Author Archives: ggdwivedi

Lull at Doklam: Time for a Holistic Strategic Review

 

Published in IDSA on 06 Oct 2017

IDSA Comment

ind-china

The recent standoff at Doklam had raised genuine concerns about the situation escalating, given that the opposing troops stood ‘eye ball to eye ball’ for over 10 weeks. While the crisis has been defused for the time being, the probability of a future flare up cannot be ruled out. Post the disengagement, Chinese troops have fortified their positions in the Doklam Plateau with the declared intent of resuming the road construction activity at an appropriate time. The military build-up, which had been undertaken by the two sides in the wake of the crisis, remains in place. The current period of lull is, therefore, a tactical pause. In all prudence, Doklam should be taken as a nudge to initiate a holistic strategic review.

There is an old adage that “the longer you look back, the farther you can look forward”. Chinese leaders have a good understanding of their nation’s history and are known to make comparisons between the present and the past. Zhou Enlai had famously said “diplomacy is continuation of war by other means”, morphing the famous maxim by Clausewitz. Doklam was a well-calibrated small team action aimed at changing the status quo on the ground but with overarching strategic ramifications. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will make further moves on the ground only after the issue has been well deliberated by the Communist leadership.

After being appointed as ‘First Lord of Admiralty’ in 1911, Winston Churchill wrote a memorandum to his cabinet colleagues in which he stated that “Preparation for war is the only guarantee for preservation of wealth, natural resources and territory of the state.” To this end, he identified three key areas; probable dangers, history’s lessons and employment of war material. Interestingly, these guiding tenets are relevant to this day in the Indian context as well.

Probable Dangers

According to Graham Allison, the preeminent geostrategic challenge of the era is not violent Islamic extremism or resurgent Russia but the impact of China’s resurgence. Lee Kuan Yew had observed that the sheer size of China’s displacement meant that the world has to find a new order. Hence, when China cautions Japan to get used to its actions in the East China Sea and India to prepare for more Chinese roads in Doklam, these should not come as a surprise.

Through its assertive behaviour and expansionist approach, China has pursued the strategy of encroachment – ‘nibble and negotiate’ – evident from its actions both along its land borders and maritime frontiers. This is in consonance with the Chinese culture of maintaining a peaceful periphery by keeping the neighbourhood subdued. The Chinese are averse to any challenge or competition. A lonely power, China has optimally used its two allies – Pakistan and North Korea – to serve its strategic interests in the Indian subcontinent and the Korean Peninsula. With the deepening Chinese economic engagement with Pakistan as part of its global outreach, the nexus between the two countries is set to strengthen further.

Given the exponential accretion in China’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP), there is a marked shift from its earlier strategy enunciated by Deng Xiao Ping – ‘to bide for time and maintain a low profile’ till the completion of peaceful rise. Now, President Xi Jinping has emerged as an all-powerful ‘Fifth Generation’ leader whose China dream – fuxing (restoration)– envisions a “powerful and prosperous China”, symbolic of its past grandeur. In the quest to shape a ‘Sino-centric global order’, China seeks a unipolar Asia and a bipolar world. Mega projects like the Belt-Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Route launched at Xi’s behest are means of power projection, designed to catapult China into the superpower league.

Xi has accorded high priority to defence modernization, an important component of CNP. Consequently, the PLA is in the midst of path breaking reforms to emerge as a modern military that is capable of winning “limited war under informationised conditions”. To this end, the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body, has been reorganized. All the members of the CMC are senior most PLA Generals, including General Chang Wanquan who has been the Defence Minister since 2012. The massive infrastructure development on the borders aims to overwhelm the adversary with sheer speed and shock action. While a major conflict with India is not in China’s larger interest, it will keep up the pressure astride the Line of Actual Control (LAC) through pre-emptive tactical actions.

Historical Perspective

An analysis of past skirmishes along the border reveal a definite pattern. Mao initiated the 1962 War when he was under serious criticism post the disastrous ‘Great Leap Forward’. The Nathu La Incident in 1967 coincided with an intensely turbulent phase of the ‘Cultural Revolution’. The Sumdurong Chu crisis in 1987 synchronised with the 13th Party Congress. The standoff in the area of Depsang Plateau in April 2013 preceded the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang. The face off in Chumar in September 2014 happened during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India. Doklam was triggered in mid-June just before Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the US. The timing of the Doklam crisis may also have some connect with the 19th Party Congress due in mid-October 2017. China’s diplomatic moves to defuse the situation at Doklam were primarily to prevent the derailment of the BRICS meeting which would have severely dented Xi’s image. It is evident that China’s internal dynamics have definite linkages with incidences on the border. Beijing has repeatedly resorted to military force against neighbours to achieve political objectives.

Employment of war waging material

In an era of ‘limited wars’, defining lines between strategic and tactical objectives stand blurred. Even small tactical incidents have strategic implications, wherein it is not unusual for the top leadership to willy-nilly get involved, Doklam being a case in point. In a limited war scenario, it is not total force ratios that are critical. What is crucial is the quantum of combat potential that can be brought to bear in an integrated manner at the point of decision, in a telescopic time frame. A flat decision making structure and synergy are sine qua non in modern warfare. Thus, well-developed infrastructure particularly in forward areas is vital. China has gained a strategic edge in this regard. However, its vulnerability of fighting from exterior lines of communications can be optimally exploited.

Strategic Review

In the light of the aforesaid imperatives, a holistic strategic review is no more an option. This ought to be carried out over a wide spectrum and in a multi- dimensional manner with specific timelines. As the Chinese leadership believes in negotiating only with equals, India has to address the current state of asymmetry vis-à-vis China in right earnest. It is only a state of strategic equilibrium between the two countries that can pave way for meaningful dialogue and regional stability. Some of the key facets which deserve attention are enumerated below.

Firstly, as a part of grand strategy, India needs to rebalance in consonance with the geopolitical shift that is in the offing in the Indo-Pacific. To counter Beijing’s growing influence especially around the neighbourhood, New Delhi needs to shed its traditional policy of ambiguity. It has to be forthcoming to play a larger role in the region by aligning with strategic partners, namely the US and Japan, besides other friendly nations. In the process, India must push strongly for a multipolar global architecture to effectively thwart China’s designs.

Secondly, the enhancement of CNP as an integral component of national policy ought to be accorded highest priority to correct the prevailing imbalance. It entails sustaining a fast pace of economic growth, strengthening institutional mechanisms and the optimal utilisation of national resources.

Thirdly, as hard power is a vital component of CNP, enhancement of military capability is a critical imperative. So far, the process of military modernization has followed an ad hoc, incremental, approach in the absence of a well-defined national policy. This demands a strategic shift to make way for a transformational process in order to enable the Indian Army match the PLA. It entails dismantling bureaucratic gridlocks, abolishing service-specific organizational structures, sharpening the teeth-to-tail ratio, fast tracking the procurement cum acquisition procedures and leveraging technology. The consistent downward trend of defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which now stands at about 1.6 per cent, needs to be corrected.

Fourthly, there is an urgent need to prepare a ‘White Paper on National Defence’ which should clearly define the prevailing security environment, threat assessment and thrust of military modernization. Given the regional security dynamics, while major wars are unlikely, localised conflicts remain a possibility. The rapid advancement in technology has compressed time and space in addition to making battlefields non-linear. The traditional view of deterrence stands redefined by new concepts of ‘pre-emption’ and ‘prevention’ and these are being increasingly practiced by India’s adversaries.

Fifthly, it is ironic that we are yet to formulate a ‘Doctrine of Limited War’. This has to be a top driven process emanating from a National Defence Policy. Even the much talked of ‘two front scenario’ has varying interpretations between the three services. The current state of infrastructure stands out as a major impediment for the timely employment of combat power at the point of decision. The development of integrated and sustainable logistics is a pre-requisite for success in a limited conflict. The creation of super highways, freight corridors, forward airfields, strategic airlift capability and state of art communications set-up is the way forward.

Lastly, the concept of ‘border management’ requires a relook as the present system suffers from serious lacunae. There is an urgent need to have a single nodal agency to coordinate the functioning of the multiple organs involved in safeguarding India’s borders. Operational control on the Line of Control (LoC) and Line of Actual Control must rest with the Army. The operational capability of the Paramilitary Forces needs to be enhanced on priority basis. The mere enhancement of budgetary allocations without a coordinated security policy will not suffice. As the probability of face-offs and local skirmishes remains high, contingencies must be in place to deliver timely and calibrated responses. Disputed areas must be held in strength ab initio in order to prevent the adversary from presenting India with a fait accompli.

Given divergent national interests and overlapping strategic objectives, rivalry and competition is inherent in India-China relations. The vexed border issue coupled with the Tibet factor further add to the complexities. Hence, politico-diplomatic showdowns and standoffs on the border have to be accepted as a new normal. While sustained efforts to revamp the existing mechanisms of engagement remains a work in progress, there can be no laxity in defence preparedness. China respects strength and despises the weak. Defence and diplomacy being two sides of the same coin, it is boots on the grounds that determine the extent to which an envelope can be pushed at the negotiation table.

Maj Gen G G Dwivedi (retd) is former Assistant Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, has served as Defence Attaché in China, North Korea and Mongolia, and is currently Professor of International Studies at Aligarh Muslim University.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Keywords:
India-China Relations

Korean Peninsula – Prevailing Imbroglio: Quest for Strategic Equilibrium

Published in USI Journal of India 

Introduction

Given the geostrategic location, Korean Peninsula has been the fulcrum in the North East Asia’s balance of power dynamics. Post the Korean War 1950-53, due to the existing parity of forces, North and South Korea despite being in possession of massive conventional arsenal and potential to engage in high intensity conflict, remained constrained, thus avoiding any form of misadventure.

The line of armistice running along the 38th Parallel, one of the most fortified defence lines in the world has held on, in the wake of ‘eye ball to eye ball’ situation, while the opposing forces technically still remain in a state of war. The strategic equilibrium that had existed in the Peninsula for over last six decades is under extreme stress today, due to intense geopolitical turbulence as the key stakeholders are feverishly engaged in pursuing their strategic national interests.

The Korean Peninsula today is an antidote to its earlier name ‘Chosun – the land of morning calm’ given by local tribals over two millennium BC. There are numerous factors which have led to current state of instability in the region. The salient ones are; increasing frequency of missile testing by North Korea, recent joint US-South Korea military exercises – unprecedented in scale and intensity which included strategic assets like the B-52 Bombers and Aircraft Carrier USS Carl Vinson, deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile system in South Korea by the US and ouster of South Korean President Park Geun-hye. The Peninsula due to the heightened state of tension has turned into a potential flash point – a tinder box.

State of asymmetry which is manifesting due to North Korea’s rapidly growing nuclear-cum-missile capabilities coupled with lack of cogent response from the opposite side has encouraged Pyongyang to indulge in the provocative actions. The current crisis situation has almost reached the tipping point. Option of altering aggressive behaviour of the North Korean regime through the use of kinetic force carries a major risk. The challenge before the US and its allies is how to bring about moderation so that the situation does not spin out of control. This demands employment of all the tools of national power by the US and South Korea; including diplomacy, economic, financial, legal and military.

In the succeeding paras, a brief review has been undertaken of the prevailing situation alongside a critical analysis of the moves underway in the quest for restoration of strategic equilibrium by the involved stakeholders.

Prevailing Imbroglio – An Overview

There are two key developments which have led to the present state of imbroglio. First, the rapid rise of People’s Republic of China (PRC) and relative decline in clout of the US, Russia and Japan, leading to state of disequilibrium. Second, the persistence of North Korean Regime in development of viable nuclear capability as a security guarantee. Five nuclear tests and series of missile launches it has undertaken offer strong evidence of North Korea’s strategy to mitigate the perceived existential threat.

The recent missile launch on 22 May 2017 by North Korea is of enhanced calibre capable of carrying large size nuclear warhead with a range of 3000-4000 km.1 It signifies quantum leap in Pyongyang’s capability. Unchecked nuclear weapons development by Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) poses growing security threat to South Korea, Japan and even to the US mainland, resulting in the possibility of conflict in the region.

The present state of affairs can be largely attributed to US failure to recalibrate its policy to check DPRK’s nuclear-missile programme and increasing influence of China in the North East Asia. US’s prolonged commitments in West Asia also contributed to the present situation. Sanctions imposed by the UN and the US to cripple North Korean Regime economically have largely proved ineffective. Absence of channels for dialogue has further added to the trust deficit between the belligerents, thus further escalating the tension in the region.

President Trump’s policy of ‘America First’ implies reluctance to be a security guarantor by limiting its global role. At the same time, he has promised to act tough with DPRK, indicating the end of ‘strategic patience’ era. Even Admiral Harry Harris, head of the US Pacific Command has called North Korea a ‘clear and dangerous threat’, stressing the need for greater cooperation amongst the allies and for all countries to implement stronger sanctions against Pyongyang. “Combining nuclear warheads with ballistic missile technology in the hands of volatile leader like Kim Jong-un is a recipe for disaster” added Harris.2 Glaring dichotomy in Washington’s policies of ‘sanctions and subsidies’ gives an impression of its half-hearted efforts to shape the regional security architecture.

China enjoys considerable leverage with North Korea as it is the only major power that extends political and economic support to Pyongyang’s authoritarian regime. 90 per cent of DPRK’s trade is with PRC.3 Beijing has cleverly manipulated Pyongyang to regulate tension in the Peninsula. China is known to have supplied nuclear material and know-how to DPRK including the missile launch vehicles. Over a period of time, its soft approach and unwillingness to apply pressure has emboldened the North Korean leadership. Somehow, the US has always believed that China can rein in DPRK, given its clout with the latter. The recent actions of Kim Jong-un tentamounting to defiance indicate limitations of Chinese influence.

With regard to Republic of Korea (ROK), PRC has two key security concerns. These are : to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula and prevent South Korea from getting too entrenched into the US security framework. China has come out strongly against South Korea in allowing the US to deploy THAAD System on its soil. China had persistently warned South Korea against agreeing to such a move. Beijing sees it as a provocative act of Seoul crossing the redline; its own policy failure notwithstanding.

There have been reports of China resorting to impose sanctions on South Korea to pressurise Seoul into reversing its decision on THAAD, as a punitive measure. Coercive diplomacy is part of Chinese tactics. The process entails initially integrating neighbours into the ambit of Chinese driven ‘East Asian Economic Order’ and thereon exploiting them to gain political advantage. South Korea has a trade surplus of US $ 73 billion with China as per 2015 figures. Hence, Beijing has the capability to hurt Seoul economically.

Major General Cai Jun from the Joint Staff Department of ‘Central Military Commission’ PRC commenting upon the impact of THAAD System had recently stated; “This will further tighten the Asia-Pacific anti-missile barrier enclosing China and Russia, weakening their strategic capacities, something we adamantly oppose”.4 Elaborating further, he said that American anti-missile plans seek absolute military advantage which will exacerbate regional tensions, triggering an all-out arms race.

President Putin, given his disillusioned vision of Cold War symmetry marked by ‘zero sum’ mentality alongside rising Russian nationalism, is unlikely to cooperate with Trump in reduction of tension in the Peninsula. Putin believes that constructive engagement with Pyongyang provides Moscow leverage over the conduct of North Korean Regime at a crucial time when PRC’s hold over DPRK is waning and US-North Korean tension is at an unprecedented level. In all probability, Moscow is likely to subtly oppose US designs in the region.

Contrary to the general image of violent brash youngster, Kim Jong-un has been successful in safeguarding regime’s legitimacy since he assumed power in December 2011, after the demise of his father Kim Jong-Il. He has consolidated his position without confronting any serious opposition. Kim Junior has gone about methodically strengthening DPRK’s defence capability along with economic growth. He has introduced reforms to move away from central planning to market based economy while maintaining tight political control. He is well entrenched for a long haul to carry forward the reign of Kim Dynasty.

Quest for Strategic Equilibrium

It is the disproportionate accretion in the North Korean military potential alongside its nuclear capability which is destabilising the regional strategic balance. Pyongyang is estimated to possess enough nuclear explosive material for at least 10 nuclear warheads. Experts believe that by 2020 it will have enough fissile material for 100 warheads. In all likelihood, DPRK already has capability to deliver some of these weapons by the short and medium range ballistic missiles it has in the arsenal.5

The American and Chinese camps are engaged in classic ‘balance of power’ game. American quest is to maintain the status quo as the sole superpower. As a Pacific power, Washington is resolved to maintaining influence in the Asia-Pacific as part of its ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy. China as a rising power seeks bipolar world with unipolar Asia. It considers the Asia-Pacific as sphere of influence and is aiming at diminution of US influence in the region alongside containing Japan. The stakes are rather high for the US and its allies. For DPRK, the key issue is survival of the regime.

In early May, US Defence Secretary James Mattis, in pursuant to the directions from President Trump and the Congress, formally announced ‘Ballistic Missile Defence Review’ which will address wide ranging issues related to defence policy and strategy. The review is expected to be completed by the year end. As a sequel to the above review, number of options could be on the table including deployment of additional ground based interceptors and acceleration of missile defence technology.6

Despite the mutual defence treaty, Seoul remains skeptical about Washington’s constraints to step in, should there be escalation leading to a military showdown. It has taken strategic review entailing several independent measures to scale up its defence preparedness. A sum of US $ 550 billion has been allocated towards military modernisation over next 15 years. Its defence budget for 2017 was US $ 34 billion, marking an increase of four per cent over the previous year.7 President Moon who recently won the South Korean elections advocating moderate approach towards North Korea has cautioned against high possibility of conflict with hostile neighbour due to recent rapid advances in the nuclear and missile capabilities.

Japan is deeply concerned about China’s rapid accretion of military capability and North Korea’s nuclear-cum-missile programme. Under Prime Minister Abe’s leadership, Tokyo has adopted ‘New Defence Policy Guidelines’ paving way for re-crafting of its military strategy. It removed one percent GDP cap. Japan’s defence budget for the year 2017 registered an increase of 1.4 per cent; pegged at US $ 43.8 billion.8 Mr Abe is also proactively pursuing the process to amend the nation’s pacifist constitution. Tokyo has taken pains to develop new strategic partnerships with the nations in the Asia-Pacific, while strengthen existing security alliances. In the future, trilateral cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea is likely to witness significant up swing.

China finds itself in quandary, given Kim Jong-un’s provocative behaviour and President Trump’s threat to act against DPRK with or without PRC’s cooperation. Expressing support for dialogue, it has called both the sides to exercise restraint. Chinese Foreign Minister Mr Wang Yi approached his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov on 15 April 2017, seeking Moscow’s help in preventing conflict between the US and North Korea.9 Historically, cooperation between the two on Korean crisis has been primarily in the form of multilateral framework rather than bilateral. The sudden surge in bilateral cooperation between Beijing and Moscow is driven by two factors: stringent opposition to the US military unilateral action against North Korea’s nuclear facilities and to ensure better diplomatic leverage against Pyongyang.

Chinese and Russian policy makers hold a steadfast belief that any US attempt to completely isolate North Korea from the global economic structure creates a sense of paranoia and siege mentality in Pyongyang. Sense of desperation drives Kim Jong-un to raise the pitch of nationalism and adopt provocative and belligerent stance. Since Kim Junior assumed power in 2011, North Korea has conducted 78 ballistic missile tests; the recent ones were the solid-fuelled Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) capable of reaching the US Military bases on Guam. Hence, the two advocate limited time bound sanctions in consonance with the conduct of DPRK leadership.

Rhetoric and provocative statements notwithstanding, the prudent heads in Washington are strongly in favour of diplomacy and negotiations as the best option to deal with Pyongyang, in order to bring about notion of stability in the region. It may appear unrealistic to set pre-conditions; like US calling for North Korean denuclearisation as Kim Jong-un is not going to give up his nuclear programme and conversely, DPRK seeking embargo on the US-South Korean naval drills is unacceptable to America and its allies. However, during their recent meeting at Mar-a-Lago, President Xi reportedly urged President Trump to accept ‘suspension for suspension’; essentially implying Mr Kim’s freeze on additional ICBMs tests and in response the US to postpone or modify military exercises in the region. Mr Xi even proposed that America and China consider new East Asian Security architecture.10

Ratcheting up sanctions on North Korea will prove to be an exercise in futility as the regime in Pyongyang is highly skilled at skirting these. Option of pre-emptive military strike against DPRK’s nuclear installations and missile test sites will be strongly opposed by even Japan and South Korea. Policy of confrontation over dialogue will only result in adding fuel to the fire.

Conclusion

The precarious situation in the Peninsula requires deft handling as resorting to failed policies of the past will only mean hitting the wall. This implies going beyond economic sanctions, six party talks and unilaterism. Bold initiatives like direct talks between Washington-Pyongyang coupled with China’s willingness to take the call could help avert the crisis. Given the prevailing gravity of the situation, Peninsula imbroglio merits urgent dialogue to obviate imminent conflict situation and restoration of strategic equilibrium; while resolution of this long lingering complex issue in the coming future remains a remote possibility.

Endnotes

1 Times of India, North Korea Missile Programme Progressing Faster than Expected- says South, 16 May 2017.

2 Christine Kim, South Korea Moon Says High Possibility of Conflict with North, World News, 17 May 2017.

3 Times of India, op cit.

4 Gerry Mullany, US Anti-Missile System in South Korea Said to be Nearly Operational, The Diplomat, 27 Apr 2017

5 Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/scienc/north-korea-nuclear-weapons.html/ r=0 accessed on 31 May 2017.

6 Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-05/news/missile-defence-review-begins accessed on 31 May 2017.

7 Prashanth Parameswaran, South Korea Boosts Defence Budget Amid Rising North Korean Threat, The Diplomat, 06 Dec 2016.

8 Jon Gravatt, Japan Approves Defence Budget 2017, HIS Defence Weekly, Bangkok, 22 Dec 2016.

9 Samuel Ramani, What’s Behind Sino-Russian Cooperation on North Korea, The Diplomat, 27 Apr 2017.

10 Graham Allison, Thinking the Unthinkable With North Korea, New York Times, 30 May 2017.

Doklam, China’s Strategic Calculus and India’s Policy Options

IDSA COMMENT
flags
Published by IDSA on August 11, 2017

It is almost two months since Indian and Chinese soldiers became locked in a standoff at Doklam in the Sikkim Sector. The faceoff was triggered when a team of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was prevented by Indian troops from extending a class-5 track in the Doklam Plateau area which is part of Bhutanese territory. The Indian Army acted in response to a request from the Royal Bhutan Army under the terms of the 2007 Bilateral Friendship Treaty. Moreover, the PLA’s track building is in contravention of the 2012 Agreement between the Special Representatives of India and China, whereby the status quo was required to be maintained in the said area until the resolution of the trijunction in consultation with Bhutan.

Post 1962, there have been numerous border incidences between the Indian and Chinese militaries; Nathu La in 1967 and Sumdrong Chu two decades later. In the recent past too, the Depsang Plateau and the Chumar-Demchok area witnessed face-offs in April 2013 and September 2014, respectively, with the latter intriguingly coinciding with President Xi Jinping’s visit to India. Incidentally, the current Chinese incursion in Bhutan happened around the time of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the United States.

Given the opaque Chinese system, deciphering the intent of its Communist leadership poses a real challenge. According to the eminent scholar Derek Bodde, those who deal with China are often bewildered when the actions of its leadership send mixed signals, making clear interpretation extremely difficult. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) draws from its ancient thinkers. Its actions are always deliberate, like the moves on a checker board. It is imperative to gain an insight into the Chinese psyche and decode China’s strategic calculus in order to effectively cope with its grand designs.

Decoding the Chinese Strategic Calculus

The PRC’s assertiveness around its periphery is attributable to its age old belief of a ‘subdued neighbourhood’ being an essential prerequisite for stability. In his book On China, Henry Kissinger has brought out that the PRC perceives itself to be a returning power and does not view exercising influence as unnatural. Alastair Johnson, an expert on Chinese strategic culture, has stated that there is no pacifist bias in the Chinese strategic tradition but only realpolitik. Nations are either friendly or hostile. This is why servile countries such as Pakistan and North Korea are generously rewarded, while those like India or Vietnam which counter China’s aggressive behaviour invite its wrath.

Chinese thinking since ancient times advocates mitigating a threat by eliminating it. Thus, during the period 1950-85, the PRC opted to use force eight times. When confronted with a stronger adversary, non-coercive means may be adopted as an interim expedient.

China’s grand strategy encompasses three concise objectives: safeguarding sovereignty, maintaining stability, and sustaining economic progress. Any danger to the Communist Party is perceived as an ‘existential threat’. Sovereignty implies, besides external non-interference, safeguarding core interests, control of the South China Sea, unification of Taiwan, and integration of claimed territories with the mainland including South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh). In the pursuit of these vital national interests, the use of force remains an option.

President Xi has emerged as an all-powerful leader. Designated as a ‘Core’ leader and addressed as ‘Chairman’ (Zhuxi), he is poised to join the league of Mao and Deng. During the forthcoming 19th Party Congress in November, Xi is set to consolidate his grip further. The earlier policy enunciated by Deng that China should “bide time, hide capability and not to claim leadership” has undergone a visible shift under Xi. Xi’s ‘China Dream’ envisions a ‘prosperous and powerful’ China restored to its past greatness.

In the Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP), hard power is the key component. China’s military culture lays immense emphasis on the ‘strategic configuration of power’, creating a favourable disposition of forces to obviate actual fighting. By exploiting its asymmetric edge to coerce smaller nations, China has effectively pursued the surreptitious strategy of ‘fighting and talking concurrently’ in order to extend its control over the South China Sea. China’s military doctrine of “Local Wars under Informationalised Conditions” envisages short-swift engagements to achieve political objectives. Under President Xi, the PLA is in the process of path breaking transformation to emerge as a modern military in the coming decades.

Internationally, PRC remains a lonely power. It has used diplomacy effectively to exploit differences among the adversaries to its advantage. China’s threat assessment perceives the US and Japan to be the prime security concerns, while India is seen as a potential threat. As US and Western countries yield space, China under Xi has pronounced itself as a champion of globalization and sustainable growth to fill the void. Major initiatives like the ‘Belt-Road’ and ‘Maritime Silk Road’ have been launched in a quest to shape a Sino-Centric global order.

The PRC’s action at Doklam is in consonance with its policy of intimidating smaller neighbours. Apparently, China did not anticipate India to step in. The Communist leadership is infuriated with India for abstaining from its signature projects. New Delhi’s growing proximity to Washington and Tokyo has also irked Beijing. Given its focus on the Western Pacific, the mounting tension on the Korean Peninsula, economic imperatives and internal stability concerns in the run-up to the forthcoming Party Congress, China will avoid an armed confrontation with India, despite its rhetoric. However, it will keep up the pressure militarily and pursue aggressive diplomacy to deal with the issue.

The PRC has pursued the policy of delinking complex political issues from economic ones. It enjoys strong trade linkages with the US, Japan and Taiwan, despite serious political differences. Beijing will continue with its policy of marginalising New Delhi politically in international forums, while seeking to avoid a negative economic fallout.

India’s Policy Options

In its efforts to engage China, India has followed a policy of appeasement. And its responses to PRC’s misadventures have been in the form of crisis management. To effectively cope with the PRC’s hostile attitude, India needs to evolve a pragmatic China policy centred on core national interests. Some essential facets which merit serious consideration are summarised below.

Firstly, given the PRC’s policy of asymmetric coercion, India has no option but to narrow the existing CNP gap between the two countries. Developing strategic partnerships, initiatives like ‘Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor’, ‘Act East Policy’ and counter balancing strategies are steps in the right direction.

Secondly, national security policy needs clear articulation, based on a realistic threat assessment. Apex organizational structures require streamlining to telescope the decision making process. The current format of military modernization demands a holistic review.

Thirdly, in an era of ‘limited wars’, a ‘joint military doctrine’ is a sine qua non and ‘tri service theatre commands’ are prerequisites for synergised application of the war waging potential. In the prevailing scenario, facing the PLA’s Western Theatre Command are India’s seven Army and Air Force commands, which is a serious lacuna. In short engagements, the timely application of requisite combat power at the point of decision is critical. This calls for creating essential infrastructure on highest priority.

Lastly, the border management mechanism needs to be revamped. A single nodal agency is required to coordinate the functions of the various organs. Operational control astride the Line of Actual Control ought to rest with the Army. A well calibrated response mechanism must be put in place, with disputed vulnerable areas effectively dominated and troops fully prepared to meet any eventuality. Paramilitary Forces deployed for manning the borders require urgent upgrade to match the PLA’s Border Regiments.

While many seem to know China, few understand it. In the desperation to engage the PRC, there is a tendency to lose sight of the bigger picture. Given the conflicting interests coupled with unresolved issues, relations between India and China are bound to be marked by contradictions, leading to frequent confrontations. However, through deft diplomacy, differences can be managed. While solutions to vexed problems may not be on the horizon, disputes turning into conflict can be avoided in the larger interest of both nations.

The Chinese are shrewd negotiators with tremendous stamina and penchant to sit across the table, but with equals. India must, therefore, firmly stand its ground and forthrightly safeguard its strategic interests. To deal with China on a level footing, the Indian leadership needs to make pragmatic assessments, possess the courage to accept home truths and display audacity for bold decisions.

The writer has served as Defence Attaché in China, North Korea and Mongolia; commanded a Division in the Eastern Sector; and currently is Professor of International Studies, Aligarh Muslim University.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Keywords:
India-China Relations

The People’s Liberation Army at Ninety – Poised for a ‘Great Leap’

 

IDSA COMMENT

pla-china

Published by IDSA on August 07, 2017

On 31 July 1997, the Central Hall of the China World Hotel in Beijing was all decked up to host a banquet dinner to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Military Attaché Corps was present in strength as President Jiang Zemin was to grace the occasion, being the Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body. It was a gala affair with a resounding undertone – that the military must continue to serve the Party in the finest traditions of the PLA.

The PLA traces its roots to the ‘Nanchang Uprising’ of 1 August 1927. It was on that day that the Communists led by stalwarts like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De revolted against the Nationalist Forces. In December 1929, the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened its ninth meeting for building the Party and the Army. The venue was Gutian, a town in the South West of Fujian Province. During the Conference, Mao addressed the men of the Fourth Army and clarified the role of the military as being “to chiefly serve the political ends”. From there on, the absolute control of the CPC over the Red Army became entrenched; the PLA was to be the military of the Communist Party, not of China.

The symbiotic relationship between the two most powerful organs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Party and PLA, is unique. The PLA played a key role during the revolution and its top commanders, Mao and Deng, emerged as iconic First and Second Generation leaders. It has been well represented in the Politburo and Central Committee, the apex political policy making bodies. The PLA top brass are also members of the CMC.

The PLA jumped into the Korean War in 1950, barely a year after the Communist revolution, to take on the US-led UN Forces. It fought the adversary to a stalemate, suffering over half a million casualties in the process. In 1962, it defeated the Indian Army in a limited conflict. However, the PLA performed poorly in 1979 during its bid to teach Vietnam a lesson. Thereafter, it went through sustained restructuring and modernization programmes as Defence was one of the’ Four Modernizations’ enunciated by Deng to transform China. However, until recently, the process lacked strategic direction.

Military reforms have been high on President Xi’s agenda since he assumed power four years back. The sense of urgency could be attributed to geopolitical considerations like the US policy of rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific Region. The reform process commenced in 2013 with the establishment of the National Security Commission (NSC), with the President as its Chairman. The rationale behind the reforms is twofold; prepare the military for China’s expanding global role, and establish the Party’s firm control over the armed forces. Interestingly, on 30 October 2014, Xi Jinping visited Gutian to address a ‘Military Political Work Conference’. In his speech, he reiterated that “PLA still remains Party’s Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters”; exactly what Mao had asserted 85 years earlier.

Thrust of Current Military Reforms

The Chinese military strategic culture believes in exploiting the ‘strategic configuration of power’ to achieve the given objectives. The aim is not annihilation of the adversary but the deployment of resources to gain a position of advantage so that fighting becomes unnecessary. China’s present military doctrine of ‘Local Wars under Informationalised Conditions’ envisages short, swift, military engagements by leveraging technology to achieve political objectives. Joint operations and integrated logistics are essential components of the new doctrine. The current military reforms are doctrine driven and oriented towards capability building and force projection. President Xi has stressed upon the importance of the military adapting to an era of Information based wars.

The theme of China’s ‘Ninth White Paper on National Defence’ published in May 2015 was “Active Defence” with the focus on winning ‘local wars in conditions of modern technology’. It also heralded a major shift in naval strategy from ‘off shore waters defence’ to a combined strategy of ‘offshore waters defence with open sea protection’.

Overall, the main thrust of military reforms is on revamping the systems and structures across the board, i.e., political, strategic and operational levels. At the macro level, the focus is on civil-military integration, jointness and optimisation. The composition of the CMC has been balanced out to remove the previous bias towards the ground forces. The CMC is now responsible for policy formulation, controlling all military assets and higher direction of war. The PLA’s erstwhile four key departments have been replaced by 15 offices/departments, fully integrated into the enlarged CMC, thus ensuring centralised control at the highest level. In the new command structure, the President as the Commander-in-Chief exercises direct operational control over the military through the ‘Joint Operations Center’. Three additional Headquarters, namely Ground Forces, Rocket Force and Strategic Force, have been created.

At the operational level, the erstwhile 17-odd army, air force and naval commands have been reorganized into five ‘theatre commands’ with all the war fighting resources in each command placed under one commander. This will ensure seamless synergy in deploying land, air, naval and strategic assets in a given theatre. In all, 84 corps level organizations have been created including 13 operational corps as well as training and logistics installations. To make the PLA nimbler, the reduction of 300,000 rank and file, mostly from non-combat positions, has been ordered. This will downsize the military to around 1.8 million.

President Xi reviewed an impressive parade at Zhurihe, a newly created training base in Inner Mongolia on 30 July 2017 to mark the PLA’s 90th Anniversary. He exhorted the troops to- “unwaveringly uphold the principle of absolute party leadership of the military, always obey and follow the Party”. The Supreme Commander also spelt out three core tenets for a strong military; confidence, competence and commitment. The mega event served multiple objectives. For the domestic audience, it vindicated the dictum ‘party rules the gun’, projected President Xi as the ‘core’ and ‘Chairman’ (Zhuxi)- in the same league as Mao and Deng, and assured the public of the PLA’s capacity to defeat any threat to national sovereignty. For the international community, it was a demonstration of power projection capability.

Implications

The ongoing reforms in the Chinese Armed Forces are perhaps the biggest military shake up in a generation. Envisaged to be in place before President Xi’s term ends in 2022, the accretion in the war waging potential of the Chinese military will have serious ramifications at both the regional and global levels. While the Communist leadership asserts that the PRC’s rise is peaceful, this is being viewed by neighbouring countries with scepticism because of the former’s assertive conduct in pursuit of national objectives and territorial claims.

For India, the complexity of its relations with China, coupled with an unsettled border, is leading to a pattern of frequent face offs between the two militaries. The PLA’s rapidly increasing capability as well as offensive design are a reality which cannot be wished away. Currently, the structure of India’s higher defence organization is service specific, lacking integration and jointness. The country is yet to formulate a comprehensive ‘limited war’ doctrine. Due to bureaucratic gridlock, the decision making loop is tenuous. In operational terms, seven odd army and air force commands face China’s Western Theatre Command. This configuration will pose enormous coordination challenges in the event of a conflict. While the probability of a major conflict between the two countries remains low, local skirmishes cannot be ruled out, especially in the event of incursions by the PLA in the disputed areas. As limited engagements demand speedy deployment and a flatter logistics chain, inadequate infrastructure in the border areas stands out as a major constraint for India. These shortcomings need to be addressed on priority.

Since 1979, China has not engaged in any major military confrontation. However, it has cleverly pursued the strategy of “nibbling and negotiating” (yi bian tan yi bian da – talking and fighting concurrently). This low cost model in the form of stand-offs like at Doklam or confrontation in the South China Sea are likely to be the new normal. For the realisation of Xi’s ‘China Dream’, Beijing does not have the luxury of indulging in a major conflict.

Coincidently, at present, China faces no external threats unless it creates one. Its main security concerns are more internal; namely economic slowdown, corruption, environmental degradation and the diminishing clout of the CPC. To ensure the CPC’s unchallenged hold, the PLA’s identity as the military of the Party needs to remain sacrosanct. The envisaged process of PLA transformation will be a long drawn out one. It will take some time before the Chinese Armed Forces can claim to be a modern military, at par with Western armies, capable of undertaking extended global missions. No doubt, the PLA is poised for a “Giant Leap”, and that is bound to dramatically change the existing ‘balance of power’ dynamics.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Keywords:
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
China

China won’t go for an all out war, says ex-Army officer

 

2017_7$largeimg28_Friday_2017_020315135 (1)

Published in Tribune, Jalandhar on July 27

Having served with the Army at the Indo-China border for seven years and remained India’s Defence attache in China for three years, Major General (retd) GG Dwivedi is of the strong view that China is just trying to browbeat India and that it will not go for an all out war. Being the co-author of a book on Indo-China war and knowing the Chinese psyche and political scenario well, Maj Gen Dwivedi cites five reasons, “The stability of China depends on economy. Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power on an assurance of providing a prosperous and powerful environment which he has to maintain. A war can destabilise the Chinese government and if the communists he represents go out of power, the changeover will be violent and Xi might even be jailed. China is only a bully. It won’t act as the Communist Party has even announced its annual congress in October. Also, the main issue as of now is over constructing 4 to 5 km of road. Hell won’t break loose if this road is not completed. So, even the stakes are not high for a war to be waged.” Interacting at KMV College campus here (he is the husband of college principal Dr Atima Sharma Dwivedi), Maj Gen Dwivedi holds a view contrary to various organisations seeking a ban on Chinese products. “Our country’s traders want the cheapest products for a good sale. We must understand that economic interests are different from the political ones. Being a professor at Aligarh University, I know how the Chinese locks have thrown the local locks of Aligarh out of market. Their special economic zones (SEZ) are as big as the whole of Jalandhar. We must also realise that the private sector is not under the government. Even if the government intends to ban China-made items, these would be smuggled to India. Even if we increase the duty on Chinese products to discourage their import, there will be a way. These items will start flowing in through Dubai. For the same reason, our Indo-China sports events are continuing to take place. We must realise that 4Cs – cooperation, competition, confrontation and conflict – go on simultaneously.” Giving a clear perception on various issues, he said, “Our President is only for giving a salute. The Chinese President is an operation commander. They do not have the MoD and their Defence Minister is a serving General. So, there is no dichotomy between the political aims and the military strategy, which remains an issue with India.” Discussing the reason over the sharp rhetoric coming from the Chinese side, the Army officer, who retired in 2009, said, “Unlike our media which is free, the Chinese media is controlled by the government. They use various people including the university authorities as their mouthpiece. That is why, they seem to be more assertive.” Comparing China with India, the Armyman-turned-professor says, “They are geographically at least three times bigger than us. We have a 2.2 trillion economy while theirs is 11 trillion. With a trade of 4 trillion, they are well ahead of us. They also have a 2.2 million strong military but that does not mean that we cannot defend ourselves. We can turn the tables if we align with the US and Japan, with whom we have good relations. Our relations with Bhutan is also strategically very important for us.” The retired Army officer has served at the Chinese border in his capacity as a Division Commander for two years, as Battalion Commander for three years and as a young officer for two years. Besides, he has done his double MPhil on China and the Asia-Pacific. He has also co-authored a book, “1962 war: A view from the other side”.

Spice of life | A pair of balloons that made the day for us Devoid of any support, always on the edge, these resilient footpath entrepreneurs are an epitome of the human will to survive

Delhi-NCR

A child selling balloons at sector 34-35 light point, Chandigarh.(Karun Sharma/HT)

Interactive sessions for the executive MBA programme at a leading business school in Delhi are organised on the weekends. The entrepreneurship course, part of the last semester was assigned to me as a visiting professor; the classes scheduled for the latter half of the day. After three hours of an intense session, it was usual for all of us to walk out together, discussing our plans for the evening.

On one such occasion, after finishing the class, I hotfooted to the parking in a tearing hurry. I had to rush home as my wife was anxiously waiting for me. In fact both of us excited like kids, were eagerly looking forward to pick up a surprise gift from our son. The sales team at the Mercedes showroom had given an assurance that they will drop shutters only after delivering the car to us.

Speeding out of the institute campus, once on the main road I found myself amid a chaotic jam. While quite at home with Delhi-NCR traffic woes, I wondered why it had to be this day! The timing couldn’t have been worse. The lanes were chock-a-block. Stuck at a traffic signal, utterly helpless, I felt suffocated.

As I rolled down the glass to feel the breeze, the sight of an elderly woman perched on the divider caught my eyes. She was deeply engrossed in inflating the balloons. Unmindful of the inclement weather, her frail arm moved in a rhythmic motion, pumping air while with the other hand she held the nozzle to the tip of the balloon. Knotted fingers artistically sealing the neck of the balloon and inflated ones deftly secured under the folded knees were unmistakable signs that she was adept at the trade. Soon, two cheerful girls in their early teens, possibly the old lady’s grandchildren collected the inflated balloons and were gently tapping at car windows to sell the product.

Overpowered by a sudden surge of emotions, I turned off the ignition and reached out to the old lady with a Rs 100 bill. Tagged at Rs 10 a piece, I picked up two balloons and asked her to keep the rest as an incentive. Taking a deep breath, with a visible sense of pride she murmured, “Hum kama kar khaten hain, mangkar nahin (We earn our living but don’t beg)”.

I was overwhelmed by her attitude, steadfast in the face of abject poverty. As the traffic began to inch forward, I hurriedly jumped into the car with the pair of balloons. Late in the evening when I made it home, the balloons proved to be a blessing in disguise in cheering up my wife and adding colour to the beige interiors of our new car.

The following week, I began the class with balloons in my hand, recasting last week’s narrative. Resilience and carpe diem or ‘seize the day’; the essence of entrepreneurial philosophy couldn’t have been better explained.

Devoid of any support, always on the edge, these footpath entrepreneurs are an epitome of the human will to survive. The flame of indomitable spirit of fellow countrymen needs to be nurtured passionately. Fortunate among us can pitch in. A symbolic gesture of buying a pair of balloons can make their day; a family meal with dignity.

(The writer teaches at Aligarh Muslim University)

govinddwivedi999@gmail.com

China’s Dam Building Spree in Tibet: Strategic Implications and India’s Options

Recent reports have pointed to China blocking the Xiabuqu tributary of the Yarlung Zangpo River (Tibetan name for Brahmaputra) for a dam project. The 195-km long Xiabuqu originates at Bainang and joins the Brahmaputra at Xigaze, close to Sikkim. The construction of the dam as part of the Lalho hydroelectric project at Xigaze reportedly began in June 2014 and is expected to be completed by 2019.

The project has been viewed with concern in India, which is a lower riparian state. The Yarlung Zangpo flows 1625 kms in Tibet before entering Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang. Further down, after confluence with the Dibang and Lohit, it is known as the Brahmaputra. In Bangladesh, it merges with the Ganga and empties into the Bay of Bengal.

China has tried to allay India’s apprehensions by stating that the project is not designed to hold water. It further claims that the Xiabuqu’s mean discharge volume is barely 0.02 per cent of the Brahmaputra’s average annual trans- boundary discharge, which latter is estimated at 142.37 cubic km. Earlier, Beijing had vehemently denied undertaking any dam construction activities on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. It was only in 2010 that the then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi formally acknowledged the construction of the Zangmu dam.

China’s closed door political system is shrouded in secrecy, leading to trust deficit. In the absence of an effective water sharing mechanism, the construction of the dam on the Xiabuqu could emerge as another irritant between India and China. Beijing’s elaborate plans to harness the waters of the rivers in Tibet have serious strategic and socio-economic implications for India.

China’s Grand Design
China’s water resources are unevenly distributed. The better developed northern region, home to 42 per cent of the country’s population, contains only 14 per cent of its fresh water. The agrarian South, which is comparatively less developed, is water surplus with a 86 per cent share of the country’s total fresh water. Over the years, industrial and domestic usage of water in China has increased significantly. As a result, Beijing has taken recourse to dam construction and water diversion to sustain economic growth.

The Tibet plateau has enormous strategic significance due to its rich water resources. Its 100,000 sq. km. surface is covered by glaciers that feed a number of river systems in South and South East Asia. The major Chinese rivers, Yangtze and Huang He, originate from the plateau. The Indus and Sutlej that flow through India also have their origin in Tibet. And the Salween and Mekong rivers, which also originate in Tibet, traverse through Indo-China.

China, as the largest consumer of energy, plans to double its current electricity generation capacity to 430,000 MW in the next couple of years. To reduce carbon emissions, Beijing aims to enhance the proportion of non-fossil fuel usage to 15 per cent by 2020. According to the Chinese Academy of Science, the hydroelectric power generation capacity of the Yarlung Zangpo basin is around 114,000 MW. The Chinese are in the process of constructing 36 dams on the rivers and tributaries in Tibet.

To tide over existing water and energy shortages, China has adopted a multi- pronged strategy. The Three Gorges project on the Yangtze generates 18,000 MW of electricity and has enabled the transfer of water to the northern regions. Another project underway is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), which entails diverting the waters of the Yangtze to augment the capacity of the Huang He.

In Tibet, the Chinese dam building spree on the Brahmaputra includes the 510 MW dam at Zangmu, which was completed in 2015. Under the ‘New Energy Development Plan-2015’, the Chinese cabinet has approved the construction of three more dams on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra. Two of these dams, Dagu (640 MW) and Jiexu (capacity unconfirmed), are 18 and 11 kms, respectively, upstream of the Zangmu. The third at Jiacha (340 MW) is downstream.

However, it is the northward rerouting of waters under the ‘Great Western Route Water Transfer Project’ that is of serious concern to India. The proposal involves the construction of a mega dam (38,000 MW capacity) at Namcha Barwa, where the Brahmaputra makes a steep loop before entering India. While initially the project is for power generation, subsequent plans are to divert water up to 200 bcm for irrigating the deserts of Xinjiang, Gansu and Inner Mongolia. Due to the requirement of major tunnelling effort, for the time being, the project is on hold. However, the Chinese have proven expertise in executing highly complex engineering ventures.

The Chinese are also in the process of constructing about a dozen dams on the Salween (Nu) in Tibet and Yunnan. Six mammoth dam projects on the Mekong are also in the pipeline.

Strategic Implications
Dams over the Yarlung Zangpo, even if these are ‘run of river’ projects, provide China the ability to control the flow of water in the Brahmaputra. An accidental or emergent outflow from these dams could prove catastrophic. Cases in point in this regard are: the sudden rise of water in the Siang in 2000, which resulted in the death of 26 people; and, the Pareechu episode in 2005, which led to flash floods in the Sutlej causing extensive damage.

In case China pursues the option of diverting the waters of the Brahmaputra, the consequences could be wide ranging. It could seriously affect the navigability of National Waterway-2 – the 890 km stretch from Sadiya to Dhubri – given the requirement of maintaining a minimum depth of 1.5 metres from Sadiya to Dibrugarh and 2 metres beyond that. Even ‘run of river’ projects are not benign. When water held back in pondage is released for the turbines to operate, it results in diurnal variation in the downstream flow. That, in turn, is likely to seriously impact India’s efforts to exploit the hydro potential of the region. Moreover, any disturbance in the existing ecological environment will have an adverse effect on the densely populated Brahmaputra Valley.

To counter the Chinese grand design of ‘stealing the rivers’, India has planned to construct 76 dams with an estimated capacity of 36,900 MW, taking advantage of the ‘UN advisory on the river water dispute’, whereby a downstream riparian state can ensure ‘first user right’ on the international rivers by building dams. Of these, the 44 dams on the Siang are expected to generate 18,293 MW of hydro power. But very little progress has been made on these dam projects due to numerous factors: inefficient official machinery, allegations of corruption and kickbacks, influential activist bodies opposing the construction of the dams on the pretext of environment degradation, and technical glitches, to name a few.

While China as an upper riparian state enjoys ‘restricted territorial sovereignty’ as per international law, it also has an obligation to protect the interests of lower riparian nations. Currently, there is no arrangement between India and China on water sharing. In a recent article carried by the state-run Global Times, China had expressed willingness to have multilateral cooperation with India and Bangladesh to share waters. Retracting this two days later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official spokesperson went on to state that effective cooperation regarding sharing data on the flow of rivers already existed.

India’s Options
India needs to address the issue of water sharing with China in a comprehensive manner. New Delhi must garner the support of other affected nations – Bangladesh and Bhutan, besides Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam – to build consensus with the aim of dissuading China from going ahead with the planned projects in Tibet. There is an urgent need to formulate a national policy that factors in both the strategic and legal dimensions. Besides, the constitution of a body of experts would go a long way in addressing the issue in its entirety.

In the emerging geopolitical scenario, water and energy security are critical for China to realise its global aspirations. In pursuit of national interests, the Communist Party’s leadership approach is characterised by assertiveness and unilateralism. Therefore, instead of adopting a policy of appeasement, New Delhi must forcefully take up its concerns with Beijing. It is only through persistence that a formal framework for a water sharing mechanism with China can be evolved. To this end, strong political will combined with crafty diplomacy appears to be the best option.

The author is a former Assistant Chief Integrated Staff. He has served as Defence Attaché in China. He is currently Professor Security & Strategic Studies at Aligarh Muslim University.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Published by Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses
www.idsa.in

Make it unsustainable for Pak

image1

After repeated unsuccessful attempts to take on India in conventional conflicts, Pakistan shifted to waging a ‘proxy war’. The mainstay of its doctrine has been to employ irregulars, non-state actors (NSAs) to bleed India in a ‘low intensity war’. Pakistan mastered this art in Afghanistan where it supported the Mujahedeen to defeat the Soviets at the behest of the US.
Proxy War
Since 1989, Pakistan has been actively involved in fuelling militancy in Kashmir. Ironically, Indian retaliation to terrorist actions has been incidence-specific, and has lacked a holistic approach. September 29, 2016, marked the first time when Indian military response became a part of a well thought-out national strategy in the form of surgical strikes across the LoC.
Surgical strikes are well-planned, bold military actions against specific target(s), executed with precision, by specialised forces, to inflict maximum destruction, with minimal collateral damage. Such tactical actions have strategic ramifications; may be executed from ground, air or sea. These military responses require careful selection of objectives aligned with overall strategy, accurate real-time intelligence, seamless coordination amongst various agencies and fine timing. Surprise is most crucial element, a vital prerequisite for success.
The destruction of Iraqi Osirak reactor by Israeli air raid in 1981, employment of Tomahawk cruise missiles in the Gulf wars, the use of armed drones and elimination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 by the US Navy Seals in Abbottabad are classic examples of surgical strikes.
The recent operations undertaken by the Army should be viewed as the military component of calibrated national response; which includes politico-diplomatic- economic dimensions. Some salient aspects with regards above surgical strike are:
The selected targets were known terrorist launch pads in POK. Located in the close proximity of the Pak Army posts astride the LoC, these act as staging areas where terrorists in small groups wait for a short period before crossing over. Launch pads are makeshift shelters and can relocate at a short notice. These were kept under close surveillance both from ground and air, to facilitate accurate target analysis.
The planning for such operations is done simultaneously at both strategic and operational levels. While it is a political decision to assign the task, the prerogative is of the field commanders to work out the plans and execute the mission. This was the format followed by the government in the run-up to the recent operation.
The troops selected for execution of the task were from the Special Forces who are attached to the Northern Theatre. They are highly trained, well-rehearsed and equipped with state-of the-art weapons, with capability to operate in all-weather conditions at a short notice. They operate in teams, with strength varying according to a task. For the above operations, a team was tasked for each target, with strength around of 30.
Execution of the surgical strike by the ground forces has three phases; insertion of force, conduct of strike and exfiltration. In this case, the strike force was heli- lifted to the forward bases during the day. Insertion was on foot in the hours of darkness. All the objectives were engaged simultaneously, well past midnight. The exfiltration had to be speedy, during the hours of darkness to avoid immediate enemy reactions.
Detailed coordination with units and formations deployed on the LoC is critical, especially during the insertion and exfiltration phases.
Surgical strike by Indian Army across LoC is a manifestation of well calibrated national response to Pakistan with a clear message; there is a penalty to be paid if Islamabad does not mend its ways. India should be well prepared to blunt Pak retaliation, which could be by way of upping the ante astride the LoC and scaling up the terrorist activities in the hinterland. It is also time to expose its hollow nuclear bogey.
Delhi has taken the call, projecting itself as a responsible and resilient nation, capable of not only safeguarding its own security but a stabilizing factor in the region at large. Diverse options including calibrated military responses are the only way to make Pakistan misadventures unsustainable and cost-prohibitive.
(The writer is former Assistant Chief Integrated Defence Staff, commanded Brigade in Valley; currently Professor Security & Strategy)
Published in The Tribune on Oct 2, 2016

Why you stand alone, o’ the bravest of all

When the impending mission foretells ‘of course, you will come home to keep date with loved ones, though maybe wrapped in the national flag’, there is no panic or regret, only calm acceptance of reality, the preordained destiny. After all, didn’t you yearn for it – “Dil maange more.” At these defining moments, count yourself to be blessed, the chosen one.
While the intellectuals engage in fiery debates to define the contours of nationalism and patriotism, and peers in the academia are raring to start the second freedom movement, you, barely in the early twenties, remain level-headed. Given the steely resolve, unflinching conviction and spirit of sacrifice, you are ever-ready to face the unforeseen eventualities to safeguard the country’s sovereignty. You make a rare case study for the motivational gurus.
It is in mid teens that you made up your mind to join the National Defence Academy (NDA). What drove you to make this choice out of the many you had? Passion, of course. You made the cut after a tough selection process; one of the 300-odd among a few lakh aspirants. Selected on pure merit without having to use quota, you held your head high. You got a level playing field, where your only identity was ‘a proud Indian’.
Once in the academy, you train to be a leader; to lead the men with courage and élan. The ethos “nation, mission, team, self” in the given order get engrained in your DNA. To deliver under the heaviest odds at any cost becomes the norm. After a gruelling three-year training, you graduate with a bachelor’s degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), followed by a year at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), where you earn the spurs of a battle-ready sub-unit commander.
Many have the honour to open the account straight on the battlefield; although some may not be fortunate to draw the first paycheque. A case in point – our 39 NDA/48 IMA course, baptised on Day One itself, in the 1971 war. Leading upfront, inspiring the men, you vindicate what general George Patton had said famously: “Wars are fought with weapons but won by men; the spirit of those who follow and the one who leads is what decides victory.”
Your operational bandwidth is almost seamless; varying from conventional to “low-intensity” conflicts; entails combating insurgency, militancy. and terrorism, besides taking aid and relief to the stranded during natural or manmade calamities. You are always there to take the call, without qualms, true for the last hope in catastrophic situations.
Despite being short changed by the system routinely, you take it silently, not making any hue and cry. Your grace and decorum in the fight is an example. Soldiering is not transactional, as life is beyond compensation. You tread on the thin edge, live to fight another day, get up again after every fall, accept the challenges, and make do with whatever available. You have earned universal respect as a hardcore professional.
Unmindful of what the nation or society owes to its soldiers, you carry on regardless. Fired up by the missionary zeal, you not only preserve the legacy of the likes of Vikram Batra and Manoj Pandey but enrich it further. Pawan and Tushar, latest in the line-up of martyrs, bear the testimony. It’s a pride to be the nation’s flag-bearer and to keep the flame of freedom glowing.
Often you defy death and sometimes cheat it. You are the real winner, selfless in letter and spirit. The kith and kin honour your perspective of family, which transcends the bonds of blood and lineage. This is why among the billion odd, you are miniscule minority that demands no special status, because you choose to stand alone.

Maj Gen GG Dwivedi (retd), Hindustan Times, Chandigarh

Those frozen moments at Siachen

In Siachen, it was not unusual to lose track of time. Amidst spells of snow storms and blizzards which could stretch up to 10 days, it didn’t matter at what pace the clock ticked. The days were defined either by weather or hostile activity.

The assigned mission was rather crisp: ‘To ensure sanctity of the Actual Ground Position Line.’ However, with deployment on forward defence line varying from 18,000 to 21,000 feet and the mercury hovering around minus 45 degrees Celsius, the challenges were enormous. Two most critical ones were: maintain moral ascendency over the adversary and keep own casualties to the minimal. Weather-related casualties being almost four times the ones attributable to enemy fire; avoiding high-altitude illness and cold injuries were the key imperatives. The crux was: ‘to stick it out and be fit to fight another day’.

When we began induction into the Northern Glacier, I, as commanding officer, sensed some degree of scepticism in certain quarters on the ability of a Jat unit to deliver in such environment, being from the plains. Soon the doubts were put to rest as the senior commanders and dignitaries found the men operating like the mountain goats, amidst fierce fire assaults, taking heavy toll of the enemy. Six months down the line, with just two casualties, the battalion went on to demolish the myth of holding Siachen being cost-prohibitive in terms of human life. As a sequel to the defence minister’s visit, the Siachen allowance was increased from ` 400 to ` 900.

Coincidentally, Sundays proved to be at odds. Starting with my own ice shelter going up in flames on the very first Sunday, twin helicopter accidents, frequent enemy’s grab actions and numerous hostile activities had a date with Sunday. September began on a dull note with weather turning extremely fowl. After a week, it was on Sunday that the sky opened up and air maintenance resumed.

In the evening, as we were planning future operations, I was informed that my father was serious. An hour later, there was call from the Base Camp breaking the news of his demise. Overpowered by deep sense of loss and intense mental agony, I decided to take a short walk. As I stepped out of my ice shelter, I saw one of my men waiting to see me. He had received intimation through a letter that his father had expired a week back and the family was awaiting his arrival for performing the last rites, he being an only son. With both my brothers abroad, my situation was no different. Together, amidst icy solitude, we shared our moment of grief.

In the battle zone, camaraderie is the hallmark. Next day, my course mate, who was commanding a helicopter unit in the sector personally flew in to pick me up, so that I could catch the courier flight to Chandigarh. I insisted that the aggrieved jawan also be taken on board, which he obliged, despite load restrictions. Soon, we were back on the line of duty to continue with our mission.

Siachen has the unique distinction of being the toughest battlefield in the world, as no other army has ever fought in such environment. Those who have slugged it out and stood their ground, unmindful of personal losses, have one common trait: indomitable spirit, far surpassing the bounds of human limits. A tragedy in Siachen brings alive the frozen moments, even quarter of century later: a mark of tribute to all those who go down in the finest traditions, leaving a legacy for posterity to emulate. The nation’s indebtedness to the bravehearts needs to transcend beyond platitudes and rhetoric.

Published in Hindustan Times, Chandigarh on  March 06, 2016

 Maj Gen GG Dwiwedi (retd),  The writer is former Assistant Chief Integrated Defence Staff