Maj Gen (Dr) G G Dwivedi, who commanded a Jat battalion in this sector in 1992, and was subsequently the defence attaché to China in 1997, told The Indian Express over the phone that he is not surprised by the recent Chinese belligerence.

The peaks around the Galwan valley last saw bloodshed in 1962, when Chinese soldiers opened fire on a company of 5 Jat on October 22, killing 36 soldiers and capturing company commander Major S S Hasabnis. It marked the start of the 1962 war.

 

“It is part of China’s ‘nibble and negotiate policy’. Their grand aim is to ensure that India does not build infrastructure along the LAC, change the status of Ladakh, cosy up to the US and join the anti-China chorus caused by Covid-19. It is their way of attaining a political goal with military might, while gaining more territory in the process.’’

Dwivedi recounted the time he commanded 16 Jat in Pangong Tso and Hot Springs area in 1992. There was no tension between the two countries at that point. “We used to patrol up till Hot Springs and so did they. The Ladakh Scouts controlled the Galwan valley and did not encounter any problems either. We would learn of Chinese patrols from the red Hong Mei cigarette packets they left behind and graffiti on the rocks that read ‘Chung ko (This is China)’.” Dwivedi said the Indian troops would retaliate by scribbling ‘This is India’ on the rocks.

Things have changed, and Beijing is worried about India’s recent actions of reorganising Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and improving infrastructure in the region, Dwivedi said. “It has high stakes in PoK as the $60-billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) traverses through it, and it is also the site of the proposed $9 billion Diamer Bhasha Dam, a joint project of China and Pakistan.’’

He said that China’s current aggressive behaviour also coincides with pressure on President Xi Jinping, who is the chairperson of the Central Military Commission, due to opposition around the globe due to Covid-19 and the economic slowdown at home.

The PLA’s aim, said Dwivedi, is to dominate Durbuk-DBO road, strengthen its position in the Fingers area, halt the construction of link roads in Galwan-Pangong Tso and negotiate de-escalation on its terms.

“They have quietly and steadily built a lot of infrastructure along the LAC, and now they want to dominate the hilltops. Any military man will tell you that this matters because if you don’t occupy the hilltops, you are like a sitting partridge.’’

Decoding LAC Conflict

• Galwan faceoff: How serious is the situation, and what happens next?
• China, the Line of Actual Control and India’s Strategic Situation
• Growing power differential is what lies behind China’s assertion in Ladakh

On the way forward, Dwivedi said India must be firm on restoration of status quo as on April 30. “We must be firm on that, they should go back. We started to disengage but the Chinese did not, they want to consolidate their gains and make us accept the new LAC alignment.”

Negotiations depend on how strong you are on the ground. “Right now, the Chinese have an edge, we must neutralise it. We must either push them back or occupy some other place that affects them.”

Military action, said Dwivedi, should be accompanied by political, diplomatic and economic action. “We must isolate China in the geo-political arena and ensure a consensus in our favour. Last but not the least, let us present a united front as a nation and win the propaganda war as well.”

 

 

 

Published in IDSA on Aug 27, 2019

Maj Gen GG Dwivedi (retd)
Former Defence Attaché in China

Hong Kong’s basic character has changed under China’s control. The chief executives of the territory have gradually become more responsive to the efforts of the mainland leadership to dilute the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ arrangement by impinging on civil liberties. China has been blamed for whisking people onto mainland for detention and torture.

Hong Kong’s return to the motherland on July 1, 1997, marked the reversal of the ‘Century of Humiliation’ (1839-1949), a period during which China suffered a series of ignominious defeats at the hands of colonial powers. Forced to yield to the will of the victors, leasing of Hong Kong Island to Britain in 1898 for 99 years was one such act of concession.

Since the handover, July 1 has been observed as a public holiday (Establishment Day) in Hong Kong. This year, instead of celebrations, it turned out to be a day of rebuking the Chinese rule, as anti-government protesters stormed into and ransacked the city’s Legislative Council, displaying British-era colonial flags. Territory’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s claims of ‘22-year successful Chinese rule’ sounded hollow as the protests laid bare the reality of the deeply fractured Hong Kong society. Around a million of Hong Kong’s 7 million population took to the streets.

Violent protests against the city administration began in mid-June this year, arising from the fear of eroding freedom. The trigger was the Hong Kong’s Government’s move to pass the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation Bill (Extradition Bill) which would allow Hong Kong citizens and foreigners accused of crimes to be extradited for trial to mainland China. This was seen as a deliberate attempt by the government to undermine the independence of Hong Kong’s legal system. Two days after the protests, Lam said the government won’t proceed with the law until public anxieties and fears were properly addressed.

Not convinced, a week later, thousands of protesters marched on streets of Tsim Sha Tsui, a popular tourist area of Hong Kong, in a bid to gain support from the mainland Chinese visitors. On July 9, Lam finally admitted that her administration’s attempt to introduce the Extradition Bill was a failure and assured that the government would not seek to revive it in Parliament. However, she refused to give in to the demand to withdraw the Bill from the legislative agenda, which led to a provocative response from the anti-government camp.

The daily rallies have been marked by increasing violence and confrontation with the police. The protesters have also demanded direct election to the city’s Chief Executive, currently chosen by Beijing. Hong Kong citizens’ real resistance is against People’s Republic of China. Li Bijian, Minister at Chinese Embassy in India has said, “What happens in Hong Kong is China’s internal affair. China will safeguard its sovereignty, security and development interests, and Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.”

Hong Kong, which had been under British rule for a century and a half, had acquired the status of a major global financial centre. Therefore, at the time of handover, in order to maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity, its legal system and culture, the Chinese Communist leadership agreed to a unique arrangement, ‘One Country, Two Systems’, enshrined by Deng Xiaoping. It implied that Hong Kong will legally be part of China, but as a ‘Special Administrative Region’ with freedom to enact its own laws (excluding foreign policy and defence) and enjoy freedom of speech and independent judiciary for the next 50 years.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) arrangement was not without scepticism, vindicated by several protest movements since the handover. In 2003, the HKSAR Government Chief Executive made a bid to introduce legislation redefining the scope of ‘treason’ that would have drastically curtailed freedom to criticise the Chinese Government. In 2014, there were large scale pro-democracy protests demanding an end to China’s surreptitious encroachment on citizens’ liberties. These went on for months and came to be known as the ‘Umbrella Movement’. The movement fizzled out due to the government’s unrelenting stance against making concessions to the protesters.

Hong Kong’s basic character has changed over the past two decades under China’s control. The territory’s chief executives over the years have become more responsive to the efforts of the mainland leadership to dilute the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ arrangement by gradually impinging on civil liberties. China has been blamed for whisking people out of Hong Kong onto the mainland for detention and torture. Even the local media is restrained today while reporting on issues considered sensitive by the Communist leadership.

In economic terms, Hong Kong’s clout has diminished over the years. In 1997, its GDP was almost one-fifth of China’s, while now it is down to 3 per cent. With significant presence of Chinese companies and financial institutions in Hong Kong, HKSAR dependence on the mainland has increased.  Shanghai, given its rapid growth as China’s financial capital, could emerge as a viable alternative to Hong Kong.

Political developments on the mainland don’t augur well for Hong Kong. Since President Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013 as the Fifth-Generation Leader, the Communist Party rule has become more authoritarian and assertive, both at home and abroad. Yang Jiechi, politburo member, Communist Party of China, has blamed the US and other Western countries for stirring trouble, whereas the movement appears to be indigenous.

Today, China’s security concerns are primarily internal as it faces virtually no external threat. Hence, sovereignty and stability stand out as its key national objectives, implying ‘zero tolerance’ to any kind of dissent. As per its latest white paper, National Defence in New Era, China retains the option to use force to unify Taiwan. Regarding Hong Kong’s situation, Beijing wants the city administration to halt the protests and deal with pro-democracy activists sternly. The protesters may have forced Lam to yield ground on the Extradition Bill, but in the long run, Beijing expects the movement to peter out as it tightens control over HKSAR. However, young activists like Joshua Wong, a Nobel Peace Prize nominee who was convicted and jailed in 2017 and released recently, are proving a tough nut to crack.

Massive drills involving some 12,000 soldiers of the Chinese People’s Armed Police (PAP) — part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) — along with armoured vehicles were staged at Shenzhen, a city in southern China adjacent to Hong Kong on August 6. It was meant to convey a veiled threat to the protesters of possible intervention. The PLA garrison in Hong Kong so far has remained confined to the barracks. Should the situation take a turn for the worse, the Communist leadership has the will to quell the protests by force, catastrophic consequences notwithstanding. However, Global Times, a government-controlled English daily, in a rare reference to Tiananmen, has insisted that the country has more sophisticated methods to handle the Hong Kong crisis than those employed 30 years ago.

The current impasse in Hong Kong poses the most serious challenge to the Chinese leadership since the territory’s integration with the mainland. The ‘One Country, Two Systems’ arrangement is at the crossroads, set to be consigned to the archives well before 2047— its expiry year.

 

 

Published in USI Journal Book

Abstract

Chinese leaders are known to have penchant for nations history. To decode China’s doctrine and its ways of war fighting, it is imperative to have a deeper understanding of its strategic culture. Hard power, an important component of Chinese concept of ‘Comprehension National Power’ (CNP) has been frequently employed by its leadership in pursuit of national interests. Beijing has continuously refined its war- fighting doctrines in consonance with prevailing security environment. Its current military doctrine of “Local War under Informationisation Conditions” is well aligned to further nation’s quest to acquire superpower status. China’s rapidly growing military capability under President Xi Jinping has serious implications for the global polity.

 Genesis

The Chinese thinkers have a great sense of history, vindicated by an old proverb; “Farther you look back-further you look ahead”. Thought process of Chinese leadership continues to be influenced by ancient wisdom, deeply rooted in four and half millennium old civilization. Hence, to comprehend the essence of China’s doctrinal architecture and decode its ways of warfighting, it is imperative to gain insight into its history and strategic culture.

In the Confucian doctrine, Guanxi implies reciprocal relationship based on ‘network of balanced interactions’ amongst the states1. Yizhan on the other hand, pertains to ‘tenets of righteous warfare’- a concept which emerged during the turbulent ‘Spring-Autumn’ period (770-476 BCE). Whereas, Sun Zi ‘doctrine of legalism’ enunciated in the classic ‘Art of War’ set in the Warring Period’ (475-221 BCE) propounded military as an instrument to rein in the adversary. Traditionally, Chinese strategic thinking professed that best way to respond to threat was by eliminating it; stressing the value of violent solutions to conflict, with preference to offensive over defensive strategies. No surprise, China used force eight times during the period 1950-85.

During the ‘Imperial Era’, Chinese security strategy was centred on the defence of heartland, encompassing plains of Yellow River in the North and Yangze River in the South, against threat emanating from bordering regions namely Xinjiang, Mongolia (both Outer and Inner), erstwhile Manchuria and Tibet. The basic strategy was a mix of border defence and employment of coercive and non-coercive means2. China remained unified except for two brief periods (220-589 AD and 907-960 AD) when it was fragmented. Besides, there were two non-Han dynasties; (Yuan 1279-1368 and Qing 1644-1910). The Chinese strategists harbour a firm belief that their country was more secure when internally strong, with subdued neighbourhood, ensuring peaceful periphery.

Chinese emperors sought tribute from weaker nations, pursuing expansionist and hegemonic policies. It was due to the weakness of the Qing Dynasty and continental mind-set that China lost its prime position. The Chinese attribute their nation’s suffering during the ‘century of humiliation’; period from First Opium War (1839-42) to1949, primarily to twin factors i.e. internal unrest and foreign aggression (Nei Luan-Wai Huan).

China’s military strategic culture lays great emphasis on Shi i.e. strategic configuration of power to achieve specific objectives. Aim is not to seek annihilation but relative deployment of own resources to gain position of advantage or ‘strategic encirclement, as in the game wei qi3. China’s latest grand initiatives, namely the ‘Belt-Road’ and ‘Maritime Silk Route’ are adaptions of this strategy. Surprise and deception marked by unpredictability are the inherent component of Chinese stratagem. Every move is thought through on the checker board. Negotiation process is always long drawn-to force a favourable deal.

China’s military strategic culture lays great emphasis on Shi i.e. strategic configuration of power to achieve specific objectives. Aim is not to seek annihilation but relative deployment   of   own    resources to gain position of advantage or ‘strategic encirclement, as in the game wei qi.

Even today, Chinese military handbooks routinely refer to old classics and battles fought some four thousand years back. A case in point is Dr Henry Kissinger’s narration about Chairman Mao briefing his commanders on the eve of ‘1962-Sino-Indian War’ in his seminal book ‘On China’. Mao recalled that China and India had fought one and half wars earlier. First one was during the Tang Dynasty when Wang Xuanxe led

Sino-Tibetan force against King Harshavardhana’s rebellious successor to

avenge humiliation in 649 AD. The ‘Half War’ was Timurlane ransacking Delhi, some 700 years later. The historic lesson, as Mao put it; “Post China’s interventions, the two countries enjoyed long period of peace and harmony. But to do so, China had to use force to ‘knock’ India back to negotiation table”4.

Chinese defence doctrines post 1949 have been based on the grand strategy, factoring national objectives and threat perceptions, drawing richly from the past. Its war fighting ways have continuously evolved, marked by

major doctrinal shift. In the earlier stages, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was constrained to fight with whatever weapons that were available. Over a period of time, with Chinese capability to produce high-tech systems, it is now the doctrine which drives the choice of weapons.

The paper delves into the dynamic process of China’s doctrinal shift, its capacity building and ways to prosecute the future wars.

Doctrinal Shift-Since 1949

During the four decades period from 1911-49, China as a Republic made tectonic transition from Imperial Era to a Communist State – the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The architect of this shift was the Communist Party of China (CCP). Established in 1921, under Mao, its main stay was ‘peasant revolution’. The highlight of Communists eight years ‘civil war’ campaign culminating in successful revolution in 1949 was the national power; its key components being the political agenda, mass support and propaganda machine5.

China has long theoretical and historical tradition of seeking asymmetric responses to strategic challenges. The concept of asymmetric warfare originated with Sun Zu emphasizing numerous strategies to defeat the enemy, later Mao propagating the ‘people’s war’ concept of exploiting the masses.

 

Mao’s ‘People’s War’ doctrine was driven by the vital national interestsPeople’s War (1949-78)

i.e. unity, security and economic progress, premised on the defence of hinterland. It was configured around the notion of ‘total war’ which included employment of nuclear weapons by the adversary.  Defensive in nature, it was to be fought by luring enemy deep into Chinese territory, causing attrition in a gradual manner, trading space for time, characterised by mass employment of regular troops to make up for inferior weapon systems, with heavy reliance on militia forces.

In pursuit of the ‘People’s War’ Doctrine, Mao went in for limited war against ill prepared India in 1962, to keep the neighbour restrained. Again in 1969, with border tension leading to Ussuri River skirmish (Damanski-Zhenbao Islands), Mao took on President Brezhnev.

Mao’s strategy was a combination of ‘Protraction and Attrition’; implied

diplomatic manoeuvre with the strong and coercion against weak. In 1949, PRC aligned with erstwhile Soviet Union to ward off threat from Japan. In October 1950, PLA marched into Tibet, re-establishing Chinese control to ensure stable periphery. Around the same time, perceiving Mac Arthur’s advance across the 38th Parallel as threat to the mainland, China jumped into the Korean War. In pursuit of the ‘People’s War’ Doctrine, Mao went in for limited war against ill prepared India in 1962, to keep the neighbour restrained. Again in 1969, with border tension leading to Ussuri River skirmish (Damanski-Zhenbao Islands), Mao took on President Brezhnev. By openly challenging Soviet Union, China was able to set stage for reconciliation with America to imbalance the adversary.

People’s War/Local War under Modern Conditions (1979-90)

In February 1979, China launched a massive attack on Vietnam to reassert its control over the latter, in pursuit of its ‘peaceful periphery’ policy. It was in keeping with its aggressive strategy of using force to achieve political objectives. PLA performed poorly which led to review of its doctrine and structures This also coincided with Deng Xiaoping’s ‘four modernisations’ drive launched in December 1978. The new military doctrine-“People’s War under Modern Conditions” was focused on mitigation of threat from the Soviet Union. Earlier concept centred on defence was revised in favour of mobile warfare, with pre-eminence of modern weapons in war fighting. Towards the mid-1980s, with the gradual decline of Soviet Union and change of threat perception, there was again a strategic review, resulting in the formulation of new doctrine of “Local War under Modern Conditions”.

 

Local War under High Tech Conditions (1991-2004)

The high intensity ‘1991 Gulf War’ and changed international situation were key factors for PLA to initiate major doctrinal reforms during the 1990s. In 1995, the Central Military Commission (CMC) the highest military body put forth ‘New Generation Operation Regulations’ (xin yidai zhuozhan tiaoling) to ‘fight and win future wars’. The two transformations (liangge zhuanbian) sought to make Chinese military undergo metamorphoses; first-from an Army preparing to fight and win ‘local wars under ordinary conditions’ to fight and win ‘local wars under high-tech conditions’ and second-to transform the armed forces from one based on quality to one based on quality. An important component of the new doctrine was the concept of ‘War Zone Campaign’ (WZC)”. More offensive in design; ‘active defence’ being the core element, it encompassed controlled space and time, deployment of Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs) and combined arms operations.6 It envisioned prosecution of future campaigns under ‘Unified Joint Services Command’ guided by the CMC.

Central Military Commission (CMC) the highest military body put forth ‘New Generation Operation Regulations’ (xin yidai zhuozhan tiaoling) to ‘fight and win future wars’. The two transformations (liangge zhuanbian) sought  to make Chinese military undergo metamorphoses; first- from an Army preparing to fight and win ‘local wars under ordinary  conditions’  to fight and win ‘local wars under high-tech conditions’ and second- to transform the armed forces from one based on quality to one based on quality.

China’s White Papers act as authentic indicators of doctrinal shift since the late 1990s. The first ‘White Paper’ was released in July 1998 titled “China’s National Defence7”. It was for the first time that PRC systematically expounded on its defence policies and explicitly expressed its new outlook on security. Second ‘White Paper’ followed two years later which laid stress on China’s priorities in safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity. Another ‘White Paper’ on ‘China’s National Defence’

was released in December 2002 which brought China’s core national interests as the fundamental basis for formulation of the defence policy. The ‘Gulf War 2003’ demonstrated the importance of ‘mechanisation’ and ‘informationisation’. In 2004, President Hu Jintao laid down revised mandate for the military; “to win local wars under informationised conditions”.Consequently, the 2004 ‘White Paper’ propounded the idea of dual historic mission of ‘mechanisation and informationisation’, besides delving on the concept of ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) with Chinese characteristics8.

 

Local War under Informationised Conditions (2005 onwards)

The first decade of the new millennium was perceived by the Chinese strategic community as the ‘critical period of multi-polarisation’ leading to the review of national security strategy, dealt in the ‘White Paper’ released in 2006. As per threat assessment by the security experts, probability of full-scale external aggression was unlikely in the near terms. However, in the

future conflicts, the PLA would be faced with technologically superior adversary. Therefore, the idea behind reframing national doctrine from ‘high-tech conditions’ to ‘informationised conditions’ was on the assumption that through informationised conditions, technologically superior adversary could be defeated.

Chinese military doctrine of ‘Local Wars under Informationised Conditions’ has two components. ‘Local Wars’ envision short swift engagements with limited military objectives in pursuit of larger political aim. ‘Informationised Conditions’ refers to the penetration of technology into all walks of modern life, but specific to war fighting includes IT, digital and ‘artificial intelligence’ applications. It implies network-centric environment and waging information operations to ensure battlefield domination. In essence, the aim is to achieve complete security of PLA networks while totally paralyzing that of adversary’s. This encompasses electronic warfare along with psychological warfare and deception to attack enemy’s Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, employing both hard and soft kills.

The concept of ‘informationisation’ is broad-based, all-inclusive and gives prominence to information ascendency as the decisive determinant and the key battle-winning factor. Salient operational facets of ‘Limited War under Modern

 

Informationised Conditions’ include induction of high-tech force multipliers, network centricity, Information Warfare (IW), jointness and interoperability, control of outer space, integrated forward logistics system and ideal man-machine mix.

 

Decoding – China’s Ways of War Fighting

As evident from the above, the Communist leadership has continuously reviewed the war fighting doctrines in consonance with prevailing security environment. To visualise the future course, it is important to analyse the rationale behind path- breaking military reforms initiated by President Xi Jinping over the last five years. On assuming the mantle of the Fifth Generation leadership in 2012, President Xi unfolded ‘China Dream’ (fixing-restoration) which envisions ‘powerful and prosperous’ China. To translate his ‘China Dream’ into reality, he outlined twin objectives; first to become ‘fully modern economy by 2035’ and acquire ‘great power status by 2049’. President Xi Jinping foresees China to be the key player in shaping the new world order with Chinese characteristics. Alongside stability and economic progress, sovereignty is a glue to foster nationalism. It implies security of periphery and integration of Taiwan and other claimed territories with the motherland, wherein use of force remains an option.

The Ninth ‘White Paper’ on ‘National  Defence’  published  in  May 2015 was titled ‘China’s Military Strategy’. Its focus is on building strong national defence and powerful armed forces as a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development. The theme is ‘active defence’ and stress remains on winning ‘local wars under conditions of modern technology’. Priority has been accorded to Navy and Air Force vis-à-vis the ground forces. It also marked a shift in the naval strategy from ‘off shore waters defence’  to  combined  strategy  of ‘off shore waters defence and open sea protection’ to secure its maritime interests. Establishment of ‘Air Defence Identification Zone’ (AIDZ) is in sync with the new strategy.

The sense of urgency with which President Xi Jinping initiated the transformational process could be attributed to the geopolitical considerations – U.S. strategy of rebalancing to Asia-

Pacific being a major factor. The underlying rationale behind the critical reforms was twofold; firstly prepare the military for China’s expanding global role and secondly, establish Party’s firm control over the PLA through the revamped CMC. The Ninth ‘White Paper’ on ‘National Defence’ published in May 2015 was titled ‘China’s Military Strategy’. Its focus is on building strong national defence and powerful armed forces as a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development. The theme is ‘active defence’ and stress remains on winning ‘local wars under conditions of modern technology’9. Priority has been accorded to Navy and Air Force vis-à-vis the ground forces. It also marked a shift in the naval strategy from ‘off shore waters defence’ to combined strategy of ‘off shore waters defence and open sea protection’ to secure its maritime interests. Establishment of ‘Air Defence Identification Zone’ (AIDZ) is in sync with the new strategy.

Salient facets of China’s future was fighting are as under10:-

• Adopt holistic approach to balance ‘war preparation’ and ‘war prevention’, create favourable posture, resolutely deter and ‘win informationised local wars’.
• Respond to multi-directional security threats; adhere to principles

of flexibility and mobility to facilitate concentration of superior forces while ensuring self- dependence.

• Employ integrated combat forces to prevail in system-vs-system operations, featuring information dominance, precision strikes and joint
• Plan for strategic deployment and military dispositions to clearly divide areas of responsibility, with the ability to support each other as organic whole e. reorientate from ‘theatre’ to ‘trans-theatre’ operations.
• Build a modern system of military forces with Chinese characteristics and constantly enhance
• Continue to pursue the strategy of “Nibbling and Negotiating” (yi bian dan, yi bian da -talking and fighting concurrently); case in point, its actions in the South China Sea.

• As part of defence diplomacy, expand military cooperation with major powers and neighbouring countries, for the establishment of regional security framework.

To align the specific services potential with the above strategic direction, salient advances in the armaments are designed to achieve domination in the field of information warfare, anti-radiation missiles, electronic attack drones, direct energy weapons, airborne early warning control system, anti-satellite weapons and cyber army under the ‘Strategic Support Force’11. Even the focus of the Chinese military publications dealing with new modes of war fighting is on jointness and space-based operations. Information based operations are an on-going process, conducted even during the peace time, which could prove a valuable asset during the times of conflict.

At the macro level, major changes have been instituted with focus on civil-military integration, jointness and speedy decision- making process. With the redefined role, CMC is now responsible for formulating  policies,  controlling all the military assets and higher direction of war.

Key Result Areas (KRAs) for the services have been clearly defined in keeping with the higher strategic direction. PLA Army (PLAA) is required to reorient from ‘theatre defence’ and adapt to precise ‘trans-theatre mobility’ missions. PLA Navy (PLAN) while gradually shifting focus to ‘offshore waters defence with open sea protection’ is required to build a combined, multi-functional and efficient maritime force structures. PLA Air Force (PLAFF) in line with the strategic requirements to execute informationised operations is to create requisite structures to ensure transition from erstwhile territorial air defence to building air-space capabilities. Besides it is also expected to boost early warning, air strike, information counter measures and force projection potential.

The ‘Rocket Force’ is adopting transformational measures through reliance on technology upgrades; enhance safety and reliability of missile systems both nuclear and conventional, thus strengthening strategic deterrence. The ‘Strategic Support Force’ is to deal with challenges in the outer space and secure the national space assets. Besides, it is also required to expedite the development of ‘Cyber Force’ by enhancing situational awareness and security of national information networks.

Systems and structures have been revamped across the board. At the macro level, major changes have been instituted with focus on civil- military integration, jointness and speedy decision-making process. With the

redefined role, CMC is now responsible for formulating policies, controlling all the military assets and higher direction of war. As a sequel to the military reforms, the Theatre Commanders directly report to the CMC.

At the operational level, erstwhile 17 odd Army, Air Force and Naval commands have been reorganised into five ‘Theatre Commands’ (TCs); Eastern, Western, Central, Northern and Southern. With all the war fighting resources in each battle zone placed under one commander ensures seamless synergy in deploying land, air, naval and strategic assets in a given theatre. In addition, 84 corps level organisations have been created including 13 operational corps, as well as training and logistics installations. Given the sensitivity of Korean Peninsula and disputed islands territories, the deployment is biased towards Eastern and Northern Theatres. The broad area of responsibility of the reorganised TCs is as under:-

 

™	Eastern–Nanjing	(Taiwan, East China Sea)	– 71, 72 & 73 Corps
™	Southern–Guangzhou	(Vietnam and South China Sea)	– 74 &75 Corps
™	Western–Chengdu	(India & Internal Security)	– 76 &77 Corps
™	Northern–Shenyang	(Korean Peninsula & Russia)	– 78, 79 & 80 Corps
™	Central–Beijing	(Internal Security & Reserves)	– 81, 82 & 83 Corps

 

China’s naval strategy in the Western Pacific is to counter U.S. aircraft carrier-based assets by concentrating on the nuclear-powered stealth submarines, littoral class surface ships and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles DF-21D ( high precision heavy warhead aircraft carrier killers). It is also known to have deployed DF-26 Missiles, ‘Guam Killer’ with a range of 5500 km. Besides Liaoning, three more aircraft carriers are expected to join PLAN soon. Current fleet of 62 submarines is expected to add another 15 boats in the near future.

To make the armed forces nimbler, a reduction of 300,000 rank and file, mostly from non-combatant positions has been ordered which will downsize the PLA to around to 1.8 million. To support capacity building in pursuit of its envisioned warfighting, adequate budgetary support has been provided with substantial periodic increase in the defence expenditure. The defence allocations for the year 2018 was pegged at $ 175 bn12. (Taking into account the hidden expenditure, the actual figures are much higher).

 

Conclusion

President Jiang Zemin had stated – “PRC should first turn itself  into  a  powerful  country if it intends to make a greater contribution to progress of mankind and world peace”.  The grand strategy of the PLA here on, was based on the key assumption that economic prosperity will afford China greater international influence, diplomatic leverage and robust modern military.

But for China, no other country can claim to link its ancient classics and dictums of strategic thoughts to its present statesmanship. This is evident from the singular uniqueness of PRC leadership, which as a matter of practice, invokes principles of warfare from events dating back to thousands of years. As a result, Its national defence policies are deeply impacted by the nation’s strategic culture.

The Chinese strategic community has continuously reviewed its war- fighting strategies inconsonance with the international security environment, resulting in periodic doctrinal shifts. Mao Zedong, the architect of 1949 Communist Revolution propounded the concept of ‘People’s War’, as major security concern then was the defence of hinterland. As a sequel to the strategic review undertaken towards the early 1980s, it was perceived that while major wars were unlikely, yet China getting involved in the limited local conflicts remained high. Consequently, ‘modern conditions’ was added to ‘People’s War’ doctrine. Large scale restructuring of defence forces was undertaken as part of the ‘Four Modernisations’.

A decade later, given the seismic changes in global arena and technology intensive operations by the US during the ‘1991 Gulf War’ led to China initiating major doctrinal reforms. By the late 1990’s, PLA operationalised the revised doctrine; “Local Wars under High-Tech Conditions”. It is around this time that former President Jiang Zemin had stated- “PRC should first turn itself into a powerful country if it intends to make a greater contribution to progress of mankind and world peace”. The grand strategy of the PLA here on, was based on the key assumption that economic prosperity will afford China greater international influence, diplomatic leverage and robust modern military.

The year 2005 witnessed yet another shift in the Chinese war fighting doctrine as both during the ‘2003 Gulf War’ and Kosovo conflict, importance of mechanisation and informationisation was duly highlighted. Hence, the rationale behind reframing the doctrine from ‘High-Tech’ to ‘Informationised Conditions’ was the conviction of the Chinese strategists that through the ‘Informationisation’ ascendency, it was possible to defeat a technologically superior adversary. Whereas mechanisation was to provide foundation, informationisation was the driving force.

Deep rooted military reforms initiated by President Xi Jinping since 2013 has provided major impetus towards operationalisation of “Local Wars under Informationised Conditions” Doctrine. Focus of ‘Ninth White Paper’ is on winning ‘local wars in conditions of modern technology’. President Xi Jinping commenced his second term in 2018 by exhorting the 2.3 million strong PLA to be combat ready and focus on ‘how to win wars’. He has laid down 2035 as the timeline for PLA to transform into a modern fighting force, at par with Western Armies, fully capable of supporting

China’s global role.

The impact of China’s doctrinal shift and its growing war waging potential is evident from Beijing’s growing assertiveness, in pursuit of its strategic interests. The latest Pentagon Report has sounded alarm on China’s relentless drive for global expansion, both by military and non-military means. PRC is on a spree to acquire string of military bases, especially in the Indian Ocean Region. This will enable PLA to project power to enhance its strategic footprint and emerge as a pre-eminent power in the Indo-Pacific region. As per Dan Taylor, senior US defence intelligence analyst, China is rapidly building robust and lethal force with capabilities spanning the ground, air, maritime, space and information domains, designed to enable Beijing to impose its will in the region and beyond13.

For India the implications are serious given its complex relations with China. While India is not in position to match China’s fast expanding military and economic clout, it is also constrained to join any grouping such as the ‘Quad’ with US, Japan and Australia so as not to antagonise China. Above paradox notwithstanding, India has no option but to revamp its military preparedness and scale up its defence budget to thwart any misadventures as Doklam type of situations could be a new normal. Delhi also has to have its long term policy in place to emerge as an important player in the Indo-Pacific.

In the Chinese concept of ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP), hard power is a key component. Its military culture lays immense emphasis on ‘strategic configuration of power’ to create favourable disposition of forces and exploit asymmetric edge. PRC has set course to emerge as a superpower by the mid of this Century, with its military’s doctrine fully aligned to support the grand design. Hence, it is vital for the global polity particularly the neighbourhood to follow PRC’s war fighting doctrinal developments closely as Communist leadership narrative on nation’s rise to be peaceful-defies its past legacy.

 

Endnotes

• Liang Hung Lin, (March 2011), Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 99, pp441-51.
• Michael D Swine & Ashley J Tellis (2000), Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, p59
• Henry Kissinger, (2011), On China, Penguin Books, New York, p23-25.
• Note 3, op cit,
• Mark A Ryan, ( 2016), Introduction to Pattern of People’s War Fighting,
• Personal visit as Defence Attaché in China to 43 Airborne Division at Kaifeng in June
• White Paper China National Defence (July1998), (The author was then Defence Attaché in China and was present when the first White Paper was released by the Director, Foreign Affairs Bureau, PLA).
• White Paper, National Defence (2004),
• White Paper-China’s Military Strategy (May 2015),
• https:// economictimes.indiatimes com. Accessed 16 January 2019,
• Times of India, (17 March 2019), Expansionist China Alarms Pentagon, New

 

 

China is rapidly building a robust and lethal force with capabilities spanning the ground, air, maritime, space and information domains, designed to enable Beijing to impose its will on the region and beyond. India finds itself in a catch-22 situation. While not in a position to effectively counter China’s expansionist design, it is constrained to join regional grouping ‘Quad’ with US, Japan and Australia.

Arecent Pentagon report has raised the alarm on China’s relentless drive for global expansion, both by military and non-military means. As per Dan Taylor, a senior US defence intelligence analyst, People’s Republic of China is rapidly building a robust and lethal force with capabilities spanning the ground, air, maritime, space and information domains, designed to enable Beijing to impose its will on the region and beyond. By undertaking counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden over the past decade and expanding its military presence in the East and South China Seas, as per Taylor, China has demonstrated its willingness to employ the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as an instrument of national power in the execution of a ‘historic mission in the new century’. The Chinese leadership considers a well-conceived military modernisation programme essential for the country to achieve the status of a ‘great power’ .

The thought process of the communist leadership continues to be influenced by China’s ancient wisdom. Chinese strategists firmly believe that their country was secure and prosperous when internally strong with a subdued neighbourhood, ensuring a peaceful periphery. Traditional Chinese thinking professed that the best way to respond to a threat was to eliminate it. This is vindicated by the fact that China used force eight times during the first three decades following the 1949 Revolution. The Chinese attribute the loss of their prime position to the weakness of the Qing Dynasty (1636-1912) and a continental mindset. ‘Shi’ (strategic configuration by gaining position of advantage) is an essential facet of strategic thinking.

Given the authoritarian character of the Chinese system, generational leadership change significantly impacted the nation’s policies, particularly during the times of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. President Xi Jinping, on assuming power, moved fast. He went on to initiate transformational reforms aimed to change the traditional strategic framework, advocating a greater Chinese role in world affairs.

Xi took on the mantle of the Fifth Generation leadership in 2012. He was expected to abide by the constitutional rules adhered to by his immediate predecessors. However, he chose to play differently. While commencing his first term as the President in 2013, Xi had stated, “To forge iron, you ought to be strong.” Accordingly, he set about systematically to strengthen his hold on the twin levers of power — the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the PLA. Xi unleashed an unbridled anti-corruption campaign which proved handy to purge political rivals. Concurrently, radical military reforms were initiated with a dual aim: to prepare the defence forces for the enlarged role and reinforce the party’s hold over the PLA. To the three most important titles — General Secretary of the CPC, Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the President — that Xi was already holding, he added half a dozen over a short period. In a lighter vein, Xi began to be referred to as the CEO (Chairman of Everything).

During the 19th Party Congress held in 2017, Xi unveiled his concept of ‘China Dream’ (Zhong Guo Meng). It envisaged China’s road to rejuvenation — entering the ‘new era’, emerging as a ‘prosperous and powerful’ nation and the restoration of its legacy. He outlined twin centenary objectives: China to emerge as a fully modern socialist economy by 2035 and to acquire the status of a ‘great modern socialist country’ by 2049. Xi’s ‘Thought for New Era Socialism with Special Chinese Characteristics’ stand enshrined in the party constitution. With the abolishment of the limit set on the presidential term through a constitutional amendment, the path was cleared for Xi to continue in power for life.

Xi propounded the policy of ‘striving for achievement’ (fanfa youwei) during the 2017 party congress, advocating a greater Chinese role to shape the new international order. This marked the abandonment of the three-decade-old strategy enunciated by Deng — to “conceal one’s strength, never take a leadership role, and bide one’s time” till China completed its peaceful rise.

In keeping with the changed foreign policy, Xi has initiated major strategic initiatives since 2014. There was an overdrive to expand China’s military position in South China Sea with a rapid programme of island reclamation to ensure diminution of US influence in the region. As part of its global outreach, China is in the process of acquiring a string of naval bases in Myanmar (Kyaukpyu), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Pakistan (Gwadar) and Djibouti to emerge as a major player in the Indo-Pacific, besides the westward expansion into Eurasia region.

The path-breaking military reforms that are underway aim to transform the PLA into a modern fighting force on a par with the Western armies by the next two decades. The focus is on building a strong national defence and powerful armed forces as a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development.

Xi has combined geo-political and geo-strategic dimensions to launch ‘Belt-Road’ and ‘Maritime Silk Route’ initiatives across Eurasia, Africa and beyond, engaging more than 70 countries and entailing multi-trillion-dollar investment. Playing a lead role in regional groupings like the Shanghai Cooporation Organisation and BRICS, and establishing financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are consistent actions to further China’s policy of resisting the West-driven international order.

Xi’s foreign policy is unapologetically nationalist, in pursuit of its core interests — sovereignty, stability, security and economic development. His new ideology seeks to promote an alternative model characterised by ‘authoritarian capitalism’. Today, the US is conflicted about its global role with Trump in relentless pursuit of the ‘America First’ policy. Russia under Putin continues to be under the delusion of the ‘Cold War’ symmetry. Xi has scripted a clearer strategic road map for China. He is expected to pursue aggressive diplomacy to restructure the international order, whose underlying rules will be increasingly framed by Beijing.

Given India’s complex relations with China, the emerging scenario has far-reaching implications. While not in a position to effectively counter China’s expansionist design and at the same time seriously constrained to join the regional grouping such as ‘Quad’ with US, Japan and Australia, India finds itself in a catch-22 situation. Ironically, Delhi has no option but to revamp its capability to engage Beijing on equal terms. It is time India formulates a long-term policy to emerge as an important stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific.

China’s strategic shift is in sync with Xi’s grand design — China acquiring superpower status by the middle of this century. Given the opaque system, past legacy and growing assertiveness, the communist leadership’s claim about their nation’s rise to be peaceful has inherent contradictions. It is vital for the global polity to effectively engage with the communist leadership to avoid what US political scientist Graham Allison called the ‘Thucydides trap’.

 

 

 

Abstract

Two most powerful organs which are critical for the very survival of current Chinese authoritarian regime are the Communist Party and the Army. The latter historically has been controlled by the Party.The underlying rationale behind the critical reforms were twofold; firstly, prepare the military for China’s expanding global role and secondly, establish Party’s firm control over the PLA through revamped CMC.China has therefore, formulated a long-drawn strategy, with well-defined national objectives. These are stability, sovereignty and modernity i.e. sustained economic development.In this milieu, ‘Stability’ implies unchallenged authority of the CPC and its continuation in power.

Background

Two most powerful organs which are critical for the very survival of current Chinese authoritarian regime are the Communist Party and the Army. While the Communist Party of China (CPC), was founded on 01 July 1921 at Shanghai, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) traces its roots to the ‘Nanchang Uprising’ of 01 August 1927, when stalwarts like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai revolted against the Nationalist Forces . Both share a unique symbiotic relationship. This historic bonding was formalised in December 1929, at the Ninth Meeting of the CPC convened at Gutian, a town in Fujian Province. During the conference, Mao addressed the men of Fourth Army and clarified the role of military; “to chiefly serve the political ends” .

Thus, absolute control of the CPC over the Red Army became entrenched. Since then, People’s Liberation Army (PLA)has remained the Army of Communist Party and not of the nation. Incidentally, President Xi Jinping visited Gutian on 30 October 2014 to address ‘Military Political Work Conference’. In his speech, he reiterated what Mao had asserted eight and half decades earlier i.e.; “PLA still remains Party’s Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to the political masters” . Traditionally, PLA has been well represented in the apex political policy making bodies. China’s highest defence body, Central Military Commission (CMC) is exclusively composed of senior most military commanders, headed by the President.

PLA played a pivotal role during the Communist Revolution as an armed wing of the Party. Its top commanders namely Mao and Deng emerged as the icons of First and Second Generational leadership. Barely a year after its establishment in 1949, People’s Republic of China (PRC) entered the ‘Korean War 1950-53′ to lock horns with the US-led UN Forces. Suffering over half million casualties, Chinese Forces succeeded in pushing the adversary back to the 38th Parallel, thus restoring ‘status quo ante’. In 1962, PLA convincingly defeated the Indian Army in a limited conflict. However, it performed poorly against the Vietnamese Army in 1979. Here on began the process of restructuring and modernization the PLA.

Defence was one of the ‘Four Modernizations’ enunciated by Deng, to transform China. However, there was lack of strategic direction. In 1993, President Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to prepare for ‘local wars under modern conditions’ on observing the power of Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) displayed by the US military in the 1992 Gulf War . This paved the way for the initiation of major doctrinal reforms in the Chinese defence forces towards late 1990s. The twin transformations (lianggezhuanbian) were aimed to prepare the PLA to ‘win local wars under high tech conditions’ and facilitate transition from ‘quantity to quality’ based military. In 2004, President Hu Jintao laid down revised mandate for the military; ‘to win local wars under informationised conditions’ .
China has formulated a long-drawn strategy, with well-defined national objectives. These are stability, sovereignty and modernity i.e. sustained economic development. ‘Stability’ implies unchallenged authority of the CPC and its continuation in power.

However, the Process of radical reforms commenced only on president Xi Jinping assuming power as the ‘Fifth Generation’ leader in 2012-13. The sense of urgency could be attributed to the geopolitical considerations; US strategy of rebalancing from West to East, being a major factor. The underlying rationale behind the critical reforms were twofold; firstly, prepare the military for China’s expanding global role and secondly, establish Party’s firm control over the PLA through revamped CMC. The path breaking reform process kick started during the Third Plenum of 18th Central Committee of the CPC held in 2013, with the establishment of National Security Commission (NSC), headed by the President as Chairman. The on-going reform process is deep rooted and goes well beyond the structural changes. Its impact is expected to be wide and varied, having both regional and global implications. The paper undertakes a holistic overview of China’s current military reforms phenomenon, with focus on salient imperatives, doctrinal dimensions, organizational restructuring and strategic ramifications.

Salient Imperatives

The on-going military reforms process is driven by multiple factors. Obama Doctrine of ‘Pivot to Asia’ enunciated in 2011 sought to deploy 60 per cent of US military assets in the Asia-Pacific region by the end of decade lent impetus to China’s military reforms and modernization . Even the Trump Administration has taken a tough stance against the Chinese growing assertiveness in South China Sea. Defence policy makers in Beijing are well aware of the prevailing wide gap in the military capabilities between the US and Chinese armed forces.

Chinese Communist leadership has laid down 2049 as the timeline for the nation to achieve status of ‘developed socialist state’. During the 19th Party Congress held at Beijing in October 2017, President Xi Jinping unfolded his grand design, referring to China entering ‘new era’, advocating greater role in the world affairs . To realise its global ambition, China has formulated a long-drawn strategy, with well-defined national objectives. These are stability, sovereignty and modernity i.e. sustained economic development.

‘Stability’ implies unchallenged authority of the CPC and its continuation in power. Absolute systematic control of the Communist Party over the military remains sine qua non. During the inaugural ceremony of newly constituted ‘Theatre Commands’ on 01 February 2016, President Xi had stated; “Centralisation of military was vital. All the theatre commands and PLA should unswervingly follow absolute leadership of the Communist Party and CMC to the letter” . ‘Sovereignty’ besides external non-interference entails protecting core national interests which encompasses unification of Taiwan with the motherland and exercising control over South China Sea; perceived by Beijing, as its backyard. Lately, Arunachal Pradesh which China claims as South Tibet has also been included in the list of core interests. Diminution of US influence in Asia-Pacific and containing Japan are extended agendas of sovereignty. Nationalists Government gaining power in Taiwan also contributed towards accelerating the military reforms. For the Communist Party to remain in power, ‘economic development’ is the key. Hence, sustaining rapid pace of growth is not an option but imperative for the Chinese leadership. Strong central authority and peaceful periphery are considered essential prerequisites for prosperity and progress.
‘Stability’ implies unchallenged authority of the CPC and its continuation in power. Absolute systematic control of the Communist Party over the military remains sine qua non. During the inaugural ceremony of newly constituted ‘Theatre Commands’ on 01 February 2016, President Xi had stated; “Centralisation of military was vital. All the theatre commands and PLA should unswervingly follow absolute leadership of the Communist Party and CMC to the letter.
Doctrinal Dimensions

Concept of ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP) which includes both hard and soft power is central to Chinese thinking. Acquisition of hard power is seen as a key component towards enhancing nation’s CNP. As per President Xi Jinping, military reforms are the key to realisation of ‘China Dream’ . This is also vital for the implementation of ‘Belt-Road Initiative’ and ‘Maritime Silk Route’ projects. In fact, Chinese military strategic culture lays great emphasis on exploiting propensity of things i.e. ‘strategic configuration of power’-Shi to achieve one’s objectives .The core of strategy is not to fight the adversary, but to create disposition of forces so favourable that fighting is unnecessary, in consonance with Sun Zu’s dictum, “to subdue enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” The on-going military reforms are oriented towards capacity building and force projection.

Concept of ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP) which includes both hard and soft power is central to Chinese thinking. Acquisition of hard power is seen as a key component towards enhancing nation’s CNP. As per President Xi, military reforms are the key to realisation of ‘China Dream’.

The general trend of the Chinese strategic thinking is defined in the White Papers on National Defence issued periodically since 1998. The theme of ‘Ninth White Paper’ published in May 2015 titled ‘China’s Military Strategy’, was ‘active defence’, with stress on winning ‘local wars in conditions of modern technology .The thrust was on expounding maritime interests, priority being accorded to navy and air force vis-à-vis the ground forces.

Chinese military doctrine of ‘Local Wars under Informationised Conditions’ has two components. ‘Local Wars’ envision short swift engagements with limited military objectives in pursuit of larger political aim. ‘Informationised Conditions’ refers to the penetration of technology into all walks of modern life, but specific to war fighting which includes IT, digital and artificial intelligence applications. It implies network centric environment and waging information operations to ensure battlefield domination. In essence, aim is to achieve complete security of PLA networks while totally paralyzing that of adversary’s. This encompasses electronic warfare including computer networks, psychological warfare and deception to attack enemy’s C4ISR systems, employing both hard and soft kills . Joint operations and integrated logistics are inherent components of the doctrine.

Thrust Areas

The main thrust of the on-going military reforms is on revamping the systems and structures across the board, at all levels i.e. political, strategic and operational. At the macro level, major changes that have been instituted are about deepening national defence through military reforms with Chinese Character, in keeping with the guidelines issued by the CMC. The focus is on civil-military integration to achieve unity of command, joint operations and optimization. The composition of the CMC itself has been balanced out to eliminate erstwhile ground forces bias. With the redefined role, CMC will now be responsible for formulating policies, controlling all the military assets and higher direction of war. As a sequel to the military reforms, PLA, People Armed Police Force (PAPF) and Theatre Commanders directly report to the CMC.

The erstwhile PLA Headquarters had four key Departments-General Staff, Political, Logistics and Armament. These have been reorganized and integrated into the restructured CMC, ensuring centralised control at the highest level. In the new set up, there are fifteen bodies. These include five departments and three commissions besides seven offices .(diagram below refers). With the integrated Joint General Staff under the CMC, the decision-making process at the apex level has been streamlined. In the restructured CMC, President as the Commander in Chief now exercises direct operational control over the military through the ‘Joint Operational Center’.

 

Besides the existing PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAFF) Headquarters, three new Service Headquarters have been created. These are ‘Ground Forces Command’ making it a service, Rocket Force-an upgrade of Second Artillery which operates both strategic as well as conventional missiles and ‘Strategic Support Force’ to control as also secure cyber and space assets. These structural additions will greatly facilitate prosecution of ‘Informationised Local Wars’.

At the operational level, erstwhile 17 odd army, air force and naval commands have been reorganized into five ‘theatre commands'; Eastern, Western, Central, Northern and Southern. With all the war fighting resources in each battle zone placed under one commander will ensure seamless synergy in deploying land, air, naval and strategic assets in a given theatre. In addition, 84 corps level organizations have been created including 13 operational corps, as well as training and logistics installations. To make the armed forces nimbler, a reduction of 300,000 rank and file, mostly from non-combatant positions has been ordered which will downsize the PLA to around to 1.8 million.
Theatre Commands (TCs) – Deployment of Corps

• Eastern TC– Nanjing (Taiwan, East China Sea)- 71,72&73 Corps
• Southern TC-Guangzhou (Vietnam and South China Sea)- 74 &75 Corps
• Western TC-Chengdu  (India &Internal Security)-76 &77 Corps  
• Northern TC– Shenyang (Korean Peninsula & Russia)- 78,79&80 Corps
• Central TC– Beijing (Internal Security& Reserves)- 81,82&83 Corps

Capacity Building

Salient advances in the armaments are designed to achieve domination in the field of information warfare, anti-radiation missiles, electronic attack drones, direct energy weapons, airborne early warning control system, anti-satellite weapons and cyber army under the Strategic Support Force[i]. Even the focus of the Chinese military publications dealing with new modes of war fighting is on jointness and space based operations.  Information based operations are an on-going process, conducted even during the peace time, which could prove a valuable asset during the times of conflict.

 

In consonance with the strategic direction, KRAs for the services have been clearly defined. PLA Army (PLAA) is required to reorient from ‘theatre defence’ and adapt to precise ‘trans-theatre mobility’ missions. This entails elevating capability through restructuring in undertaking multi-dimensional, joint offensive and defensive operations. PLA Navy (PLAN) while gradually shifting its focus from ‘off shore waters defence’ to a combined strategy of ‘offshore waters defence with open sea protection’ is required to build a combined, multi-functional and efficient maritime force structures. It has been tasked to enhance capabilities for strategic deterrence, counter attack, joint operations at sea and provide comprehensive support. PLA Air Force (PLAFF) in line with the strategic requirements to execute informationised operations is to build requisite structures by shifting focus from erstwhile territorial air defence to building air-space capabilities. It is also in the process of boosting strategic capabilities for early warning, air strike, information counter measures and force projection[ii].

[i]Zi Yang (24 January 2018), Ideology behind China’s Fast-Changing Military, The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-ideologu-behind-china’s-fast-changing-military

[ii]Note 11, op cit.

President Xi is the lead architect of the current phase of the path breaking reforms. His ideology which has been enshrined into the Party constitution during the 19^th Party Congress also encompasses army rebuilding. It expects PLA to “Obey the Party, be able to win wars and maintain good conduct”. The supreme Commander has also pronounced three tenets for a strong military i.e. confidence, competence and commitment

The Rocket Force to be lean and effective will be adopting transformational measures through reliance on technology upgrades, enhance safety and reliability of missile systems-both nuclear and conventional, thus strengthening strategic deterrence. Strategic Support Force will deal with challenges in the outer space and secure the national space assets. Besides, it will also expedite the development of “Cyber Force” by enhancing situational awareness, cyber defence and security of national information networks. People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) is to undertake multiple and diversified tasks including contingency tasks under informationised conditions.

President Xi is the lead architect of the current phase of the path breaking reforms. His ideology which has been enshrined into the Party constitution during the 19^th Party Congress also encompasses army rebuilding. It expects PLA to “Obey the Party, be able to win wars and maintain good conduct”[i].The Supreme Commander has also pronounced three tenets for a strong military i.e. confidence, competence and commitment. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Xi has maintained close relations with the armed forces, obvious from his frequent appearances at PLA events and visits to remote military bases in various parts of the country. The process is being supported by requisite budgetary allocations; evident from the fact that 2017 defence budget of $151 bn (actual spending estimated to be far higher) marks an increase of over 7 per cent[ii].

 Strategic Implications

 The on-going China’s military reforms as a phenomenon are possibly one of the biggest generational shake of its kind. Steered by President Xi as the Chairman of the CMC, these radical reforms are in line with the PRC’s envisioned future role as a global player. Although the framework of reforms does not follow traditional Western model or template, yet these are in sync with the key trends in modern warfare.  While the primary aim is to scale up national defence capability with Chinese characteristics, the process is geared to serve multiple objectives, with far reaching ramifications.

Domestically, predominance of the Party over PLA stands revalidated with centralization of power structure under the reorganized CMC. By ensuring implicit obedience and absolute loyalty of the armed forces through rejigged structures and reshuffles in the PLA hierarchy, President Xi has reinforced unity of command; most critical for any professional war fighting organization. Total control over the military has ensured that reformed PLA is resistant to the external influences. Xi’s emergence as an unquestionable leader with titles such as the ‘paramount leader’ and Zhu Xi (Chairman) puts him in the league of Mao and Deng. As per the Chinese public opinion, Mao made China great, Deng made it rich and Xi is striving to make it strong.  Described as a person with ‘an iron soul’ by former statesman late Lee Kuan Yew, Xi is expected to pursue his stated vision relentlessly.

From the external perspective, exponential accretion in China’s military capability is a cause of concern, particularly in PRC’s neighbourhood. Beijing is already seen to be more assertive towards realising its national objectives. It will be rather naïve to believe that the ‘Belt- Road’ and ‘Maritime Silk Route’ projects are only driven by economic considerations. In fact, these are path breaking initiatives to facilitate China to enlarge its strategic footprint, an essential pre-requisite for the global superpower in making.  Communist leadership’s repeated claims that China’s rise will be peaceful,bely its actions on the ground. After all, ‘a dragon remains a dragon’. As per Trump Administration Security Strategy, China and Russia are its main rivals. As Washington is expected to play a greater role in protecting its interests besides assuaging the concerns of its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific, the region is set to be the scene of intense inter- power rivalry.

Being India’s biggest neighbour with disputed border, clashing geostrategic interests and complex relations, China’s critical military reforms and rapid build-up of its military potential are stark realities which cannot be wished away. It is a matter of serious security concern. From the strategic perspective, India’s current higher defence organizational structure is service specific, lacking integration and jointness. We are yet to formulate comprehensive National ‘Limited War Doctrine’. Due to bureaucratic gridlocks, the procurement procedures of armament and equipment are rather tenuous, proving to be major impediment in modernization process. Current piecemeal and knee jerk approach to augment the defence capability needs to be replaced by long term national defence policy. Restructuring of the higher defence organization to meet the emerging security challenges is no more an option but an imperative.

[i]Note 14 op cit.

[ii]Michael Martina, Ben Blanchard (05 March 2017) Economic News

Being India’s biggest neighbour with disputed border, clashing geostrategic interests and complex relations, China’s critical military reforms and rapid build-up of its military potential are stark realities which cannot be wished away. It is a matter of serious security concern.

 

In operational terms, before the current reforms, it was PLA’s Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions which were responsible for operations against India’s Eastern and Northern borders. Post reorganization, it is now the Western Theatre with integrated Army, Air Force and Rocket Force assets, under a single commander that faces own four army commands (Northern, Western, Central and Eastern) and three air force commands (Western, Central and Eastern). This configuration will pose enormous coordination challenge in the event of a major conflict. Even during the 1962 War, China had constituted single Headquarters for controlling operations in Ladakh and Arunachal (then NEFA) while we fought isolated battles even within the theatre. Ironically, five and half decades on, we remain oblivious to this glaring short coming.

China has avoided major military confrontation since 1979. However, it has cleverly pursued the strategy of ‘nibbling and negotiating’ (yibiandanyibian da-talking and fighting concurrently). Doklam type stand-offs or confrontations in South Sea are part of this strategy and ought to be accepted as the new normal in dealing with PRC. Frequent incursions by the Chinese and hardening claims to Arunachal which it claims as South Tibet need to be seen in the light of the above realities. To realise Xi’s ‘China Dream’, Beijing does not enjoy the luxury of indulging in a major conflict. Therefore, while probability of a major confrontation between the two giants remains low, local skirmishes cannot be ruled out, especially in the contentious locations. As limited engagements demand speedy deployment and a flatter logistics chain, inadequate infrastructure in the border areas stands out as a major constraint for India while the adversary has a distinct edge. This shortcoming needs to be addressed on the highest priority.

China’s critical military reforms and rapid build-up of its military potential are stark realities which cannot be wished away. It is a matter of serious security concern. From the strategic perspective, India’s current higher defence organizational structure is service specific, lacking integration and jointness.

The revolutionary military reforms initiated under the current Chinese Communist leadership are indeed of monumental nature. With President Xi all set to be at the helm well beyond his stipulated two terms i.e. 2023, the military reforms process will continue till 2035, the timeline laid by him for PLA to ‘emerge as a modern fighting force capable of winning wars’. Incidentally, today China faces no external threat and its main security concerns are internal. Continued maintenance of CPC’s unchallenged hold over the system being prime concern of the Communist Leadership, PLA’s identity as the ‘military of the Party’ remains sacrosanct. To further its aspiration as emerging superpower, China’s Military reforms aim to enhance nation’s war waging capacity and power projection capabilities.

The PLA transformation process, its magnitude notwithstanding, is on the fast track. It will take a few decades before the Chinese Armed Forces as a modern military can stake claims to be at par with the Western Armies. PLA undoubtedly is poised for a ‘Great Leap’; in the process set to seriously disrupt the existing ‘balance of power’ dynamics. In the Chinese strategic lexicon, military strength is an important component of the CNP. The global strategic community will constantly struggle to decode the intent of Chinese Leadership; as to how it will deploy exponential accretion in country’s military potential.

Endnotes

[1]Edgar O’Ballance, (1962), The Red Army of China, Faber and Faber, London, p38

[1]David Shambaugh (1996), Soldier and State in China in Brain Hook, The Individual and State, Oxford, New York, p108.

[1]China Military Online, (3 November 2014), Party Controls Gun.

[1]Andrew Scobell, (2004), Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin, University Press of Pacific, p11.

[1]Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Travis Tanner, Assessing the People Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, Strategic Studies Institute-US War College Press, p10.

[1]President Obama address to Australian Parliament (17 November 2012), Parliament House Canberra, Australia http://www.white house.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian parliament. Accessed 24 January 2018, 4pm.

[1]Mark Moore,(24 October 2017), New York Post, New York.http://mypost.com, accessed 20 January 2018, 10am

[1]The Hindu, (03 February), China Revamps Military Command Structure

[1] Ibid

[1]Thomas G Mahnken, (2011), Secrecy and Stratagem: Understanding Chinese Strategic Culture, Lowy Institute of international Policy, Australia, p18.

[1]White Paper on China’s Military Strategy (May 2015), The State Council Information Office, People Republic of China, Beijing.

[1]Zi Yang (24 January 2018), Ideology behind China’s Fast Changing Military, The Diplomat.http://thediplomat.com. Accessed 28 January 2018

[1]Business Insider, (14 January 2016), China’s Latest Military Reform Reveals its Rising Ambitions.

[1]Zi Yang (24 January 2018), Ideology behind China’s Fast-Changing Military, The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-ideologu-behind-china’s-fast-changing-military

[1]Note 11, op cit.

[1]Note 14 op cit.

[1]Michael Martina, Ben Blanchard (05 March 2017) Economic News

Published in Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLVIII, No. 612, April-June 2018.

Mr Henry Kissinger’s seminal book “On China” begins with Chairman Mao Zedong briefing his top military commanders in October 1962, in the wake of Sino-Indian border standoff.1 Deep diving into history, he recalled that China and India had fought ‘one and half’ wars and there were valuable lessons to be drawn from each. The “first war” occurred during Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD) when China dispatched troops to support Indian Kingdom against an aggressive rival. After China’s intervention, the two countries enjoyed centuries of religious and economic exchanges. The lesson as Mao put it; “China and India were not doomed to perpetual enmity. They could enjoy long period of peace again, but to do so, China had to use force to ‘knock’ India back to negotiating table.” The “half war” Mao referred to was, when Mongol Timurlane sacked Delhi, almost seven hundred years later in 1398, killing over 100,000 prisoners. (Mao reckoned China and Mongolia then were part of same political entity).  When ordering offensive against India, Mao instructed his forces to be ‘restrained and principled’.  Accordingly, after inflicting crushing defeat on Indian forces, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) retreated to the original line of control, returning even the captured heavy equipment.2

The singular uniqueness of Chinese leaders lies in invoking strategic principles from millennium old events. No other country can claim to link its ancient classic dictums of strategy to its present statesmanship. This is why; the world often gets China wrong while decoding the mind of its leaders. Even in the recent past, series of incidences that occurred on India’s border with China invariably synchronised with important visits. Depsang in April 2013 preceded Chinese Prime Minister (PM) Li Keqiang visit to India, Demchok-Chumar happened in September 2014 when President Xi was in India and Doklam in June-August coincided with PM Modi’s visit to the USA.

President Xi Jinping is known to have deep understanding of Chinese history and seems to follow Mao. As per Mr Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, Xi is a man of extraordinary intellect with well-defined world view.3 Late Mr Lee Kuan Yew had compared Xi with the likes of Nelson Mandela. Therefore, informal summit (Fei Zhengshi Huitian) at Wuhan on 27-28 April 2018, at the behest of personal invitation from President Xi Jinping to PM Modi merits in-depth introspection and analysis. It was the second time that Xi made an exception to welcome any leader outside Beijing, first time in 2015 when he hosted Modi at Xian. Xi definitely would not be making such exceptional gestures without a grand design.  To unravel the labyrinth of Wuhan reset, it is pertinent to take a kaleidoscopic view of the strategic etymology, particularly from the Chinese perspective and its interpretation to gauge impact on the future course of India-China relations.

Strategic Etymology- Kaleidoscopic View

The circumstances which led to the informal summit at Wuhan can be largely attributed to the strategic review of the global environment by President Xi, in the realm of his recently enunciated doctrine. After assuming power as Fifth Generation Leader, President Xi surprised everybody by grossly bending the constitutional rules followed by his immediate predecessors. During the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, Xi had his “Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” enshrined in the Constitution.4  During the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2018,  he went on to abolish the Presidential term limit, to retain power for life.5 Thus, Xi has emerged as the most powerful leader after Mao.

Through its history, China has persuaded neighbours to acquiesce. It prospered only when the Emperor was strong and periphery peaceful. Xi commenced his second term with conviction that China needed strong personalistic leader. Accordingly, he gradually established himself both in the Party and PLA; twin pillars of Chinese power structure. Xi unleashed anti-corruption campaign to clean up the system and purge potential political rivals. Simultaneously, he initiated radical military reforms to prepare the defence forces for future global role and reinforce Party’s hold over the PLA.

During the Party Congress, Xi unfolded his doctrine centred on ‘China Dream’ (zhongmeng); which envisions ‘powerful and prosperous China’. It entails rejuvenation (fuxing) i.e. restoration of China’s past grandeur. To implement his grand vision, Xi outlined twin centenary objectives; People’s Republic of China (PRC) to become fully modern economy – achieve social modernisation by 2035 and acquire status of ‘great modern socialist country’ by middle of the Century.6 He also propounded the policy of ‘striving for achievements’ (fanfa youwei) and usher China into the New Era, advocating Beijing’s leadership role to shape China-centric global order. This marked a paradigm shift from Deng’s strategy of maintaining low profile till China completed its peaceful rise.

Xi has been empowered by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to be at the helm indefinitely,  to give him adequate time to complete the process of China’s rise as a global power. Besides, Chinese economy is in state of transition from low technology manufacturing to advance digitally enabled products. Further, continuity is considered vital in executing the mega global initiatives like the ‘belt-road’. With collective leadership on the backburner, the burden of performance now squarely rests on Xi. His failure could push China into chaos, given the high expectations of China’s rising middle class.

China has always opposed global security system based on American military alliances and partnerships. Therefore, China’s policy seeks diminution of American influence in the Asia-Pacific region. With US adopting ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, China accelerated its military modernisation process. In pursuit of the Chinese based world order, Beijing has undertaken series of initiatives to set up alternate multilateral structures to include Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Asia Infrastructure Development Bank (AIDB) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As per Beijing’s strategic calculus, in the coming decades, while China and USA will be the competing powers, the other important players will be India and Japan, both in its neighbourhood. Hostile periphery will not be conducive to China’s progress.

China at no cost will condescend to the idea of ‘Indo-Pacific’ gaining currency and Quad (US, India, Japan and Australia) grouping taking shape of an alliance. Even in the ancient times, its emperors dealt with the adversaries by pitching ‘one barbarian against the other’.7 To counter Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, China is keen to make Asia as the globalisation pivot. In the larger Pan-Asian sub-set, China views India as one of the important players. Beijing is also re-engaging Tokyo as part of its strategic review. Mr Li Keqiang visited Japan for the trilateral summit which included South Korea in May 2018. The trio strongly voiced for regional comprehensive economic cooperation encompassing ASEAN and other major economies; India, Australia and New Zealand. Sino-Russian relations over the recent years have transformed into strategic partnership.

In view of the aforesaid, Xi apparently has had a serious rethink on Beijing’s relations with its important neighbours. Doklam stand-off was also a trigger for China to reconsider its India policy. Xi is going about systematically to challenge America. In the process, Beijing is willing to yield tactical space to serve its larger strategic interests. How can PRC stake its claim to be a superpower; politically isolated and confined to Western Pacific?

From India’s perspective, there was an imperative need to recast China policy based on pragmatism through fresh initiatives.  PM Modi has established good personal rapport with president Xi. Hence, informal setting offered excellent opportunity to put across India’s concerns about the cross border terrorism, Chinese looming presence in India’s neighbourhood including India Ocean Region, China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC), impasse on the border issue and restoring glaring trade imbalance.

Wuhan Reset: Common Theme – Different Tones

Considerable effort went in by way of ministerial level meetings to set the stage for the Wuhan Summit. The basic rationale behind whole exercise was to build mutual trust and identify common ground to resolve vexed problems. Besides being on same page on a number of global issues, idea was also to evolve broad framework for strengthening bilateral relations.

Wuhan as a venue, situated on River Yangze in central China was a well-considered choice; given its rich historic past (unrest to unseat the Qing Dynasty started in the military barracks of the city) and to showcase China’s industrial prowess. Six meetings in the course of twenty four hours with open ended agenda allowed the two leaders to have a freewheeling dialogue with no pressure on the outcome. Mr Modi highlighted the need to have shared vision, shared thought process, shared resolve, strong relationship and better communications between the two neighbours. He further went on to define his vision of bilateral relationship in the form of five principles i.e. Thought (Soch), Contact (sampark), Cooperation (Sahyog), Determination (Sankalp) and Dream (Sapne). 8

In the absence of a joint communiqué, the two sides issued separate statements, with common themes and varying tones.9  Salient aspects are summarised below:-

(a)   One significant outcome was agreement between the two leaders to have such summits periodically, facilitating ‘strategic communications’ at the highest level.

(b)   Second important facet was of providing ‘strategic guidance’ to the respective militaries to build trust, mutual understanding and enhance cooperation in effective management of the border affairs. There was emphasis by both sides on ‘maturity and wisdom’ to handle differences; keeping each other’s sensitivities, concerns and aspirations in mind.

(c)   With regards to India-China border question, the two leaders expressed support for the work of Special Representatives. They urged for intensification of efforts to seek fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement, while underscoring the importance of ‘maintaining peace and tranquility’ in all areas of border region. Apparently, it is further building upon the agreement reached in 2005 referred to as “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of Border Question”.10

(d)   On terrorism, both sides agreed to promote more active regional and international cooperation. They also concurred to join hands in offering innovative and sustainable solutions to global challenges like natural calamities and climate change.

(e)   With regards to trade and economy, the areas of emphasis were starkly divergent. While India wanted the trade deficit to be balanced and sustainable, China on the other hand was focussed on investment, by tapping full potential and exploring new areas of cooperation.

(f)    Another important outcome was agreement to work jointly on an economic project in Afghanistan. The details are to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

(g)   On the issue of strategic autonomy and stability, the two sides were at variation. India’s view on peaceful, stable and balanced relations envisaged creating conditions for the ‘Asian Century’. China sees the two biggest developing economies as a positive factor for global stability. Both sides agreed to continuously enhance mutual trust and carry forward the fine norms enshrined in ‘Five Principles’ of peaceful coexistence.

Prognosis

Wuhan Summit, although termed as an informal meeting between Modi and Xi, was a meticulously planned, deliberately structured and precisely choreographed dialogue with far reaching ramifications. It was aimed to provide the two leaders a platform for ‘heart to heart’ candid exchange of views. Being strategic in nature, the underlying intent was to take holistic perspective of complex issues and explore innovative options for future progress. The thrust was on developing shared understanding, establishing personal rapport and exploring avenues of consensus for establishing effective structures for stable and balanced relations. While the themes of summit were common, the accents of the two sides were at variance, given the divergent perspectives. China’s political aspirations being global, its post- summit statements were articulated accordingly. Indian approach on the other hand, was more in the regional setting.

China’s core national objectives – Stability, Sovereignty and Modernity remain sacrosanct. Stability implies unchallenged authority of the Communist Party. To this end, Chinese leadership remains very sensitive to Tibet and Xinjiang. Sovereignty, besides strategic autonomy entails unification of claimed territories with the motherland which includes Taiwan, island territories in East and South China Sea and South Tibet (Xizang-Arunachal Pradesh). Modernity connotes development and economic progress; critical to the very survival of the Communist regime.

President Xi’s commitment to the national aims in letter and spirit is evident from the fact that he started his second innings by exhorting the PLA to be combat ready and focus on winning wars. During the closing session of the 13th NPC, Xi vowed to safeguard national sovereignty and not concede an inch of its territory.11 He also issued stern warning to Taiwan against any attempt of separatism.  In view of the above, China is unlikely to soften its stand on the border issue or forsake claims on Arunachal Pradesh. Its heavy handed policy on Tibet is there to continue as also pressure on India to keep distance from Dalai Lama. There is likely to be no significant change in Chinese relations with all- weather ally Pakistan. Even on the issues of candidature for the membership of UN Security Council or to be part of Nuclear Supply Group, Chinese are expected to stick to their current position. With the strategic guidance to the respective militaries, the tension on the borders is expected to ease out.

It is in India’s larger interest to collaborate with China and manage the differences through dialogue. To ensure continued engagement with Beijing on equal terms, Delhi needs to carry out strategic review of its national aims and objectives on a wider spectrum, factoring both regional and global imperatives. There is need for a pragmatic China policy with thrust on achieving strategic equilibrium between the two neighbours. This can only be achieved if India makes an earnest effort to scale up its ‘Comprehensive National Power’ and reduce the prevailing yawning gap. This includes both the hard and soft power. Indian Armed Forces have to adopt a transformational approach in modernisation process to match the PLA which is all set to emerge as modern military at par with the Western Armies by 2035. India has a major geostrategic advantage in the Indo-Pacific region which it needs to leverage through astute diplomacy.

Wuhan Summit was not merely tango between the Dragon and Elephant. It was a well thought through diplomatic initiative to give fresh impetus to the India-China relations in the realm of changing international environment. Informal structure of the meeting provided the two sides to think beyond the stated positions to dismantle existing gridlocks. The new format of ‘strategic communication’ between the two sides sets a precedence, for more such dialogues to follow.

Chinese leaders have penchant for ancient history and realpolitik approach to address the contentious issues.  Xi and his team would definitely take long term view of the Wuhan deliberations to recalibrate strategic calculus in consonance with the ‘Grand National Objectives’. On the Indian side, given the reality of ‘five year’ cycle based strategic culture, post 2019 scenario will be crucial to take Wuhan process forward. This notwithstanding,  in the larger national interest, Wuhan format needs to be institutionalised as a platform for strategic dialogue at the highest level, which will go a long way in balancing and stabilising India-China relations.

Endnotes

1 Henry Kissinger, (2011), On China, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, p1-2.

2 Ibid.

3 Kevin Rudd, (20 March 2018), What West Doesn’t Get About Xi Jinping, New York Times. Available at https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/what-west-doesnt-get-about-xi-jinping. Accessed on 20 May 2018, 10 am.

4 Mark Moore, (24 October 2017), New York Post, New York. Available at http://my post. Com. Accessed on 25 May 2018, 2pm. Times Global (25 October 2017) China Enshrines Xi’s Thoughts in Party Statute Elevating him to Mao’s Status, New Delhi.

5 Reuters (15 March 2018) China’s Unspoken Compact Put to Test by Xi Jinping Power Play.

6 China Daily Supplement-Hindustan Times (03 November 2017), New Delhi.

7 Op Cit 1, p20.

8 Narayan MK, (21 May 2018), Making Sense of Wuhan Reset, Hindu.

9 MEA Press Release (28 April 2018). Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/press.release.htm?dtl?29853?indiachina+informal+summit+at+wuhan. Accessed 15 May 2018, 2pm. Xinhua, (28 April2018), China India reach broad consensus in informal summit. Available at http://goggleweblight.com/i?u=http://www.xinhuanet.com?english/2018-04/29/c_137145546.htm & hi+en-IN. Accessed on 15 May 3pm.

10 Agreement between India and China-2005. Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl6534/Agreement+between+the + Government of +the +Republic +India+and +and +the +Government of+the+Peoples+Republic +of +China+on+the+Political+Parameters+ and+Guiding+Principles+for+the+Settlement+of+the+IndiaChina+ Boundary+Question.

11 The Economist (29 March 2018), Xi Jinping New Side Kicks- The Helmsman Crew. www.indianexpress.com