Given that for the last six and half decades, the opposing sides have been technically at war on the Korean Peninsula, besides President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un trading open threats of military confrontation only six months back, the Singapore Summit appears to be a minor miracle. Considering that a dozen odd former US Presidents were unable to break the Korean deadlock, what Trump has been able to pull off is no mean achievement. Whereas the future course will largely depend upon how Kim chooses to play it out, the Singapore Summit marks the beginning of a phenomenon which will go on to reset the existing strategic alignments in the region with far reaching ramifications.

The Score Card

The Singapore Summit materialised after some theatrics, with Trump almost calling it off. Contrary assessments notwithstanding, it certainly stands out as a path breaking initiative to resolve the Korean imbroglio. Trump was rather upbeat after the meeting and went on to comment, “Everybody can now feel much safer than the day I took over the office”. He followed it up with a tweet: “There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea”. Subsequently, he told reporters, “I have solved the problem”. As for Kim, he was lauded back home in North Korea as a hero and the Singapore Summit hailed as the ‘meeting of the century’.

The post- summit joint statement issued by the two leaders was rather brief, vague and generic; more about aspiration than accomplishments. Some of its salient facets were:-

• Establishment of new US-DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) relations with commitment to build a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
• Trump’s commitment to provide security guarantees to North Korea (implying preserving the Kim regime) and end US-South Korea Joint war games.
• Reaffirming the Panmunjom declaration, Chairman Kim committed to work towards complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (without laying down any time frame).

Professor Graham Alison, former Director of Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), offering first hand insight on the Singapore Summit, recalled the Chinese maxim: “Journey of 1000 miles starts with first step”. According to him, Trump has taken one big step down the most promising path available at this point. Later, in an article in the National Interest, he assessed the Summit as “oversold and undervalued”.

According to Ambassador Nicholas Burns, now the Director of the ‘Future of Diplomacy Project’ at HKS, “while the Summit marks a good beginning and powerfully symbolic, the agreement per se is paper thin, without commitment or accountability from Kim.” Burns was also critical about Trump overselling the imminence of peace, considering that the negotiation process is expected to be a long drawn affair requiring strategy and patience. South Korea and Japan not being part of the process was a matter of concern, he added.

“Nuclear weapons are central to the legitimization of the oxymoronic Communist monarchy that rules North Korea”, opined Professor Joseph Nye. His scepticism about Kim’s promise of denuclearisation is evident from the fact that both Kim’s grandfather and father lied to US Administrations about their nuclear programme. Endorsing that prolonged negotiations are much better than war, Nye underscored the danger of the cosmetic ‘breakthrough’ weakening US alliances in the region.

The reactions of Brookings experts to the Trump-Kim Summit were more critical. Dr Jung Pak, Senior Fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAPS), felt that building upon the diplomatic process started with the Summit will be a tough call for US officials. Besides, Trump’s policy of exerting maximum pressure on North Korea has morphed into maximum manoeuvring space for Kim. In evaluating the outcome of the Summit, Dr Ryan Hass, Fellow at CEAPS, perceived China to be the big winner as a reduction of US military forces stationed in North East Asia and the widening gap between the US and its allies serve Beijing’s interests. Dr Tarun Chhabra, Fellow in the ‘Project-International Order and Strategy’ recounted the US stance – never to accept “freeze for freeze” approach, but in Singapore Trump agreed to freeze joint US-South Korean military exercises in exchange for continued freeze on North Korean nuclear and missile testing, with no concrete commitments on denuclearisation.

It is evident that Trump steered the Summit through personal diplomacy; he claimed to have established ‘a very special bond’ and ‘terrific relationship’ with Kim. While Trump’s intimidating statements and the cajoling words of President Xi Jinping might have resulted in bringing the North Korean regime to the negotiation table, the prospects of leveraging it into a concrete denuclearisation process remains an illusion. The Summit has disrupted the prevailing geopolitical status quo, making a strategic reset inevitable.

Strategic Realignment

Trump’s ‘one on one’ meeting with Kim and offer of concessions to North Korea has created new anxieties amongst America’s Asian allies. It has exacerbated their doubts about US long term commitment to safeguard their security interests. Trump’s surprise declaration during the news conference about the suspension of joint military drills between the US and South Korea, even terming these provocative and his desire to eventually pull out some of the 28,500 US troops off the Peninsula blindsided South Korea and other American allies.

America has always considered itself a Pacific power. Since World War II, it has been the leader and security provider in East Asia. But since assuming office, Trump has raised questions on stationing troops in the region and the heavy expenditure being incurred in sustaining them. He has increasingly shown disregard for traditional allies, the recent G-7 Conference being a case in point. As Michael Green, former Asia adviser to President George Bush, put it: “It suggests that when he is in the mood, the President will cut deals with our adversaries involving the interests of our allies”. Given Trump’s approach of taking on allies on trade issues, in the long run, America’s role as a leader in the region is likely to erode.

While Seoul has not been outrightly critical of Trump’s announcements about the joint wargame, officials in Tokyo have been much more vocal in expressing their views. Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera stated that joint drills with US forces in South Korea play an important role in East Asia security. Japan has been anxious about its alliance with the US ever since Trump’s election. Its biggest fear is that future negotiations with North Korea are unlikely to result in substantial disarmament even as the US gradually withdrew from the region. This implies that Japan will have to review its security options. In fact Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made earnest efforts to bolster Japan’s military capabilities besides being an ardent protagonist of amending the country’s pacifist constitution. In fact, Tokyo is already in the process of developing a new partnership in the Indo-Pacific.

The biggest beneficiary of these developments is China, as Beijing considers the Western Pacific to be its area of influence and seeks a diminution of the American influence in the region. Therefore, the US ending military drills in South Korea and effecting a gradual withdrawal from the region will be a gift for China. With the US now preoccupied with North Korea, China can continue to consolidate its military build-up in the South China Sea without ruffling feathers in the neighbourhood. Contributing to the trust deficit between the US and its allies fits well into the Chinese traditional policy of pitching ‘one barbarian against the other’.

That China holds an upper hand is evident from Xi hosting Kim three times, twice just before the Singapore Summit and once immediately after. No doubt, Beijing is exerting immense influence behind the scenes, reaffirming its centrality in East Asian diplomacy. Xi is expected to make his maiden visit to North Korea soon to maintain the momentum in bilateral relations. Yet, China is taking no chances with North Korea. There is a likelihood of Kim venturing to counter balance China’s influence by embracing USA. Another possibility could be of US, South Korea and North Korea aligning together, thus isolating China. It is no coincidence that Kim, after coming to power in 2011, stayed away from China for six years and did not meet with Xi. Kim would certainly like to reduce Pyongyang’s dependence on Beijing.

Prognosis

According to Professor Allison, when Trump assumed the Presidency, he had three choices with regards to North Korea. First, continue doing what his predecessors had done in the past decades, i.e., seek to stop North Korea’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles by either tightening sanctions or promising economic relief. The second option was to attack North Korea before it acquired the capability to launch a nuclear attack against the US homeland. The third course, though bizarre, was for the two sides to engage in finding an alternate course. Call it providence, but it is the highly unorthodox third option that worked out. Even Trump’s most bitter critics have not been able to convincingly challenge the fact that North Korea’s nuclear threat to the US stands diminished.

With Xi playing the role of godfather to Kim, coupled with the past experience, the road to denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula is going to be long and bumpy. Both Xi and Kim are lifelong heads of their nations with time on their side. Hence it may be decades before the contentious issues get resolved and a formal agreement is inked. Considering China’s ability to play spoiler, Beijing will ensure that the long term outcomes in terms of shaping the architecture of the Korean Peninsula are in its favour.

While the US may be able to ensure the security of its homeland, it is bound to gradually yield strategic space to China in the region. All said, prevailing alignments in the region are in for a definite reset. The emerging geostrategic landscape of North East Asia is bound to have a cascading impact on the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Kim Jong-un’s historic meeting with South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in across the ‘Military Demarcation Line’ (MDL) on April 27, 2018 will go down as a watershed moment in the destiny of Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula, given its geographic location, has been the scene of inter power rivalry in the North East Asian region. Post the Korean War, despite adversaries being armed to the teeth and in a ‘trip wire’ state of readiness, major confrontation was obviated due the prevailing state of parity in terms of military potential. Hence, even after six and half decades, the status of MDL remained unaltered, despite sporadic incidences of incursion and violence.

In recent times, the delicate strategic equilibrium on the Peninsula has been under intense strain due to the persistent obsession of the North Korean regime to develop credible nuclear capability as a security guarantee. Consequently, Pyongyang remained a major security concern for the Obama administration. Armed with ballistic and nuclear missiles, North Korea posed a serious security threat to the US and its East Asian allies. Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure proved ineffective in stalling Kim’s missile and nuclear programmes. The American policy of ‘sanctions and subsidies’ in fact gave an impression of a half-hearted and inadequate approach to shape the regional security architecture.

Fire-Fury and Frosty Thaw

Pyongyang’s missile launches, especially the 13,000 range Hwangsong-15, along with the sixth nuclear test in 2017, were highly provocative acts that disturbed the geo strategic equations in the region. At the same time, joint US-South Korea military drills, unprecedented in intensity and scope, were seen as an existential threat by Kim’s dictatorial regime. Absence of effective channels of communication and widening trust deficit added to the escalation of tensions.

The region witnessed dramatic turn of events over past few months. Sabre rattling by President Donald Trump and Kim’s vitriolic threats of merciless retaliation made it appear as if war clouds were gathering over the Peninsula, raising fears of a possible nuclear showdown. There was sudden climb down when during his New Year address on January 1 this year, Kim made unexpected reconciliatory overtures. He called for better relations with South Korea, even showing inclination to participate in the Winter Olympics.

This change of stance followed Trump’s hard hitting speech at the UN a few days earlier. It was a well calculated strategic move by Pyongyang with multiple objectives — to weaken US-South Korea alliance and provide relief to North Korea’s sanctions-battered economy. Presence of Kim’s powerful sister Kim Yo-jong accompanied by Kim Yong-nam, North Korea’s presumed head of State during the opening ceremony at Pyeong Chang in February 2018 was a coup of Olympic proportions. It was the highest level visit by a leader from the North to the South and the first by a member of the Kim clan.

The hyper paced developments which brought Kim to the negotiation table without preconditions could be attributed to number of factors. These could include biting pressure due to fresh US sanctions, China tightening curbs on trade with the unruly neighbour (imports reduced by over 78 percent and exports by almost 34 percent, as of late 2017), and a desire to end the state of international isolation and gain recognition in the global polity. As a reaffirmation of the traditional bond between the Communist neighbours, Kim travelled to Beijing in March 2018 on his maiden foreign tour since assuming power in 2011. President Trump too despatched Mike Pompeo, then Director CIA and now Secretary of State to meet with the North Korean leader, which has set the stage for his forthcoming meeting with Kim.

Historic Summit at Panmunjom

Kim commenced the path breaking summit meeting with a sweeping promise, “I came here to put an end to the history of confrontation”. The salient highlight of Panmunjom Declaration was the pledge by the two leaders to officially end the Korean War. It envisages complete cessation of all hostile acts against each other and multilateral talks with other countries including the US. To realise the common goal, both sides agreed to pursue complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Announcing the beginning of a ‘new age of peace’, the two sides declared that there will be no more wars on the Korean peninsula. Both the leaders agreed to transform the fortified border into a peace zone. Practical schemes would be devised to transform the current ‘Northern Limit Line’ in the West Sea into a ‘maritime peace zone’. Mechanisms will also be put in place to hold frequent defence ministerial and working level meetings in a bid to immediately resolve military issues, with the first meeting scheduled in May.

The two sides further committed to fully implement existing agreements and declarations. They also committed to jointly participate in international sports events and resolve the humanitarian issues resulting from the nation’s division. Measures are to be instituted to encourage more active cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts between the two sides. A joint liaison office is to be established in the Kaesong industrial zone with resident representatives from both the sides.

Beginning of a New Era

Despite these positive developments, given the conflicting interests of the key stakeholders, there are number of imponderables which need to be addressed. Peace prospects will largely depend on the outcome of the Trump-Kim meeting, tripartite talks between US and two Koreas and ‘four party’ talks involving China. To make any tangible progress, Washington will have to allay Pyongyang’s security concerns and Beijing will need to be an honest broker.

Going by the past record, Pyongyang is no naïve player. On two occasions, South Korean Presidents had travelled to North for summit meetings. Post the inter-Korean summit in 2007, the joint declaration had almost identical goals as the recent one, including on the nuclear issue. Yet the international peace process failed to make any progress and North Korea went on to resume its nuclear weapons programme.

For the US, denuclearization tops the agenda which includes removal of chemical and biological weapons and elimination of the ballistic missile threat. Going by Trump’s stance on renegotiation of the Iranian nuclear deal, the terms and conditions with respect to North Korea are expected to be very stringent. Besides, America will press for a peace treaty to end the state of hostility and move towards normalization of relations. If achieved, it will be a major victory for Trump. However, US will always be vary of losing its influence in the region, especially regarding issues like the future of 28,500 American troops stationed in South Korea.

China is an important stake holder in the region. As a peaceful periphery is vital for its economic progress, a nuclear free and stable Korean Peninsula best serves Beijing’s strategic interests. Fearing the loss of North Korea as a buffer, Mao Tse Tung had entered the Korean War in November 1950 in the wake of the northward advance of General Douglas MacArthur’s forces. Mao succeeded in fighting the adversary to a stand-still astride the 38th Parallel; in the process suffering over 600,000 fatalities, including of his own son Anying. In case its interests are not well served, Beijing can well block the peace deal by not being an honest broker.

For North Korea, the key concern is the survival of its authoritarian regime. Kim Jong-un and his father Kim Jong-Il painstakingly built the nuclear arsenal as a guarantee to obviate the repeat of US interventions in Iraq and Libya. That is why, North Korea is insistent on guarantee against any US misadventure, before it even considers giving up its nuclear arsenal. While Kim has stated that his nation’s nuclear sites will be open to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for inspection, he has not made any tangible concessions on his nuclear weapons.

Kim’s motives for rapprochement are open to conjecturing. His outreach to President Moon is a smart move to weaken sanctions and erode Trump’s clout. By replaying the cycle of provocation and reconciliation pioneered by his grandfather and father, Kim has catapulted himself as a world class player. President Moon Jae-in, a former human rights lawyer had flagged conciliation with North Korea a key issue of his Presidential campaign. Consequently, he has made proactive moves to deliver on his promise. For South Korea, the highest priority is to prevent conflict on the Peninsula and open avenues to find lasting solution to the prevailing imbroglio. The recent summit is bound to deliver enormous political dividend for Moon at home, with national elections slated for June 2018.

For Japan, having witnessed Kim’s missiles flying over its territory, reduction of tensions would come as a great relief. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe termed the recent Korean Summit as a positive move forward towards resolution of various issues. President Vladimir Putin referred to the dialogue as positive news with certain prospects.

One issue that is highly complex and contentious relates to ‘denuclearisation’, as the three key stake holders have varying perceptions. According to Trump, “it means North Korea gets rid of its nukes”. However, North Korea itself has made no explicit pledge to do so during the current rapprochement. The Chinese state media has cited Kim as saying that the issue could be resolved if Washington and Seoul take progressive and synchronous measures for realisation of peace, implying some kind of ‘quid pro quo’. As per Seoul, Pyongyang has offered to give up nuclear weapons for unspecified security guarantee. Hence, resolving this issue will entail a long drawn process and multiple rounds of negotiations, before a deal is reached to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear programme.

Intense rivalry amongst the major stakeholders in pursuit of their national interests is going to pose major challenges for the impending negotiations to resolve the Korean issue, as it concerns the future of North East Asia. Japan and South Korea are already worried that Trump may sacrifice their interests in pursuit of an ‘America First’ policy. Even the peace treaty to formally close the conflict and help in the subsequent unification of the two Koreas will be a complicated process as both Seoul and Pyongyang claim sovereignty over the whole Peninsula. The process will have reasonable chances of progress only if the key players re-evaluate their basic goals and reframe the issues. This will entail massive diplomatic effort. While the recent Korean Summit marks the beginning of the new era, to achieve lasting peace will require intense diplomatic efforts.

In Chinese tradition, dynastic bloodline has never been the criterion to determine the line of succession. It is the capable ministers and victorious generals who were bestowed the ‘mandate of heaven’ (tianming) to rule China. Hundreds of rulers earned the legendary title of Huang di – the ‘first Yellow Emperor’ who founded China on the rich flood plains of the Yellow River (Huang He).Few wielded more power than Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the founding emperors of China’s Communist Dynasty. Now, Xi Jinping has made history with the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s Parliament – a rubber stamp body –voting to abolish the 10-year presidential term limit, thus enabling him to lead China for several years more.

Mao, as the First Generation leader, ruled China for nearly three decades till his death in 1976. Deng succeeded Mao, albeit after a brief power struggle, and remained at the helm for almost two decades. To avoid a repeat of the aftermath of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, Deng incorporated a provision in the Party constitution in 1982 to limit the tenure of the President. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as the Third and Fourth Generation Leaders respectively, served two- five years terms each, adopting a collective leadership style.

Xi, the son of Xi Zhongxun – a revolutionary and Mao’s compatriot – joined the Party in 1974 at the age of 21. He burst on the political scene as a graft fighting Governor of Fujian in 1999. Xi was a consensus candidate to take on the mantle of the Fifth Generation leadership in 2012. Given the smooth transition of power for the third consecutive time, coupled with his low profile (then he was better known as the husband of popular folk singer Peng Liyuan), speculation was rife that Xi will abide by the constitutional rule that his immediate predecessors had abided by. However, he played his hand differently to emerge as the most powerful leader after Mao and promising to usher China into the ‘New Era’.

Xi bends the curve to forge ‘Generation Rule’

While commencing his first term in 2013, Xi had stated that “to forge iron, you ought to be strong”. He then set about systematically consolidating his position by strengthening his hold on the twin levers of power: the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). He wasted no time in assuming the triple titles of: General Secretary of the CPC, the most powerful appointment; Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body; and, the Presidency, the least important of the three. Incidentally, Jiang Zemin had held on to the Chairmanship of the CMC for almost two years after handing over the reins to Hu Jintao, thus creating dual power centres.

Xi unleashed an unbridled campaign to clean up the system as corruption had got deeply engrained in the Party culture. Some of the stalwarts who were either punished or removed for corruption or other violations included Zhou Yongkang, member of the apex Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and Bo Xilai, member Politburo and Party Secretary of Chongqing. Besides, more than 40 PLA Generals were netted in the anti-graft operations. These included Generals Guo Boxing and Caihu, Vice Chairmen in the CMC and recently General Fang Fenghui, former Chief of General Staff and member of the CMC. The anti-corruption campaign has also proved handy for Xi to purge potential political rivals.

Concurrently, Xi initiated radical military reforms with a dual aim; to prepare the defence forces for their future role and reinforce the Party’s firm control over PLA. The reforms process started in 2013 during the Third Plenum of the Party Congress with the establishment of the National Security Commission with Xi as its Chairman. In the reorganized CMC, the role of the President as the ‘Commander in Chief’ enables Xi to exercise direct operational control over the military through the ‘Joint Operational Center’. By ordering a series of reshuffles in the PLA hierarchy, Xi ensured that his loyalists occupied key positions. To reaffirm the role of the military, Xi visited Gutian, a town in Fujian Province, on 30 October 2014 and reiterated what Mao had legislated at the same venue in December 1929; “PLA remains Party’s Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters”.

At the time of the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, Xi was holding over a dozen titles, and was referred to, in a lighter vein, as ‘Chairman of all’. During the Party Congress, Xi further cemented his authority by enshrining his “Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” in the Constitution. His eponymous political ideology proposes an alternate to liberal democracy and serves as a philosophy around which the CPC can coalesce. In a clear departure from the well-established tradition followed since the last three decades, no one was chosen as the ‘Sixth Generation’ leader, a successor to be groomed to take over from Xi after he completes his second five year term in 2023. This set a new precedence, giving rise to speculation that Xi was planning for a third term.

During the 19th Party Congress, Xi unveiled his ‘China Dream’ (fuxing),whichenvisions a powerful and prosperous China entering a ‘New Era”. To this end, he outlined the twin centenary objectives: China to become a fully modern economy and achieve social modernization by 2035; and acquire the status of ‘great modern socialist country’ by the middle of this Century. He propounded the policy ‘striving for achievement’ (fanfa youwei), advocating a greater Chinese leadership role in global affairs to shape the new world order. This marked an abandonment of Deng’s strategy of maintaining a low profile, never taking a leadership role and biding for time till China completes its peaceful rise.

Post the Party Congress, Xi surreptitiously engineered the process to do away with the two-term Presidential limit, although the appointment is of ceremonial nature to facilitate the discharge of political functions. In January 2018, some 200 senior officials of the Communist Party Central Committee gathered behind closed doors to abolish the Presidential term limit so that Xi could hold on to power indefinitely. The decision was kept under wraps and abruptly announced just before the commencement of the NPC annual session. As expected, the controversial constitutional amendment to abolish the limit set on the presidential term was passed with an overwhelming majority by the NPC on 11 March 2018 at the Great Hall of People, thus enabling Xi to continue to retain power for life.

China Set for a Long March to Enter ‘New Era’

When China started to integrate into the ‘global economic order’, the West began to believe that the PRC would bind itself to the rule based system and evolve into a market economy. It was further assumed that, as Chinese people grew wealthier, they will yearn for democratic freedom thus paving the way for political reforms. Xi was expected to initiate far reaching economic and political reforms. However, this turned out to be an illusion.

There are a few reasons that explain the CCP’s decision to empower Xi indefinitely. Firstly, the process of China’s emergence as a global power remains a work in progress and is expected to continue for the next few decades. Secondly, the Chinese economy is in a state of transition from low technology manufacturing to advanced digitally enabled products. Thirdly, Xi’s pet project, the ‘Belt-Road Initiative’ which envisages an investment of US $ 1 trillion abroad, and is perceived to be vital for sustaining China’s pace of economic growth and creating a strategic web to expand the Dragon’s influence, requires leadership continuity. Fourthly, Xi’s on-going anti-corruption drive demands a strong person at the helm.

China’s political system is authoritarian and leaves no space for dissent. Hence, despite Xi’s political coup and underlying fears of oppressive measures, large scale protests are unlikely. Moreover, the public at large perceives Mao to have made China great, Deng rich, and Xi to be building a strong nation. For the time being, the major concerns of the Chinese people are economic, i.e., jobs, prosperity and quality of life; politics is certainly not a key issue.

According to retired Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces, Xi’s elevation as a lifelong Emperor will lend China a short term advantage by way of consistency of policies and clear strategic direction vis-a vis the democracies where leaders and policies change frequently. However, in the long run, dictatorial regimes are prone to political instability, especially during transitions of power; China itself being a case in point. Another fact could be the rise of China’s middle class over a period of time which would consist of people with varied experiences and independent mindseta who could possibly seek greater political freedom.

Global polity is often surprised by the Communist leadership, primarily due to a lack of understanding of Chinese history, culture and a system shrouded in secrecy. All Chinese regimes since the demise of the Qing Monarchy have consolidated national sovereignty and pursued power through all available means. Most commentators who got Xi wrong claim that not much was known about him before he came to power. The lateLee Kuan Yew, when expressing his opinion about Xi Jinping, had stated that he has the soul of iron and does not let past suffering weigh upon him. He had compared Xi with the likes of Nelson Mandela. According to Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, Xi is a man of extraordinary intellect, is self-confident and has a well-defined world view.

Xi began his second term by exhorting the two million strong PLA to be combat ready by focussing on how to win wars. In his recent speech at the 19th Party Congress, Xi stated that while he would strive to resolve disputes through dialogue he will not compromise on sovereignty. During his interaction with the delegates of the current NPC, he warned officials to shed ‘pillow talk’ and refrain from indulging in corruption. If the above statements are any indication, the world can expect Xi to be internally oppressive and externally assertive in pursuit of his ‘China Dream’, which could intensify the ensuing ‘great power rivalry’

China under a powerful autocratic leader does not augur well for India. The I962 War and the stand-offs in 1967 and 1987 occurred during the Mao and Deng eras. And the recent face-offs at Depsang, Demchok and Doklam have taken place during Xi’s rule. India will have to be well prepared to counter Chinese intimidation and aggressive behaviour. This will require decoding Xi’s strategic design and exploit windows of opportunities to enhance cooperation and reduce confrontation. The formulation of a holistic China policy driven by India’s long term core interests is no more an option, but an imperative.

Xi rides the Dragon which is externally formidable but internally fragile. He is aware of the consequences of his policies going awry. There is scepticism about China’s ability to maintain its pace of economic growth, given the signs of slow down. Xi has offered the China model based on ‘neo authoritarianism’, where political stability and economic development trump democracy and individual rights, as an alternate to the Western liberal democratic capitalist model. China’s long march to enter the ‘New Era’ will come at a price as it retracts into Mao era centralisation.,

According to the Chinese 11th Century Classic ‘The General Mirror for the Aid of Government’ (Cu Chi Tang Qian), “Anyone who is able to prevent violence and remove harm from the people so that men’s lives are protected, who can reward good and punish evil and thus avoid disaster – such a man be called an emperor.” Xi is known to have deep insights in Chinese history. He has taken a tough call fraught with tremendous risk but with the conviction that he has it in him to be in the league of Mao and Deng, although, as a princeling, he may not belong to the same tribe.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

According to Chinese traditional belief, it is the ‘mandate of heaven’ (tianming) that selects an individual to rule. A Confucian idea to facilitate the dynastic cycle, it implied that while good rulers would be allowed to govern with a renewed mandate, the mandate would be revoked in the case of despotic and unjust rulers.

The first Chinese ruler to claim the mandate of heaven was King Wen of Zhou (1050 BCE), a pre- dynastic feudal state in the Wei River Valley. Wen remained a model for many subsequent emperors and politicians. Rival dynasties often used the concept of mandate as a pretext to gain legitimacy for perpetuating political unrest. A case in point was the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BCE) under Shi Huangti, who used it to justify the conquest of all other states, thus unifying China for the first time.

Post the 1949 Communist Revolution, Mao emerged as an autocratic paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). His ideology ‘Mao Zedong Thought’, encapsulated in the famous ‘red book’, was enshrined in the party’s constitution. After Mao’s death in 1976 followed by a brief power struggle, Deng Xiaoping assumed the ‘Second Generation’ leadership. Deng’s ideology was ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics, a clear departure from the ‘class struggle’ enunciated by Mao. After Deng’s demise in 1997, Jiang Zemin emerged as the ‘core’ of the ‘Third Generation’ leadership and adopted a collective leadership approach. He was the architect of the ‘three represents’ ideology (san ge daibiao); implying that the Communist Party should be representative of advanced social productive forces – economic growth, culture and interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people – under new historical conditions. His successor Hu Jintao, representing the ‘Fourth Generation’ Leadership, followed a similar model, professing the concept of ‘scientific development and harmonious society’. To take on the mantle of the ‘Fifth Generation’ leadership, Xi Jinping was picked as the consensus candidate.

Singapore’s late elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew had described Xi Jinping as a person who had a soul of iron and compared him with the likes of Nelson Mandela. After taking over the reins of power in 2012, Xi moved quickly to consolidate power and project the image of a strongman. Over the last five years, he has established himself as the “core” leader and strengthened his hold on the Party and the PLA, the two key structural pillars of the People’s Republic.

Having famously stated that “Things must have gone rotten before insects can grow”, Xi initiated an unforgiving anti-corruption campaign. The relentless drive resulted in 278,000 officials facing disciplinary action, including 440 holding ministerial or higher positions in government establishments, ‘state owned enterprises’ and the military. Some of the big names caught in the anti-corruption campaign were:

• Zhou Yongkang, a former security czar and member of the apex ‘Politburo Standing Committee’ (PSC),
• Bo Xilai, Member of the Politburo and Party Secretary Chongqing,
• Generals Guo Boxing and Xu Caihu, Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body.

The anti-corruption campaign also saw the elimination of potential rivals, specifically those belonging to factions not aligned with Xi. Cleaning up the system remains a work in progress with two more senior most Generals being implicated recently.

The Party Congress is a five yearly affair, shrouded in secrecy and preceded by intense back room parleys. In the just concluded week long 19th Party Congress, Xi has further strengthened his iron grip over the power levers, specifically in the Party’s policy making structure, and emerged as China’s most powerful leader after Mao. Having been re-elected for a second five year term, he is apparently set to call the shots well beyond 2022, since the new PSC has no chosen successor to be groomed, which is a glaring shift from the Party’s well established tradition during the last two decades. Two probables – Hu Chunhua (Party Chief Guangdong Province) and Chen Miner (Party head of Chongqing City and Xi’s protégé tipped to be his successor) did not make it to the PSC, a pre-requisite for eventual emergence as Party Secretary General.

Xi’s Grand Strategy

The enshrining of “Xi Jinping Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” in the Party constitution as a guiding principle puts him in the league of Mao and signals the further cementing of his power base. Henceforth, any criticism of Xi’s policies will be deemed as an attack on the Communist system itself.

To realise his ‘China Dream’ (fuxing – restoration), which envisions a ‘powerful and prosperous’ China, Xi unfolded his grand design while presenting his report on the opening day of the Party Congress at the Great Hall of the People. He referred to China entering a ‘New Era’ marked by social contradictions. To this end, Xi has propounded the policy of ‘striving for achievements’ (fenfa youwei) and advocating a greater Chinese leadership role in world affairs. This is an obvious departure from the strategy that Deng had advocated, namely, ‘maintain low profile and bide for time’ till China completes its peaceful rise, which was followed scrupulously thus far.

To translate his ‘China Dream’ into reality, Xi outlined the ‘twin centenary objectives’: to become a ‘fully modern’ economy and society between 2020 and 2035; and acquire ‘great power’ status by 2050, coinciding with the centenary of the foundation of the PRC. Undoubtedly, Xi envisions China as a key player in shaping the new global order with Chinese characteristics. His grand strategy is in consonance with the Chinese strategic culture of ‘thinking deep and far’, i.e., taking a holistic and long term perspective.

Ramifications

Today, USA is conflicted about its global role, with President Trump advocating an ‘America First’ policy. Russia under Putin is still in delusion about Cold War symmetry. Xi, on the other hand, has enunciated a clearer strategy for China. As evident from his speeches, he has articulated the idea of a new type of great power relationship based on parity in US-China relations. Now with the stature of a paramount leader, Xi is expected to pursue assertive diplomacy in restructuring the international system whose underlying rules will be increasingly framed by China. Major projects like the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR) are means for promoting the objective of a ‘community of shared future’; part of Beijing’s new peripheral diplomacy. This will also enable China to leverage its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to pursue core national strategic interests.

Xi stated in his speech on 18 October that China would strive to resolve disputes through dialogue but will not compromise on national sovereignty. He has begun his second term by exhorting the 2.3 million strong PLA to be combat ready and focus on ‘how to win wars’. China’s official stated position on the integration of claimed territories with the motherland does not preclude the use of force. For India, China under a powerful autocratic leader does not augur well, given the past record. The 1962 War and stand-offs in 1967 and 1987 occurred when Mao and Deng reigned supreme. The recent face-offs at Depsang, Demchok and Doklam have all taken place during Xi’s tenure. India will have to be prepared to counter China’s growing assertiveness and be wary of the latter’s strengthening nexus with Pakistan.

Xi today rides the Dragon which is externally strong but internally fragile. As political reforms are not on Xi’s agenda, it is economic growth that is the key to translate his dream into reality. There is scepticism about the sustainability of China’s current economic model, given signs of slowing down. Therefore, some tough reforms are inevitable in the future which are likely to lead to social turbulence.

At the beginning of his first term five years back, Xi had stated that one has to be strong to forge iron. Accordingly, he systematically went about centralising power and pushing through the process of consolidation ruthlessly. Xi’s strategy to catapult China to the status of a superpower in the next three decades has no precedence, both in terms of enormity and scope. Lee Kuan Yew had stated that the sheer size of China’s displacement meant that the world has to find a new order. Time has come for the global polity to take note of Xi’s grand design as he flags off China for a ‘long march’ to reshape the world order.

(The authoris former Assistant Chief Integrated Defence Staff, served as Defence Attaché in China, Mongolia and North Korea, and currently professor International Studies, Aligarh Muslim University)

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Published in IDSA on 06 Oct 2017

IDSA Comment

The recent standoff at Doklam had raised genuine concerns about the situation escalating, given that the opposing troops stood ‘eye ball to eye ball’ for over 10 weeks. While the crisis has been defused for the time being, the probability of a future flare up cannot be ruled out. Post the disengagement, Chinese troops have fortified their positions in the Doklam Plateau with the declared intent of resuming the road construction activity at an appropriate time. The military build-up, which had been undertaken by the two sides in the wake of the crisis, remains in place. The current period of lull is, therefore, a tactical pause. In all prudence, Doklam should be taken as a nudge to initiate a holistic strategic review.

There is an old adage that “the longer you look back, the farther you can look forward”. Chinese leaders have a good understanding of their nation’s history and are known to make comparisons between the present and the past. Zhou Enlai had famously said “diplomacy is continuation of war by other means”, morphing the famous maxim by Clausewitz. Doklam was a well-calibrated small team action aimed at changing the status quo on the ground but with overarching strategic ramifications. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will make further moves on the ground only after the issue has been well deliberated by the Communist leadership.

After being appointed as ‘First Lord of Admiralty’ in 1911, Winston Churchill wrote a memorandum to his cabinet colleagues in which he stated that “Preparation for war is the only guarantee for preservation of wealth, natural resources and territory of the state.” To this end, he identified three key areas; probable dangers, history’s lessons and employment of war material. Interestingly, these guiding tenets are relevant to this day in the Indian context as well.

Probable Dangers

According to Graham Allison, the preeminent geostrategic challenge of the era is not violent Islamic extremism or resurgent Russia but the impact of China’s resurgence. Lee Kuan Yew had observed that the sheer size of China’s displacement meant that the world has to find a new order. Hence, when China cautions Japan to get used to its actions in the East China Sea and India to prepare for more Chinese roads in Doklam, these should not come as a surprise.

Through its assertive behaviour and expansionist approach, China has pursued the strategy of encroachment – ‘nibble and negotiate’ – evident from its actions both along its land borders and maritime frontiers. This is in consonance with the Chinese culture of maintaining a peaceful periphery by keeping the neighbourhood subdued. The Chinese are averse to any challenge or competition. A lonely power, China has optimally used its two allies – Pakistan and North Korea – to serve its strategic interests in the Indian subcontinent and the Korean Peninsula. With the deepening Chinese economic engagement with Pakistan as part of its global outreach, the nexus between the two countries is set to strengthen further.

Given the exponential accretion in China’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP), there is a marked shift from its earlier strategy enunciated by Deng Xiao Ping – ‘to bide for time and maintain a low profile’ till the completion of peaceful rise. Now, President Xi Jinping has emerged as an all-powerful ‘Fifth Generation’ leader whose China dream – fuxing (restoration)– envisions a “powerful and prosperous China”, symbolic of its past grandeur. In the quest to shape a ‘Sino-centric global order’, China seeks a unipolar Asia and a bipolar world. Mega projects like the Belt-Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Route launched at Xi’s behest are means of power projection, designed to catapult China into the superpower league.

Xi has accorded high priority to defence modernization, an important component of CNP. Consequently, the PLA is in the midst of path breaking reforms to emerge as a modern military that is capable of winning “limited war under informationised conditions”. To this end, the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body, has been reorganized. All the members of the CMC are senior most PLA Generals, including General Chang Wanquan who has been the Defence Minister since 2012. The massive infrastructure development on the borders aims to overwhelm the adversary with sheer speed and shock action. While a major conflict with India is not in China’s larger interest, it will keep up the pressure astride the Line of Actual Control (LAC) through pre-emptive tactical actions.

Historical Perspective

An analysis of past skirmishes along the border reveal a definite pattern. Mao initiated the 1962 War when he was under serious criticism post the disastrous ‘Great Leap Forward’. The Nathu La Incident in 1967 coincided with an intensely turbulent phase of the ‘Cultural Revolution’. The Sumdurong Chu crisis in 1987 synchronised with the 13th Party Congress. The standoff in the area of Depsang Plateau in April 2013 preceded the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang. The face off in Chumar in September 2014 happened during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India. Doklam was triggered in mid-June just before Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the US. The timing of the Doklam crisis may also have some connect with the 19th Party Congress due in mid-October 2017. China’s diplomatic moves to defuse the situation at Doklam were primarily to prevent the derailment of the BRICS meeting which would have severely dented Xi’s image. It is evident that China’s internal dynamics have definite linkages with incidences on the border. Beijing has repeatedly resorted to military force against neighbours to achieve political objectives.

Employment of war waging material

In an era of ‘limited wars’, defining lines between strategic and tactical objectives stand blurred. Even small tactical incidents have strategic implications, wherein it is not unusual for the top leadership to willy-nilly get involved, Doklam being a case in point. In a limited war scenario, it is not total force ratios that are critical. What is crucial is the quantum of combat potential that can be brought to bear in an integrated manner at the point of decision, in a telescopic time frame. A flat decision making structure and synergy are sine qua non in modern warfare. Thus, well-developed infrastructure particularly in forward areas is vital. China has gained a strategic edge in this regard. However, its vulnerability of fighting from exterior lines of communications can be optimally exploited.

Strategic Review

In the light of the aforesaid imperatives, a holistic strategic review is no more an option. This ought to be carried out over a wide spectrum and in a multi- dimensional manner with specific timelines. As the Chinese leadership believes in negotiating only with equals, India has to address the current state of asymmetry vis-à-vis China in right earnest. It is only a state of strategic equilibrium between the two countries that can pave way for meaningful dialogue and regional stability. Some of the key facets which deserve attention are enumerated below.

Firstly, as a part of grand strategy, India needs to rebalance in consonance with the geopolitical shift that is in the offing in the Indo-Pacific. To counter Beijing’s growing influence especially around the neighbourhood, New Delhi needs to shed its traditional policy of ambiguity. It has to be forthcoming to play a larger role in the region by aligning with strategic partners, namely the US and Japan, besides other friendly nations. In the process, India must push strongly for a multipolar global architecture to effectively thwart China’s designs.

Secondly, the enhancement of CNP as an integral component of national policy ought to be accorded highest priority to correct the prevailing imbalance. It entails sustaining a fast pace of economic growth, strengthening institutional mechanisms and the optimal utilisation of national resources.

Thirdly, as hard power is a vital component of CNP, enhancement of military capability is a critical imperative. So far, the process of military modernization has followed an ad hoc, incremental, approach in the absence of a well-defined national policy. This demands a strategic shift to make way for a transformational process in order to enable the Indian Army match the PLA. It entails dismantling bureaucratic gridlocks, abolishing service-specific organizational structures, sharpening the teeth-to-tail ratio, fast tracking the procurement cum acquisition procedures and leveraging technology. The consistent downward trend of defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which now stands at about 1.6 per cent, needs to be corrected.

Fourthly, there is an urgent need to prepare a ‘White Paper on National Defence’ which should clearly define the prevailing security environment, threat assessment and thrust of military modernization. Given the regional security dynamics, while major wars are unlikely, localised conflicts remain a possibility. The rapid advancement in technology has compressed time and space in addition to making battlefields non-linear. The traditional view of deterrence stands redefined by new concepts of ‘pre-emption’ and ‘prevention’ and these are being increasingly practiced by India’s adversaries.

Fifthly, it is ironic that we are yet to formulate a ‘Doctrine of Limited War’. This has to be a top driven process emanating from a National Defence Policy. Even the much talked of ‘two front scenario’ has varying interpretations between the three services. The current state of infrastructure stands out as a major impediment for the timely employment of combat power at the point of decision. The development of integrated and sustainable logistics is a pre-requisite for success in a limited conflict. The creation of super highways, freight corridors, forward airfields, strategic airlift capability and state of art communications set-up is the way forward.

Lastly, the concept of ‘border management’ requires a relook as the present system suffers from serious lacunae. There is an urgent need to have a single nodal agency to coordinate the functioning of the multiple organs involved in safeguarding India’s borders. Operational control on the Line of Control (LoC) and Line of Actual Control must rest with the Army. The operational capability of the Paramilitary Forces needs to be enhanced on priority basis. The mere enhancement of budgetary allocations without a coordinated security policy will not suffice. As the probability of face-offs and local skirmishes remains high, contingencies must be in place to deliver timely and calibrated responses. Disputed areas must be held in strength ab initio in order to prevent the adversary from presenting India with a fait accompli.

Given divergent national interests and overlapping strategic objectives, rivalry and competition is inherent in India-China relations. The vexed border issue coupled with the Tibet factor further add to the complexities. Hence, politico-diplomatic showdowns and standoffs on the border have to be accepted as a new normal. While sustained efforts to revamp the existing mechanisms of engagement remains a work in progress, there can be no laxity in defence preparedness. China respects strength and despises the weak. Defence and diplomacy being two sides of the same coin, it is boots on the grounds that determine the extent to which an envelope can be pushed at the negotiation table.

Maj Gen G G Dwivedi (retd) is former Assistant Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, has served as Defence Attaché in China, North Korea and Mongolia, and is currently Professor of International Studies at Aligarh Muslim University.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.