhan on 27-28 April 2018, at the behest of personal invitation from President Xi Jinping to PM Modi merits in-depth introspection and analysis. It was the second time that Xi made an exception to welcome any leader outside Beijing, first time in 2015 when he hosted Modi at Xian. Xi definitely would not be making such exceptional gestures without a grand design.  To unravel the labyrinth of Wuhan reset, it is pertinent to take a kaleidoscopic view of the strategic etymology, particularly from the Chinese perspective and its interpretation to gauge impact on the future course of India-China relations.

Strategic Etymology- Kaleidoscopic View

The circumstances which led to the informal summit at Wuhan can be largely attributed to the strategic review of the global environment by President Xi, in the realm of his recently enunciated doctrine. After assuming power as Fifth Generation Leader, President Xi surprised everybody by grossly bending the constitutional rules followed by his immediate predecessors. During the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, Xi had his “Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” enshrined in the Constitution.4  During the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2018,  he went on to abolish the Presidential term limit, to retain power for life.5 Thus, Xi has emerged as the most powerful leader after Mao.

Through its history, China has persuaded neighbours to acquiesce. It prospered only when the Emperor was strong and periphery peaceful. Xi commenced his second term with conviction that China needed strong personalistic leader. Accordingly, he gradually established himself both in the Party and PLA; twin pillars of Chinese power structure. Xi unleashed anti-corruption campaign to clean up the system and purge potential political rivals. Simultaneously, he initiated radical military reforms to prepare the defence forces for future global role and reinforce Party’s hold over the PLA.

During the Party Congress, Xi unfolded his doctrine centred on ‘China Dream’ (zhongmeng); which envisions ‘powerful and prosperous China’. It entails rejuvenation (fuxing) i.e. restoration of China’s past grandeur. To implement his grand vision, Xi outlined twin centenary objectives; People’s Republic of China (PRC) to become fully modern economy – achieve social modernisation by 2035 and acquire status of ‘great modern socialist country’ by middle of the Century.6 He also propounded the policy of ‘striving for achievements’ (fanfa youwei) and usher China into the New Era, advocating Beijing’s leadership role to shape China-centric global order. This marked a paradigm shift from Deng’s strategy of maintaining low profile till China completed its peaceful rise.

Xi has been empowered by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to be at the helm indefinitely,  to give him adequate time to complete the process of China’s rise as a global power. Besides, Chinese economy is in state of transition from low technology manufacturing to advance digitally enabled products. Further, continuity is considered vital in executing the mega global initiatives like the ‘belt-road’. With collective leadership on the backburner, the burden of performance now squarely rests on Xi. His failure could push China into chaos, given the high expectations of China’s rising middle class.

China has always opposed global security system based on American military alliances and partnerships. Therefore, China’s policy seeks diminution of American influence in the Asia-Pacific region. With US adopting ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, China accelerated its military modernisation process. In pursuit of the Chinese based world order, Beijing has undertaken series of initiatives to set up alternate multilateral structures to include Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Asia Infrastructure Development Bank (AIDB) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As per Beijing’s strategic calculus, in the coming decades, while China and USA will be the competing powers, the other important players will be India and Japan, both in its neighbourhood. Hostile periphery will not be conducive to China’s progress.

China at no cost will condescend to the idea of ‘Indo-Pacific’ gaining currency and Quad (US, India, Japan and Australia) grouping taking shape of an alliance. Even in the ancient times, its emperors dealt with the adversaries by pitching ‘one barbarian against the other’.7 To counter Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, China is keen to make Asia as the globalisation pivot. In the larger Pan-Asian sub-set, China views India as one of the important players. Beijing is also re-engaging Tokyo as part of its strategic review. Mr Li Keqiang visited Japan for the trilateral summit which included South Korea in May 2018. The trio strongly voiced for regional comprehensive economic cooperation encompassing ASEAN and other major economies; India, Australia and New Zealand. Sino-Russian relations over the recent years have transformed into strategic partnership.

In view of the aforesaid, Xi apparently has had a serious rethink on Beijing’s relations with its important neighbours. Doklam stand-off was also a trigger for China to reconsider its India policy. Xi is going about systematically to challenge America. In the process, Beijing is willing to yield tactical space to serve its larger strategic interests. How can PRC stake its claim to be a superpower; politically isolated and confined to Western Pacific?

From India’s perspective, there was an imperative need to recast China policy based on pragmatism through fresh initiatives.  PM Modi has established good personal rapport with president Xi. Hence, informal setting offered excellent opportunity to put across India’s concerns about the cross border terrorism, Chinese looming presence in India’s neighbourhood including India Ocean Region, China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC), impasse on the border issue and restoring glaring trade imbalance.

Wuhan Reset: Common Theme – Different Tones

Considerable effort went in by way of ministerial level meetings to set the stage for the Wuhan Summit. The basic rationale behind whole exercise was to build mutual trust and identify common ground to resolve vexed problems. Besides being on same page on a number of global issues, idea was also to evolve broad framework for strengthening bilateral relations.

Wuhan as a venue, situated on River Yangze in central China was a well-considered choice; given its rich historic past (unrest to unseat the Qing Dynasty started in the military barracks of the city) and to showcase China’s industrial prowess. Six meetings in the course of twenty four hours with open ended agenda allowed the two leaders to have a freewheeling dialogue with no pressure on the outcome. Mr Modi highlighted the need to have shared vision, shared thought process, shared resolve, strong relationship and better communications between the two neighbours. He further went on to define his vision of bilateral relationship in the form of five principles i.e. Thought (Soch), Contact (sampark), Cooperation (Sahyog), Determination (Sankalp) and Dream (Sapne). 8

In the absence of a joint communiqué, the two sides issued separate statements, with common themes and varying tones.9  Salient aspects are summarised below:-

(a)   One significant outcome was agreement between the two leaders to have such summits periodically, facilitating ‘strategic communications’ at the highest level.

(b)   Second important facet was of providing ‘strategic guidance’ to the respective militaries to build trust, mutual understanding and enhance cooperation in effective management of the border affairs. There was emphasis by both sides on ‘maturity and wisdom’ to handle differences; keeping each other’s sensitivities, concerns and aspirations in mind.

(c)   With regards to India-China border question, the two leaders expressed support for the work of Special Representatives. They urged for intensification of efforts to seek fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement, while underscoring the importance of ‘maintaining peace and tranquility’ in all areas of border region. Apparently, it is further building upon the agreement reached in 2005 referred to as “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of Border Question”.10

(d)   On terrorism, both sides agreed to promote more active regional and international cooperation. They also concurred to join hands in offering innovative and sustainable solutions to global challenges like natural calamities and climate change.

(e)   With regards to trade and economy, the areas of emphasis were starkly divergent. While India wanted the trade deficit to be balanced and sustainable, China on the other hand was focussed on investment, by tapping full potential and exploring new areas of cooperation.

(f)    Another important outcome was agreement to work jointly on an economic project in Afghanistan. The details are to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

(g)   On the issue of strategic autonomy and stability, the two sides were at variation. India’s view on peaceful, stable and balanced relations envisaged creating conditions for the ‘Asian Century’. China sees the two biggest developing economies as a positive factor for global stability. Both sides agreed to continuously enhance mutual trust and carry forward the fine norms enshrined in ‘Five Principles’ of peaceful coexistence.

Prognosis

Wuhan Summit, although termed as an informal meeting between Modi and Xi, was a meticulously planned, deliberately structured and precisely choreographed dialogue with far reaching ramifications. It was aimed to provide the two leaders a platform for ‘heart to heart’ candid exchange of views. Being strategic in nature, the underlying intent was to take holistic perspective of complex issues and explore innovative options for future progress. The thrust was on developing shared understanding, establishing personal rapport and exploring avenues of consensus for establishing effective structures for stable and balanced relations. While the themes of summit were common, the accents of the two sides were at variance, given the divergent perspectives. China’s political aspirations being global, its post- summit statements were articulated accordingly. Indian approach on the other hand, was more in the regional setting.

China’s core national objectives – Stability, Sovereignty and Modernity remain sacrosanct. Stability implies unchallenged authority of the Communist Party. To this end, Chinese leadership remains very sensitive to Tibet and Xinjiang. Sovereignty, besides strategic autonomy entails unification of claimed territories with the motherland which includes Taiwan, island territories in East and South China Sea and South Tibet (Xizang-Arunachal Pradesh). Modernity connotes development and economic progress; critical to the very survival of the Communist regime.

President Xi’s commitment to the national aims in letter and spirit is evident from the fact that he started his second innings by exhorting the PLA to be combat ready and focus on winning wars. During the closing session of the 13th NPC, Xi vowed to safeguard national sovereignty and not concede an inch of its territory.11 He also issued stern warning to Taiwan against any attempt of separatism.  In view of the above, China is unlikely to soften its stand on the border issue or forsake claims on Arunachal Pradesh. Its heavy handed policy on Tibet is there to continue as also pressure on India to keep distance from Dalai Lama. There is likely to be no significant change in Chinese relations with all- weather ally Pakistan. Even on the issues of candidature for the membership of UN Security Council or to be part of Nuclear Supply Group, Chinese are expected to stick to their current position. With the strategic guidance to the respective militaries, the tension on the borders is expected to ease out.

It is in India’s larger interest to collaborate with China and manage the differences through dialogue. To ensure continued engagement with Beijing on equal terms, Delhi needs to carry out strategic review of its national aims and objectives on a wider spectrum, factoring both regional and global imperatives. There is need for a pragmatic China policy with thrust on achieving strategic equilibrium between the two neighbours. This can only be achieved if India makes an earnest effort to scale up its ‘Comprehensive National Power’ and reduce the prevailing yawning gap. This includes both the hard and soft power. Indian Armed Forces have to adopt a transformational approach in modernisation process to match the PLA which is all set to emerge as modern military at par with the Western Armies by 2035. India has a major geostrategic advantage in the Indo-Pacific region which it needs to leverage through astute diplomacy.

Wuhan Summit was not merely tango between the Dragon and Elephant. It was a well thought through diplomatic initiative to give fresh impetus to the India-China relations in the realm of changing international environment. Informal structure of the meeting provided the two sides to think beyond the stated positions to dismantle existing gridlocks. The new format of ‘strategic communication’ between the two sides sets a precedence, for more such dialogues to follow.

Chinese leaders have penchant for ancient history and realpolitik approach to address the contentious issues.  Xi and his team would definitely take long term view of the Wuhan deliberations to recalibrate strategic calculus in consonance with the ‘Grand National Objectives’. On the Indian side, given the reality of ‘five year’ cycle based strategic culture, post 2019 scenario will be crucial to take Wuhan process forward. This notwithstanding,  in the larger national interest, Wuhan format needs to be institutionalised as a platform for strategic dialogue at the highest level, which will go a long way in balancing and stabilising India-China relations.

Endnotes

1 Henry Kissinger, (2011), On China, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, p1-2.

2 Ibid.

3 Kevin Rudd, (20 March 2018), What West Doesn’t Get About Xi Jinping, New York Times. Available at https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/what-west-doesnt-get-about-xi-jinping. Accessed on 20 May 2018, 10 am.

4 Mark Moore, (24 October 2017), New York Post, New York. Available at http://my post. Com. Accessed on 25 May 2018, 2pm. Times Global (25 October 2017) China Enshrines Xi’s Thoughts in Party Statute Elevating him to Mao’s Status, New Delhi.

5 Reuters (15 March 2018) China’s Unspoken Compact Put to Test by Xi Jinping Power Play.

6 China Daily Supplement-Hindustan Times (03 November 2017), New Delhi.

7 Op Cit 1, p20.

8 Narayan MK, (21 May 2018), Making Sense of Wuhan Reset, Hindu.

9 MEA Press Release (28 April 2018). Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/press.release.htm?dtl?29853?indiachina+informal+summit+at+wuhan. Accessed 15 May 2018, 2pm. Xinhua, (28 April2018), China India reach broad consensus in informal summit. Available at http://goggleweblight.com/i?u=http://www.xinhuanet.com?english/2018-04/29/c_137145546.htm & hi+en-IN. Accessed on 15 May 3pm.

10 Agreement between India and China-2005. Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl6534/Agreement+between+the + Government of +the +Republic +India+and +and +the +Government of+the+Peoples+Republic +of +China+on+the+Political+Parameters+ and+Guiding+Principles+for+the+Settlement+of+the+IndiaChina+ Boundary+Question.

11 The Economist (29 March 2018), Xi Jinping New Side Kicks- The Helmsman Crew. www.indianexpress.com

Barely 11, I was set to begin the nine-year trudge in pursuit of a cherished dream to serve the nation in uniform.

It was early morning on August 16, 1962, as we disembarked at the New Delhi railway station after an overnight journey from Jalandhar. With the coolie lugging my freshly painted box and new holdall, we headed for the waiting room as GT Express to Madras was in the afternoon.

The newspapers at the Wheeler Bookstall on the platform carried highlights of the Independence Day celebrations. Spontaneously, I shared with dad the memories of Independence Day proceedings at the Red Fort I had witnessed a few years earlier.

On the third day we were at Vijayawada. It was the first time I feasted on steaming hot idlis served with coconut chutney. Late in the afternoon, the train made sluggish entry into Madras station, dot on time. In the evening, we boarded Blue Mountain Express and arrived at Coimbatore in the morning. Most people, including porters, could communicate in English so we had no problem in finding our way.

Amaravathinagar, a hamlet nestled in the foothills of the Nilgiris, was a four-hour bus ride from Coimbatore. Finally, after a four-day journey, I was at Sainik School. Barely 11, I was set to begin the nine-year trudge in pursuit of a cherished dream to serve the nation in uniform.

We were around 150 of us in the first batch, coming from distant parts of the country, including Andaman and Nicobar Islands. While a few were wards of senior officials, most of us came from middle-class families. We shared one identity: Everyone had made it on merit through a competitive exam. Those whose parents could not afford to pay the school fee were given financial assistance by the state governments.

Our class of 20-odd included Anwar, Ranjit Singh and Peter. Initially, Ms Murphy was our class teacher. Later, it was Mr John from England, who was also our English teacher. Many local boys were proficient in Hindi. Soon those of us who came from the North were fluent in Tamil. Even today, conversation in Tamil with waiters at restaurants invariably earns me a complimentary helping of sambar.

The topics during the morning assembly highlighted India’s uniqueness, unity in diversity. This was evident on the sports field, too. In cricket, Sukhjeet Singh spearheaded the pace attack with Balakrishnan, the spin artist. Hockey forward line was anchored by Ravinder and self, Sunder the star goalkeeper. Similar was the case in other games and disciplines. This synergy and peer group learning was the main reason for our school’s outstanding all-round performance.

Five years on, half the class made it to the National Defence Academy. Over the next four years, during the pre-commission training, the idea of India we had imbibed in school was etched in our DNA, nation first always. Here on, repeatedly responding to the call, in the finest traditions of the army, became a way of life.

A few decades later, when I was faculty at Staff College, I happened to visit my school. Surprisingly, the whole environment had changed.

Over a period of time, the administrative control of Sainik Schools changed hands from the Centre to the states. Now, only students with domicile status are eligible to join Sainik Schools in their respective states. The multi-cultural identity of the school is now a matter of the past.

Reflecting on bygone times, India an idea stands overshadowed by the rising frenzy of sons of the soil syndrome and politically motivated narrow parochialism. Our generation owes to posterity to reverse this phenomenon. No sacrifice is too great for this cause.

Published in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLVIII, No. 612, April-June 2018

Mr Henry Kissinger’s seminal book “On China” begins with Chairman Mao Zedong briefing his top military commanders in October 1962, in the wake of Sino-Indian border standoff.1 Deep diving into history, he recalled that China and India had fought ‘one and half’ wars and there were valuable lessons to be drawn from each. The “first war” occurred during Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD) when China dispatched troops to support Indian Kingdom against an aggressive rival. After China’s intervention, the two countries enjoyed centuries of religious and economic exchanges. The lesson as Mao put it; “China and India were not doomed to perpetual enmity. They could enjoy long period of peace again, but to do so, China had to use force to ‘knock’ India back to negotiating table.” The “half war” Mao referred to was, when Mongol Timurlane sacked Delhi, almost seven hundred years later in 1398, killing over 100,000 prisoners. (Mao reckoned China and Mongolia then were part of same political entity).  When ordering offensive against India, Mao instructed his forces to be ‘restrained and principled’.  Accordingly, after inflicting crushing defeat on Indian forces, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) retreated to the original line of control, returning even the captured heavy equipment.2

The singular uniqueness of Chinese leaders lies in invoking strategic principles from millennium old events. No other country can claim to link its ancient classic dictums of strategy to its present statesmanship. This is why; the world often gets China wrong while decoding the mind of its leaders. Even in the recent past, series of incidences that occurred on India’s border with China invariably synchronised with important visits. Depsang in April 2013 preceded Chinese Prime Minister (PM) Li Keqiang visit to India, Demchok-Chumar happened in September 2014 when President Xi was in India and Doklam in June-August coincided with PM Modi’s visit to the USA.

President Xi Jinping is known to have deep understanding of Chinese history and seems to follow Mao. As per Mr Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, Xi is a man of extraordinary intellect with well-defined world view.3 Late Mr Lee Kuan Yew had compared Xi with the likes of Nelson Mandela. Therefore, informal summit (Fei Zhengshi Huitian) at Wuhan on 27-28 April 2018, at the behest of personal invitation from President Xi Jinping to PM Modi merits in-depth introspection and analysis. It was the second time that Xi made an exception to welcome any leader outside Beijing, first time in 2015 when he hosted Modi at Xian. Xi definitely would not be making such exceptional gestures without a grand design.  To unravel the labyrinth of Wuhan reset, it is pertinent to take a kaleidoscopic view of the strategic etymology, particularly from the Chinese perspective and its interpretation to gauge impact on the future course of India-China relations.

Strategic Etymology- Kaleidoscopic View

The circumstances which led to the informal summit at Wuhan can be largely attributed to the strategic review of the global environment by President Xi, in the realm of his recently enunciated doctrine. After assuming power as Fifth Generation Leader, President Xi surprised everybody by grossly bending the constitutional rules followed by his immediate predecessors. During the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, Xi had his “Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” enshrined in the Constitution.4  During the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2018,  he went on to abolish the Presidential term limit, to retain power for life.5 Thus, Xi has emerged as the most powerful leader after Mao.

Through its history, China has persuaded neighbours to acquiesce. It prospered only when the Emperor was strong and periphery peaceful. Xi commenced his second term with conviction that China needed strong personalistic leader. Accordingly, he gradually established himself both in the Party and PLA; twin pillars of Chinese power structure. Xi unleashed anti-corruption campaign to clean up the system and purge potential political rivals. Simultaneously, he initiated radical military reforms to prepare the defence forces for future global role and reinforce Party’s hold over the PLA.

During the Party Congress, Xi unfolded his doctrine centred on ‘China Dream’ (zhongmeng); which envisions ‘powerful and prosperous China’. It entails rejuvenation (fuxing) i.e. restoration of China’s past grandeur. To implement his grand vision, Xi outlined twin centenary objectives; People’s Republic of China (PRC) to become fully modern economy – achieve social modernisation by 2035 and acquire status of ‘great modern socialist country’ by middle of the Century.6 He also propounded the policy of ‘striving for achievements’ (fanfa youwei) and usher China into the New Era, advocating Beijing’s leadership role to shape China-centric global order. This marked a paradigm shift from Deng’s strategy of maintaining low profile till China completed its peaceful rise.

Xi has been empowered by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to be at the helm indefinitely,  to give him adequate time to complete the process of China’s rise as a global power. Besides, Chinese economy is in state of transition from low technology manufacturing to advance digitally enabled products. Further, continuity is considered vital in executing the mega global initiatives like the ‘belt-road’. With collective leadership on the backburner, the burden of performance now squarely rests on Xi. His failure could push China into chaos, given the high expectations of China’s rising middle class.

China has always opposed global security system based on American military alliances and partnerships. Therefore, China’s policy seeks diminution of American influence in the Asia-Pacific region. With US adopting ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, China accelerated its military modernisation process. In pursuit of the Chinese based world order, Beijing has undertaken series of initiatives to set up alternate multilateral structures to include Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Asia Infrastructure Development Bank (AIDB) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As per Beijing’s strategic calculus, in the coming decades, while China and USA will be the competing powers, the other important players will be India and Japan, both in its neighbourhood. Hostile periphery will not be conducive to China’s progress.

China at no cost will condescend to the idea of ‘Indo-Pacific’ gaining currency and Quad (US, India, Japan and Australia) grouping taking shape of an alliance. Even in the ancient times, its emperors dealt with the adversaries by pitching ‘one barbarian against the other’.7 To counter Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, China is keen to make Asia as the globalisation pivot. In the larger Pan-Asian sub-set, China views India as one of the important players. Beijing is also re-engaging Tokyo as part of its strategic review. Mr Li Keqiang visited Japan for the trilateral summit which included South Korea in May 2018. The trio strongly voiced for regional comprehensive economic cooperation encompassing ASEAN and other major economies; India, Australia and New Zealand. Sino-Russian relations over the recent years have transformed into strategic partnership.

In view of the aforesaid, Xi apparently has had a serious rethink on Beijing’s relations with its important neighbours. Doklam stand-off was also a trigger for China to reconsider its India policy. Xi is going about systematically to challenge America. In the process, Beijing is willing to yield tactical space to serve its larger strategic interests. How can PRC stake its claim to be a superpower; politically isolated and confined to Western Pacific?

From India’s perspective, there was an imperative need to recast China policy based on pragmatism through fresh initiatives.  PM Modi has established good personal rapport with president Xi. Hence, informal setting offered excellent opportunity to put across India’s concerns about the cross border terrorism, Chinese looming presence in India’s neighbourhood including India Ocean Region, China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC), impasse on the border issue and restoring glaring trade imbalance.

Wuhan Reset: Common Theme – Different Tones

Considerable effort went in by way of ministerial level meetings to set the stage for the Wuhan Summit. The basic rationale behind whole exercise was to build mutual trust and identify common ground to resolve vexed problems. Besides being on same page on a number of global issues, idea was also to evolve broad framework for strengthening bilateral relations.

Wuhan as a venue, situated on River Yangze in central China was a well-considered choice; given its rich historic past (unrest to unseat the Qing Dynasty started in the military barracks of the city) and to showcase China’s industrial prowess. Six meetings in the course of twenty four hours with open ended agenda allowed the two leaders to have a freewheeling dialogue with no pressure on the outcome. Mr Modi highlighted the need to have shared vision, shared thought process, shared resolve, strong relationship and better communications between the two neighbours. He further went on to define his vision of bilateral relationship in the form of five principles i.e. Thought (Soch), Contact (sampark), Cooperation (Sahyog), Determination (Sankalp) and Dream (Sapne). 8

In the absence of a joint communiqué, the two sides issued separate statements, with common themes and varying tones.9  Salient aspects are summarised below:-

(a)   One significant outcome was agreement between the two leaders to have such summits periodically, facilitating ‘strategic communications’ at the highest level.

(b)   Second important facet was of providing ‘strategic guidance’ to the respective militaries to build trust, mutual understanding and enhance cooperation in effective management of the border affairs. There was emphasis by both sides on ‘maturity and wisdom’ to handle differences; keeping each other’s sensitivities, concerns and aspirations in mind.

(c)   With regards to India-China border question, the two leaders expressed support for the work of Special Representatives. They urged for intensification of efforts to seek fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement, while underscoring the importance of ‘maintaining peace and tranquility’ in all areas of border region. Apparently, it is further building upon the agreement reached in 2005 referred to as “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of Border Question”.10

(d)   On terrorism, both sides agreed to promote more active regional and international cooperation. They also concurred to join hands in offering innovative and sustainable solutions to global challenges like natural calamities and climate change.

(e)   With regards to trade and economy, the areas of emphasis were starkly divergent. While India wanted the trade deficit to be balanced and sustainable, China on the other hand was focussed on investment, by tapping full potential and exploring new areas of cooperation.

(f)    Another important outcome was agreement to work jointly on an economic project in Afghanistan. The details are to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

(g)   On the issue of strategic autonomy and stability, the two sides were at variation. India’s view on peaceful, stable and balanced relations envisaged creating conditions for the ‘Asian Century’. China sees the two biggest developing economies as a positive factor for global stability. Both sides agreed to continuously enhance mutual trust and carry forward the fine norms enshrined in ‘Five Principles’ of peaceful coexistence.

Prognosis

Wuhan Summit, although termed as an informal meeting between Modi and Xi, was a meticulously planned, deliberately structured and precisely choreographed dialogue with far reaching ramifications. It was aimed to provide the two leaders a platform for ‘heart to heart’ candid exchange of views. Being strategic in nature, the underlying intent was to take holistic perspective of complex issues and explore innovative options for future progress. The thrust was on developing shared understanding, establishing personal rapport and exploring avenues of consensus for establishing effective structures for stable and balanced relations. While the themes of summit were common, the accents of the two sides were at variance, given the divergent perspectives. China’s political aspirations being global, its post- summit statements were articulated accordingly. Indian approach on the other hand, was more in the regional setting.

China’s core national objectives – Stability, Sovereignty and Modernity remain sacrosanct. Stability implies unchallenged authority of the Communist Party. To this end, Chinese leadership remains very sensitive to Tibet and Xinjiang. Sovereignty, besides strategic autonomy entails unification of claimed territories with the motherland which includes Taiwan, island territories in East and South China Sea and South Tibet (Xizang-Arunachal Pradesh). Modernity connotes development and economic progress; critical to the very survival of the Communist regime.

President Xi’s commitment to the national aims in letter and spirit is evident from the fact that he started his second innings by exhorting the PLA to be combat ready and focus on winning wars. During the closing session of the 13th NPC, Xi vowed to safeguard national sovereignty and not concede an inch of its territory.11 He also issued stern warning to Taiwan against any attempt of separatism.  In view of the above, China is unlikely to soften its stand on the border issue or forsake claims on Arunachal Pradesh. Its heavy handed policy on Tibet is there to continue as also pressure on India to keep distance from Dalai Lama. There is likely to be no significant change in Chinese relations with all- weather ally Pakistan. Even on the issues of candidature for the membership of UN Security Council or to be part of Nuclear Supply Group, Chinese are expected to stick to their current position. With the strategic guidance to the respective militaries, the tension on the borders is expected to ease out.

It is in India’s larger interest to collaborate with China and manage the differences through dialogue. To ensure continued engagement with Beijing on equal terms, Delhi needs to carry out strategic review of its national aims and objectives on a wider spectrum, factoring both regional and global imperatives. There is need for a pragmatic China policy with thrust on achieving strategic equilibrium between the two neighbours. This can only be achieved if India makes an earnest effort to scale up its ‘Comprehensive National Power’ and reduce the prevailing yawning gap. This includes both the hard and soft power. Indian Armed Forces have to adopt a transformational approach in modernisation process to match the PLA which is all set to emerge as modern military at par with the Western Armies by 2035. India has a major geostrategic advantage in the Indo-Pacific region which it needs to leverage through astute diplomacy.

Wuhan Summit was not merely tango between the Dragon and Elephant. It was a well thought through diplomatic initiative to give fresh impetus to the India-China relations in the realm of changing international environment. Informal structure of the meeting provided the two sides to think beyond the stated positions to dismantle existing gridlocks. The new format of ‘strategic communication’ between the two sides sets a precedence, for more such dialogues to follow.

Chinese leaders have penchant for ancient history and realpolitik approach to address the contentious issues.  Xi and his team would definitely take long term view of the Wuhan deliberations to recalibrate strategic calculus in consonance with the ‘Grand National Objectives’. On the Indian side, given the reality of ‘five year’ cycle based strategic culture, post 2019 scenario will be crucial to take Wuhan process forward. This notwithstanding,  in the larger national interest, Wuhan format needs to be institutionalised as a platform for strategic dialogue at the highest level, which will go a long way in balancing and stabilising India-China relations.

Endnotes

1 Henry Kissinger, (2011), On China, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, p1-2.

2 Ibid.

3 Kevin Rudd, (20 March 2018), What West Doesn’t Get About Xi Jinping, New York Times. Available at https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/what-west-doesnt-get-about-xi-jinping. Accessed on 20 May 2018, 10 am.

4 Mark Moore, (24 October 2017), New York Post, New York. Available at http://my post. Com. Accessed on 25 May 2018, 2pm. Times Global (25 October 2017) China Enshrines Xi’s Thoughts in Party Statute Elevating him to Mao’s Status, New Delhi.

5 Reuters (15 March 2018) China’s Unspoken Compact Put to Test by Xi Jinping Power Play.

6 China Daily Supplement-Hindustan Times (03 November 2017), New Delhi.

7 Op Cit 1, p20.

8 Narayan MK, (21 May 2018), Making Sense of Wuhan Reset, Hindu.

9 MEA Press Release (28 April 2018). Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/press.release.htm?dtl?29853?indiachina+informal+summit+at+wuhan. Accessed 15 May 2018, 2pm. Xinhua, (28 April2018), China India reach broad consensus in informal summit. Available at http://goggleweblight.com/i?u=http://www.xinhuanet.com?english/2018-04/29/c_137145546.htm & hi+en-IN. Accessed on 15 May 3pm.

10 Agreement between India and China-2005. Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl6534/Agreement+between+the + Government of +the +Republic +India+and +and +the +Government of+the+Peoples+Republic +of +China+on+the+Political+Parameters+ and+Guiding+Principles+for+the+Settlement+of+the+IndiaChina+ Boundary+Question.

11 The Economist (29 March 2018), Xi Jinping New Side Kicks- The Helmsman Crew. www.indianexpress.com

             IDSA COMMENT

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLVII, No. 610, October-December 2017.

Background

The Communist Party Convention, which is twice-a-decade event, is of immense political significance in People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is during the course of this Convention that the National Congress, symbolic body of Communist Party of China (CPC), ratifies key decisions made behind the closed doors by Party’s top brass. These include changes in the apex leadership structure, review of past achievements, amendments to Party constitution and realigning future direction.  The Nineteenth National Congress of CPC was held from 18-25 October 2017 at the ‘Great Hall of People’ in Beijing. It was attended by 2287 delegates, elected from amongst 89 million Party members.1 Incidentally, the First Party Congress was held in Shanghai from 23-31 July 1921. Then 13 delegates had participated while the Party membership was barely 50.

As per the ancient Chinese belief, it is the ‘mandate of heaven’ (tianming), the divine source of authority that grants an individual right to rule.2 Based on Confucian idea, it ensured dynastic succession, where power and not the lineage mattered. The tradition continued to be observed by various emperors as also politicians till the demise of last Qing Dynasty in 1911, marking the end of feudal monarchy system. Post Chinese Communist revolution in 1949, collective ‘Generational Leadership’ model was instituted to rule the nation.

The ‘First Generation’ CPC leaders were revolutionaries – People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Veterans, namely Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yi, led by Mao Zedong. To propel China into the league of industrialised nations, Mao came up with an innovative idea of adopting labour intensive approach. It involved setting up backyard furnaces in the rural areas to produce steel to catch up with the West. Perceived to be ‘Great Leap Forward’ (1958-60), the initiative turned out to be a disaster, leading to serious famine, killing millions of people. To retain his popularity and defang the opponents, Mao launched ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-76), which again proved to be a fiasco, causing serious economic turbulence. Over a period of time, Mao emerged as an autocrat. His ideology; ‘Mao’s Thoughts’, a political theory which propagated ‘collectivism in a classless society’, encapsulated in famous ‘red book’ was enshrined in the Party Constitution.3

Deng Xiaoping, a PLA Veteran assumed the ‘Second Generation’ leadership post Mao’s death. There was a brief spell of power struggle as Mao had left no successor. Deng did away with most Mao’s practices in 1978. His guiding ideology was ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, focussed on economic growth by easing government hold on the means of production.4 It entailed reforming agriculture by de-collectivising of farms. To unleash entrepreneurial spirit, Deng pushed for restructuring the industrial sector by allowing privatisation of small scale enterprises and, thereafter, opening of Chinese economy to foreign investors.  It was a clear departure from ‘class struggle’ enunciated by Mao. During Deng’s regime, while the general standard of living improved, the inequality gap widened too.

Jiang Zemin emerged as the core of the ‘Third Generation’ leadership after Deng’s demise in 1997 and pursued collective style of leadership. He officially adopted market economy and reformed ‘state owned enterprises’. His ‘three represents’ ideology, (san ge daibiao) propagated that the CPC should be the representative of advance social forces (to drive economic growth), culture and core interests of the Chinese society.5  Jiang believed in status quo and was averse to the idea of bold reforms. Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao, as the head of ‘Fourth Generation’ leadership laid emphasis on reforming social security. He introduced the concept of ‘scientific development and harmonious society’.6

For the ‘Fifth Generation’ Leadership, Xi was selected as a consensus candidate. On assuming power in 2012, he moved fast. Xi systematically consolidated position by strengthening hold on Party and PLA (twin pillars of power in China’s political structure) by virtue of triple titles; Secretary General of CCP, Chairman Central Military Commission (CMC) the highest military body and President of People’s Republic.

Given the menace of corruption that had got deeply engrained in the Party culture, Xi unleashed an unbridled campaign to clean up the system. This involved targeting both the low ranking bureaucrats, referred to as flies, to the highest level officials referred to as tigers. As a result, 278,000 persons have been implicated in the anti-corruption drive including 440 high ranking officials holding ministerial or higher positions in the government, both civil and military.7 Some of the stalwarts against whom disciplinary action had been initiated are; Zhou Yongkang – former member of the apex political body, Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and Bo Xilai – member Politburo and Party Secretary Chongqing. Besides, two senior most PLA Generals – Guo Boxing and Xu Caihu, Vice Chairmen of Central Military Commission (CMC) too faced corruption charges. The anti-corruption campaign has also proved handy in purging the political rivals.

According high priority to defence modernisation, President Xi initiated path breaking military reforms. The rationale was twofold; firstly to prepare defence forces for their future role and secondly, maintain Party’s firm control over the PLA. On 30 October 2014 at Gutian, a small town in Fujian Province, President Xi reiterated; “PLA remains Party’s Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters”; exactly repeating what Mao had said eight and half decades back.8 The reforms process started in 2013 with the establishment of National Security Commission, with Xi as the Chairman.  As a sequel to the reorganisation of CMC, President as the ‘Commander in Chief’ exercises direct operational control over the military through the ‘Joint Operational Center’. By ordering series of reshuffles in the top military ranks, Xi ensured that his loyalists occupied the key positions.

Nineteenth Party National Congress – Xi Sets Course

The Party Congresses are primarily about leadership, political vision and ideology. As brought out above, President Xi had worked assiduously during his first five year term to gain control of all levers of power. Nineteenth Party Congress was only a culmination of the power play wherein Xi further entrenched his position. By cementing CPC’s absolute authority and enshrining of “Xi Jinping Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” in the Party constitution as guiding principle makes Xi China’s most powerful leader, in the league of Mao.9 His eponymous political ideology proposes an alternate to liberal democracy around which CPC coalesces. Here on, any criticism of Xi policies will be deemed as an attack on the Communist Party itself.

In a clear departure from the Party’s well established tradition being followed over last two decades, PSC did not choose ‘Sixth Generation’ leader as successor to be groomed to take over from Xi when he completes his second five year term. Hence, it is apparent that Xi is set to continue well beyond 2022, by seeking third term, which will mean setting a new precedence. Interestingly, two probable contenders; Hu Chunhua (Party Chief of Guangdong Province) and Chen Miner (Party head of Chongqing City), Xi’s protégé did not make to the PSC; a mandatory requirement for the incumbent Party Secretary General.

It is evident that for the long term survival of ‘one party system’, it is an inescapable imperative that China sustains its fast pace of growth. This demands deft management of socio-economic transformation while excluding political reforms to avoid internal instability. Xi’s focus is on revival of CPC to improve the state governance. To achieve this, new generation of competent people are being inducted into the Party. Enforcing ‘rule of law’ is high on Xi’s agenda which implies strengthening the institutional mechanism, while idea of independent judiciary remains elusive. To navigate through the above paradoxes is a tall order for the Communist leadership.

Xi has unfolded ‘China Dream’ (fuxing) which envisions powerful and prosperous China. It aims at national rejuvenation, besides encouraging people to seek fulfilment beyond material wealth. While presenting his report during the opening session of the recent Party Congress, Xi rolled out his grand design. It referred to China, entering a ‘New Era’ marked by social contradictions. He has propounded policy of ‘striving for achievements’ (fanfa youwei), while advocating a greater Chinese leadership role in the world affairs. This marks an obvious departure from Deng’s strategy being followed implicitly for last over two decades, which professed China to ‘maintain low profile and bid for time’ till it completes peaceful rise.

To translate ‘China Dream’ into reality, Xi has outlined ‘twin centenary objectives’; to become ‘fully modern’ economy and society by 2035 and acquire ‘great power’ status by 2050, timed with the centenary foundation of the PRC.10 Xi’s vision envisages China to be a key player in shaping new world order with Chinese characteristics and regain its past grandeur; rightful place in the global polity.

Implications

Today, the global order is in flux. Three key players – the US, Russia and China are in the fray to shape it in consonance with their respective national interests. Given President Trump’s ‘Doctrine of Uncertainty’, the USA is in a state of ambiguity regarding its global role. Russia, under President Putin is still in delusion of Cold War symmetry. It seems to be heading for a major political crisis.11 On the other hand, President Xi has articulated a clear vision and long term strategy on China’s future role.

During marathon recital at the Party Congress opening session on 18 October, Xi stated that ‘no country alone can address the many challenges facing mankind and no country can retreat into isolation’. His envisioned architecture of great power interface is based on parity in US-China relations. Xi also reiterated China’s rejection of ‘Cold War political mentality’.  Now as a paramount leader, he is expected to pursue proactive diplomacy in restructuring the international systems, whose underlying rules will be increasingly framed by China.

With the US yielding strategic space in pursuit of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy coupled with eroding credibility of Western leadership,  Xi has projected himself as the flag bearer of globalisation and trade liberalisation.  At Davos World Economic Forum 2017, Xi strongly batted for globalised economy. Over the last five years, new institutions like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have been established. Concurrently, major projects like the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR) have been launched. These initiatives have been termed as the “community of common destiny”; extension of neighbour centric ‘periphery policy’ enunciated in 2013. Such measures will facilitate China to leverage its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) in pursuit of revised strategic objectives.

In his recent Congress speech, Xi had stated that China would strive to resolve disputes through dialogue but will not compromise on national sovereignty. He has begun his second term by exhorting over two million strong China’s military to be combat ready by focussing on how to win wars. China’s official stated position on the integration of claimed territories does not discount use of force as an option. For India, China under a powerful autocratic leader does not augur well, given the past record. 1962 War, standoffs in 1967 and 1987 occurred during Mao and Deng rule. Recent face-offs at Depsang, Demchok and Doklam have all taken place during Xi’s time. India will have to be prepared to counter growing Chinese assertiveness.12

Today, Xi rides the Dragon which is externally formidable but internally fragile. He is well aware of the consequences should his policies go awry. As political reforms are not on Xi’s agenda, it is economic growth that is the key to translate Xi’s China dream into reality. There is skeptism about the sustainability of China’s current economic model, given signs of slowing down. Therefore, some tough reforms are inevitable in the future which are likely to lead to social turbulence.

While beginning his first five years term, Xi had stated that to forge iron, you ought to be strong. Hence, he went about systematically to grab power and pushed through the process of consolidation ruthlessly, making himself unassailable. Xi envisions China to be a beacon of stability and prosperity following an alternate path, defying the Western model. Ironically, Chinese leadership’s oft-touted claim of peaceful rise is not in sync with actions. As per eminent scholar Graham Allison, the founder of Harvard Belfer Center, greatest challenge facing the globe is China’s rise. In his latest book “Destined for War – Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap”, he has stated that only through moderation and imaginative diplomacy can the conflict situation be avoided.13

Conclusion    

Xi joins the league of Mao and Deng while he does not belong to the tribe. Being smart and compared to the likes of Nelson Mandela by no lesser person than late statesman Lee Kuan Yew, he is not likely to commit the same mistakes as his predecessors. Xi is in quest of legacy as a great reformer. To this end, he has unfolded a grand design and set the course to usher China into a ‘new era’ and acquire superpower status in coming three decades. It’s a tough call fraught with high risks; but a price Xi is willing to pay to secure his ordained place in the history.

Endnotes

1 China Daily Supplement -Hindustan Times, 03 Nov 2017, New Delhi.

2 Jonathan Fenby, (2008), The Penguin History of Modern China, Penguin Group, London p 4.

3 Mao Ideology, available at https://www.britannnica.com. Accessed 20 Nov 2017, 3pm.

4 China Report 34, (1998), Sage Publication, New Delhi

5 Three represents CPC (23 June 2006). Available at http://english.CPC.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html. Accessed on 19 Nov 2017, 11 am

6 Kerry Brown (2012), Hu Jintao Silent Ruler, World Scientific, London, p 141-142.

7 Kevin Rudd (22 Oct 2017), Xi Jinping offers Long Term view of China’s Ambition, Financial Times Ltd. Available at http// Kevin rudd.com/blog/2017/10/23 kevin rudd, accessed on 15 Nov 2017, 11am.

8 David Shambaugh (1996), Soldier and State in China, and The Individual and State in China, Clarendon Press Oxford, New York, p 108.

9 Mark Moore, (24 Oct 2017), New York Post, New York. Available at https:// my post.com, accessed 20 Nov 2017, 4 pm.

10 Op. Cit. Note 1.

11 Oliver Carrol, (19 Nov 2017), Russia’s Uncertain Future, Independent Available at https:/www.google.co.in, assessed 20 Nov 2017, 5pm.

12 Chankya, Hindustan Times, 29 Oct 2017.

13 Graham Allison, (2017), Destined For War – Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, p vii.